San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 04-17554.

• Decision Date: 08 March 2007
• Docket Number: No. 04-17554.,No. 05-15051.,04-17554.,05-15051.
• Citation: 481 F.3d 700
• Parties: SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER; Citizens Committee to Complete the Refuge; Michael R. Lozeau, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CARGILL SALT DIVISION; Cargill Inc., Defendants-Appellants. San Francisco Baykeeper; Citizens Committee to Complete the Refuge, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Michael R. Lozeau, Plaintiff, v. Cargill Salt Division; Cargill Inc., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

481 F.3d 700

SAN FRANCISCO BAYKEEPER; Citizens Committee to Complete the Refuge; Michael R. Lozeau, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CARGILL SALT DIVISION; Cargill Inc., Defendants-Appellants.

San Francisco Baykeeper; Citizens Committee to Complete the Refuge, Plaintiffs-Appellants, and Michael R. Lozeau, Plaintiff, v. Cargill Salt Division; Cargill Inc., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 04-17554.

No. 05-15051.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted September 27, 2006.

Filed March 8, 2007.

John F. Barg, Barg, Coffin, Lewis & Trapp, LLP, San Francisco, CA; Sandi L. Nichols, Stoel Rives LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.

Daniel Purcell, Keker & Van Nest, LLP, San Francisco, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellees-cross-appellants.

Gregory T. Broderick, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, CA; Scott M. DuBoff, Wright & Talisman, PC, Washington, D.C.; Virginia S. Albrecht, Hunton & Williams, LLP, Washington, D.C.; James Murphy, National Wildlife Federation, Montpelier, VT; Katherine J. Barton, United States Department of Justice, Environment & Natural Resources Division, Washington, D.C., for the amici curiae.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California Susan Yvonne Illston, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. Nos. CV-96-02161-SI.

Before CANBY, HAWKINS, and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

CANBY, Circuit Judge.

San Francisco Baykeeper and Citizens Committee to Complete the Refuge (collectively "Baykeeper") filed this citizen suit under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., ("CWA" or "the Act") against Cargill Salt Division and Cargill, Incorporated (collectively "Cargill"). Baykeeper alleged that Cargill discharged pollutants into "waters of the United States" without a permit. The body of water into which Cargill allegedly discharged waste is a non-navigable, intrastate pond ("the Pond"), not determined to be a "wetland," that collects polluted runoff within Cargill's waste containment facility located near the southeastern edge of San Francisco Bay. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Baykeeper after determining that the Pond qualifies as a "water[ ] of the United States" because it is adjacent to a protected water of the United States (Mowry Slough). Cargill then brought this appeal. Because we conclude that mere adjacency provides a basis for CWA coverage only when the relevant waterbody is a "wetland," and no other reason for CWA coverage of Cargill's Pond is supported by evidence or is properly before us, we reverse the district court's summary judgment.

Background

Cargill and its predecessors have conducted salt-making operations at the edge of San Francisco Bay, in Alameda County, California, since the 1860's. In 1979, the United States acquired some 15,000 acres of Cargill's lands for inclusion in the Don Edwards San Francisco Bay Wildlife Refuge ("the Refuge"). Cargill retained an easement over 12,000 acres that permits it to continue its salt-making operation.

Cargill produces salt by evaporating water from the Bay in a series of ponds. The harvesting and refinement of the salt results in the production of waste residue that is heavily saline and contains other pollutants. Cargill maintains within the Refuge a 17-acre waste containment facility that it uses for disposal of salt-processing residue. The northern portion of the disposal site (the "upper elevation") contains a pile of uncovered waste several acres in size ("the Pile"). During storms, rainwater carries residue from the upper elevation (including the Pile) to the southern portion of the site (the "lower elevation") where it drains into the non-navigable Pond. An earthen levee separates the southern edge of the Pond from Mowry Slough, a navigable tributary of San Francisco Bay. The parties agree that Mowry Slough is a "water[ ] of the United States."

The horizontal distance between the edge of the Slough and the edge of the Pond varies considerably depending on the tide. At low tide, the Pond and the Slough are separated by as much as 125 feet, including the surrounding wetlands. At high tide, however, Slough water inundates the wetlands up to the levee and has, on some occasions, overtopped the levee and flowed into the Pond. While there is no evidence in the record that liquid has ever flowed from the Pond to the Slough, the district court made no specific rulings on that issue. Cargill from time to time pumps waste water away from the Pond to prevent the level of the Pond from approaching the top of the levee.

