Strong v. University Healthcare System, L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 26 March 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-30270.,06-30270. |
| Citation | 482 F.3d 802 |
| Parties | Laurie Weiss STRONG, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNIVERSITY HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, L.L.C., d/b/a Tulane University Hospital and Clinic, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Allison Anne Jones (argued), Davidson, Jones & Summers, Roy Steven Payne, Law Office of Sam N. Gregorio, Shreveport, LA, for Strong.
Sidney F. Lewis, V (argued), Shelley M. Sullivan, Jones Walker, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana.
Before REAVLEY, DeMOSS and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff-Appellant Laurie Strong challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of University Healthcare System, L.C. ("UHS") dismissing her Title VII retaliation claims. We must decide whether, within the applicable McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, Strong has shown that UHS would not have terminated her employment "but for" its alleged retaliatory motive.
UHS is a large hospital in Louisiana. Prior to the termination of her employment, Strong worked for approximately two years as a nurse coordinator in the "liver department" of UHS's Abdominal Transplant Center.
On December 15, 2003, Strong attended a UHS meeting called by Susan Andrews, one of Strong's numerous supervisors. At the meeting, Strong complained that Dr. Douglas Slakey, a surgeon, discriminated against her because she is a woman. Strong cited three separate incidents: (1) he called her lazy; (2) he called her stupid and lazy and screamed at her; and (3) he got angry at her during a meeting.
In January 2004, Strong asked Andrews about the status of her complaint against Dr. Slakey. Andrews responded that it was under consideration and that the details were confidential. Soon after, Andrews met with Strong and reaffirmed that the matter was being reviewed and that further details were confidential.
Before and after Strong complained about Dr. Slakey's work conduct, however, Strong's conduct also was called into question. Between late 2003 and early 2004, numerous patients, co-workers, supervisors and doctors complained about Strong's behavior in the workplace.
Specifically, (1) in October 2003, a staff member reported that Strong asked her to perform duties that were Strong's responsibility to perform; (2) in December 2003, a patient's husband reported that Strong was rude and demeaning to his wife; (3) in mid-January 2004, a surgeon reported that, in front of new employees, Strong inappropriately commented that physicians at UHS use livers that are "no good" and "high risk"; (4) in late-January 2004, Jeannette Hammond and Louis Larmeu, two more of Strong's supervisors, reported that during a meeting initiated to address other matters, Strong brought up her complaint against Dr. Slakey and persisted in knowing its status; (5) also in late-January 2004, Marian O'Rourke, Director of Nursing and seemingly Strong's most direct supervisor, reported that Strong's attitude was combative when given orders; (6) on January 30, 2004, a patient filed an official grievance against Strong regarding her treatment of him; (7) in mid-February 2004, a staff member reported that Strong refused to see a patient who had been waiting in a room for over an hour; (8) also in mid-February 2004, a nurse under Strong's supervision complained that Strong mistreated him; and (9) in general, UHS employees observed that Strong continuously showed supervisors little respect and challenged their authority.
Strong was "talked to" or "counseled" by different supervisors after a number of the incidents. Although Strong does not explain exactly what the "talks" or "counselings" entailed, they appear to have been informal and brief discussions initiated to address the substance of particular complaints made against Strong. Strong disagrees with the allegations underlying some of the complaints. Importantly, however, she does not allege that the complaints were made in retaliation for her complaint against Dr. Slakey.
Strong's alleged disruptiveness continued even after supervisors confronted her. On March 3, 2004, O'Rourke implemented a new policy requiring that lab reports be entered by clerks rather than nurse coordinators. Strong commented that the new policy was "silly." To UHS supervisors, the comment was another example of Strong's tendency to challenge authority and exhibit a negative or hostile attitude in the workplace.
On March 10, 2004, O'Rourke asked Strong to call the operating room to check on a transplant patient. Strong resisted and had to be asked multiple times to make the call. Later that day, a doctor reported to Hammond (again, one of Strong's supervisors) that Strong (1) made negative comments about a transplant patient before the patient had even been seen by a doctor, and (2) improperly steered patients away from certain doctors.
