Manson v. Edwards

• Citation: 482 F.2d 1076
• Decision Date: 12 July 1973
• Docket Number: No. 73-1025.,73-1025.
• Parties: Marc David Manson et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George C. EDWARDS, Clerk for the City of Detroit, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

482 F.2d 1076 (1973)

Marc David Manson et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. George C. EDWARDS, Clerk for the City of Detroit, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 73-1025.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 19, 1973.

Decided July 12, 1973.

Robert Reese, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., for appellants; Michael M. Glusac, Corp. Counsel, Detroit, Mich., on brief.

Richard A. Soble, Detroit, Mich., for appellees; Goodman, Eden, Millender, Goodman & Bedrosian, Detroit, Mich., on brief.

Before PHILLIPS, Chief Judge, CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge, and LAMBROS,^* District Judge.

PHILLIPS, Chief Judge.

A minimum age of twenty-five years for the office of City Councilman is prescribed by the Charter of the City of Detroit.¹ This suit challenges that restriction as violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In an opinion published at 345 F.Supp. 719 (E.D.Mich.1972) the District Court found the challenged charter provision to be unconstitutional. The District Judge held that the restriction could not withstand the scrutiny of the equal protection clause, because the City was unable to demonstrate a compelling state interest in its support. The City appeals. We reverse and remand for the reasons hereinafter set forth.

Marc David Manson, a twenty-one year old registered voter, attempted to file as a candidate for the office of Councilman. The City Clerk refused to accept Manson's petition or to place his name on the ballot because he failed to qualify for the minimum age prescribed by the City Charter.

Thereafter this suit was filed by Manson and three registered voters who alleged a desire to vote for him, charging a denial of equal protection.

The threshold question is whether the age restriction should be examined under the traditional rational basis test or whether there are exceptional circumstances in the present case requiring application of the more strict compelling state interest test.

The Fourteenth Amendment does not require a state to treat all people identically. State legislation, even though discriminatory, generally will not be held violative of the equal protection clause where it can be shown that the classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate state objective. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Robinson v. Board of Regents, 475 F.2d 707 (6th Cir.1973).

In McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802, 809, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 1408, 22 L. Ed.2d 739 (1969), Chief Justice Warren wrote:

"The distinctions drawn by a challenged statute must bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state end and will be set aside as violative of the Equal Protection Clause only if based on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of that goal. Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source materials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them."

Under certain circumstances a stricter scope of review will be employed, generally referred to as the "compelling state interest" test. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); Green v. McKeon, 468 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1972). The stricter standard will only be employed where the classification is inherently "suspect," as for example where the classification is by race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1967), or where the restriction infringes a fundamental right, such as the right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969).

Differentiations based upon classification by age are not viewed as suspect. See, United States v. Duncan, 456 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1972); Smith v. United States, 424 F.2d 267 (9th Cir. 1970); Republican College Council of Pennsylvania v. Winner, 357 F.Supp. 739 (E.D.Pa.1973).

We believe the correct method of analysis for issues of this character is set forth in the recent decision in Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L. Ed.2d 92 (1972). In that case the Court determined that a state law that inhibited potential candidates for office from seeking their party's nomination because neither they nor the voters who supported them could pay a portion of the cost of conducting the primary, so discriminated against those candidates and the voters who wished to support them as to be violative of the equal protection clause. The Court noted that while the issue was essentially one of candidates' rights:

"The rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters. Of course, not every limitation or incidental burden on the exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review." 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 856.

In determining whether the effect on voters will be sufficient to mandate the stricter standard in a case essentially involving candidates' rights, the Court noted: "In approaching candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and nature of their impact on voters." 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 856. After determining that the size of the filing fees would discourage potential candidates, that many candidates would be forced to look to their supporters for assistance, and that the result of this would be to inhibit...