In 1996, Baykeeper filed a citizen suit pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365 against Cargill, stating various claims under the CWA arising from Cargill's alleged unpermitted discharge of pollution into "waters of the United States" (the Pond). From the beginning, the parties have disputed whether the Pond is within the coverage of the CWA.

In its first motion for summary judgment, Baykeeper alleged that the Pond is a "water[ ] of the United States" under the "Migratory Bird Rule" of the Environmental Protection Agency ("the EPA"), 53 Fed.Reg. 20,764, 20,765 (June 6, 1988), because it is used intermittently as habitat by migratory birds. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Baykeeper on two claims.¹ While appeals were pending here, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), 531 U.S. 159, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001), holding that the identical Migratory Bird Rule of the Army Corps of Engineers ("the Corps"), when applied to isolated intrastate waters, exceeded the Corps' authority under the CWA. Id. at 174, 121 S.Ct. 675. In light of SWANCC, we vacated the district court's summary judgment and remanded for consideration of whether alternative grounds exist for CWA jurisdiction. San Francisco Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 263 F.3d 963 (9th Cir.2001).

On remand, Baykeeper again moved for summary judgment, this time advancing the theory that the Pond is a "water[ ] of the United States" because it is adjacent to Mowry Slough. Cargill opposed the motion, arguing that, under controlling regulations, adjacency provides a basis for CWA coverage only in the case of wetlands. Baykeeper has apparently never argued or presented evidence that the Pond qualifies as a "wetland" under the applicable regulatory definition. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2006).

The district court granted summary judgment a second time in favor of Baykeeper after determining that "bodies of water that are adjacent to navigable waters are `waters of the United States' and are therefore protected under the Clean Water Act." Noting that adjacent wetlands qualify for CWA protection under the applicable regulations and Supreme Court precedent, the court reasoned that "the same characteristics that justif[y] protection of adjacent wetlands . . . apply as well to adjacent ponds." In support of its determination that the Pond is a water of the United States, the district court found as undisputed facts that: (1) "the Pond was adjacent to Mowry Slough at the time that the suit was filed"; (2) "the soils between the Pond and Mowry Slough are saturated"; and (3) "the berm between the Pond and Mowry Slough leaked and allowed Slough water to enter the Pond at high tide."²

The parties subsequently entered into a settlement agreement setting forth potential remedies contingent on further proceedings, and preserving the right to appeal certain issues (including the district court's finding of CWA jurisdiction based on adjacency). As part of the agreement, Baykeeper waived the right "now or in the future" to assert "any theories of CWA jurisdiction over the Site (including the Pond), other than the Adjacent Waters Theory upon which the District Court based its Jurisdictional Ruling." The district court issued a final judgment incorporating the terms of the settlement agreement, and this appeal followed.

Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment that the Pond is a "water[ ] of the United States." Baccarat Fremont Developers, LLC v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 425 F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005).

Discussion

We conclude that the district court improperly expanded the regulatory definition of "waters of the United States" when it held that bodies of water that are adjacent to navigable waters are subject to the CWA by reason of that adjacency. Our conclusion is based on the CWA, the regulations promulgated by the agencies responsible for administering it, and the decisions of the Supreme Court addressing the reach of the Act and its regulations.

Congress passed the CWA in 1972 "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 86 Stat. 816, codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). One of its principal provisions prohibits the unpermitted discharge of pollutants into "navigable waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The term "navigable waters" is defined elsewhere in the Act to mean "waters of the United States." Id. § 1362(7).

By not defining further the meaning of "waters of the United States," Congress implicitly delegated policy-making authority to the EPA and the Corps, the agencies charged with the CWA's administration. See Chevron, USA Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (holding that congressional delegation to an agency may be implicit).³ Although the Corps initially construed the Act to cover only waters navigable-in-fact, the Corps and the EPA have since issued nearly identical regulations expanding the definition of "waters of the United States" to include some intrastate waterbodies that are not navigable in the traditional sense.⁴

As relevant here, current regulations protect not only navigable-in-fact waters but also tributaries...