On March 11, 2004, during a meeting with Andrews and O'Rourke, Strong became combative and aggressive after being asked to inform a supervisor when "dealing with a non-liver patient." She accused them of "threatening her." In response, Andrews and O'Rourke asked a Human Resources ("HR") employee to join the meeting. It ended when Strong asked one supervisor if she "was done."
Later that day, a staff member reported that Strong erroneously characterized a patient as an alcohol drinker not eligible for a liver transplant. Strong got the misinformation from a page from a different patient's file, which mistakenly had been placed in the wrong file by a clerk. However, UHS partially faulted Strong for not catching the error, which it determined should have been noticed after an adequate reading of the entire file.
According to UHS, the incident was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. Andrews decided to suspend Strong with pay. Strong then told HR she thought she was being retaliated against. But when HR asked Strong to expand on her allegation of retaliation, she refused.
Days later, HR asked Strong to come to a meeting to explain her allegation of retaliation. Strong came to the meeting, but provided HR with no evidence of retaliation. HR ultimately concluded that Strong's retaliation allegation had no merit.
On March 25, 2004, HR called Strong to another meeting. There, UHS provided Strong with reasons for her continued suspension: poor performance and improper work conduct, including redirecting patients away from certain doctors, presenting patients in a negative fashion, arguing with superiors, and engaging in behavior obstructive to various department policies. Strong provided no evidence at that time suggesting that the real reason was retaliation.
After further investigation and consideration, UHS fired Strong on March 31, 2004, citing the numerous incidents outlined above. The decision was made collectively by her many supervisors.
On November 24, 2004, Strong filed a complaint against UHS alleging violations of Title VII and Louisiana law. First, she alleged gender discrimination based on the incidents with Dr. Slakey. Second, she alleged retaliation based on her termination a few months after complaining of discrimination.
UHS moved for summary judgment, asking that the discrimination claims be dismissed because the three incidents with Dr. Slakey were too insignificant to be actionable, and that the retaliation claims be dismissed because Strong failed to present legally sufficient evidence that UHS's stated reasons for firing Strong were pretextual.
The district court agreed with both of UHS's arguments and dismissed Strong's claims. On appeal, Strong does not challenge the dismissal of her gender discrimination claims. She does, however, challenge the dismissal of her retaliation claims.1
We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as the district court. Chacko v. Sabre, Inc., 473 F.3d 604, 609 (5th Cir.2006). Summary judgment is proper when there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgement as a matter of law. FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c).
Because Strong's retaliation claims are based on a pretext theory, our analysis is governed by the well-known McDonnell Douglas test and its burden-shifting framework. Septimus v. Univ. of Houston, 399 F.3d 601, 608 (5th Cir.2005). Thus, to start, Strong must make a prima facie showing that her termination was retaliatory. Id. at 607. For summary judgment purposes only, UHS conceded at the district court that Strong made a prima facie showing.
The burden then shifts to UHS to state a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for firing Strong. Id. UHS points to the long list of occurrences between October 2003 and March 2004, and Strong does not dispute that such occurrences provide an adequate, legal reason for termination.
Finally, the burden shifts back to Strong. Id. Her ultimate burden is to show pretext; that is, to prove by a preponderance that UHS fired her not for its stated reasons, but in retaliation for her gender discrimination complaint against Dr. Slakey. See id.
It is well established that Strong ultimately must "prove that [UHS's] stated reason for the adverse action was merely a pretext for the real, retaliatory purpose." Id. at 608. Surprisingly, the parties disagree whether Strong must show that she would not have been fired "but for" UHS's alleged retaliatory purpose. Strong, relying on numerous cases discussing the standard applicable to a plaintiff's prima facie case, suggests that she need only show a "causal link" between the alleged retaliation and the adverse employment action. However, the district court determined, and UHS agrees, that the but for standard applies.
We think our decision in Septimus...
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