Mark v. Gustafson, 05-C-279-C.
| Decision Date | 30 August 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05-C-279-C.,05-C-279-C. |
| Citation | 482 F.Supp.2d 1084 |
| Parties | Jonathon M. MARK, Plaintiff, v. Off. GUSTAFSON; Sgt. McArther; Lt. Dohms; Unit Manager Dougherty; Mr. Brown (head of PRC); Stephen M. Puckett, Defendants, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Diane L. Milligan, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, WI, for Defendants.
In this civil action for monetary relief, plaintiff Jonathon M. Mark, an inmate of the Oakhill Correctional Institution, contends that (1) defendants Daqian Gustafson and James McArthur interfered with his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs when they removed "magic seals" from the walls and door of his prison cell and (2) defendants Warren Dohms, Steven Dougherty, Michael Brown and Stephen Puckett conspired to violate plaintiffs right to access the courts by transferring him to a prison that lacked the legal resources he needed to pursue various lawsuits he was litigating. Jurisdiction is present under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
On January 27, 2006, defendants moved for summary judgment. I granted their motion in an order dated March 31, 2006, after finding that plaintiff had failed to respond to defendants' proposed findings of fact in the manner required by this court's summary judgment procedures and that defendants were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. However, on April 3, 2006, three days after judgment was entered, plaintiff submitted an affidavit to the court in which he averred that he had "never received from this court or otherwise the `Procedure to be Followed on Motions for Summary Judgment.'" Consequently, on May 2, 2006, I vacated judgment, provided plaintiff with a new copy of the court's procedures and gave plaintiff a renewed opportunity to oppose defendants' motion in accordance with the procedures he had been given.
Now defendants' motion for summary judgment is before the court a second time. Although plaintiff responded to defendant's submissions as required by the court's procedures, he did not dispute the essential facts set forth by defendants and he did not propose facts of his own that would support his claims against defendants. Because plaintiff has not produced evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer that defendants violated his right to freely exercise his religious beliefs or his right of access to the courts, defendants' motion will be granted. The infirmities in plaintiffs case are the same now as they were in March 2006; consequently, I have altered the original opinion only minimally to address points raised by plaintiff in his opposition brief.
From the parties' proposed findings of fact, I find the following facts to be material and undisputed.
Plaintiff Jonathon Mark is an inmate of the Oakhill Correctional Institution in Oregon, Wisconsin. Plaintiff was incarcerated previously at the Jackson Correctional Institution in Black River Falls, Wisconsin and the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Defendant Daqian Gustafson has been employed as a correctional officer at the Jackson Correctional Institution since 2003.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, defendant James McArthur was employed as a correctional sergeant at the Jackson Correctional Institution. Since March 2004, defendant McArthur has been employed as a sergeant at the New Lisbon Correctional Institution in New Lisbon, Wisconsin.
Defendant Steven Dougherty has been employed as a correctional unit manager at the Jackson Correctional Institution since March 13, 2000.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, defendant Warren Dohms was employed as a correctional lieutenant at the Jackson Correctional Institution. Since March 2004, defendant Dohms has been employed at the New Lisbon Correctional Institution, where he is a captain.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, defendant Michael Brown was employed as an offender classification specialist with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections Bureau of Offender Classification and Movement. As an offender classification specialist, defendant Brown was responsible for determining inmate custody levels and assigning inmates to appropriate programs and institutions. Defendant Brown is now a lieutenant with the Wisconsin Department of Corrections Division of Adult Institutions.
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, defendant Stephen Puckett was the director of the Bureau of Offender Classification and Movement. He is now retired.
At various times during his confinement in the Wisconsin prison system, plaintiff identified himself to prison officials as a pagan, a Wiccan, a "working magician" and a "ritual magician." While incarcerated, plaintiff attended Wiccan religious group services and wore a "religious emblem."
In the spring of 2003, plaintiff was incarcerated at the Jackson Correctional Institution. In an inmate complaint dated March 3, 2002, plaintiff alleged that "religious seals" were taken from the walls and door of his cell by defendants MacArthur and Gustafson during a routine cell search. Defendants MacArthur and Gustafson do not remember searching plaintiff cell in February 2003. However, if defendant MacArthur had seen papers on the wall or door of plaintiffs cell, he would have taken them in accordance with institution policy. When defendant Gustafson finds items attached to the interior of an inmate's cell, it is her practice to remove the items and place them on the inmate's table.
In a response to plaintiffs inmate complaint, prison officials stated:
Provided the religious materials that Inmate Mark refers to in this complaint are not considered contraband (i.e. altered), he is permitted to keep them in his possession. However, he is still required to follow institution rules regarding cell standards.
According to prison officials, plaintiff may possess his "seals"; however, he may not affix them to the walls or door of his cell.
Wisconsin Department of Corrections Internal Management Procedure Number 309-6A states in relevant part:
Inmates are permitted to possess approved religious property associated with their designated religious preference, unless the item presents a threat to the order and safety of the institution
. . .
Items will be subject to regulations applicable to the location and storage of inmate property ...
Religious property will be recorded on a DOC-237 Property Disposition Receipt
. . .
Inmates will be permitted to wear or use religious property items during individual practice, religious ceremonies, congregate services and meetings consistent with institution policy and procedures.
Inmates at the Jackson, Correctional Institution are expected to follow the rules outlined in the institution's handbook. The institution handbook indicates that "all inmate personal property, excluding electronic equipment, typewriters, fans, etc., shall be stored in receptacles provided by the institution." (Requiring inmates to store personal property in a single receptacle makes cell searches and property inventories more efficient.)
In addition, the institution handbook states that all authorized inmate personal property must be recorded on a personal property list. Authorized items not recorded on an inmate's property list are considered contraband and may be seized in accordance with prison rules.
The institution handbook contains the following passage:
Nothing is to be placed on the cell lights, windowsill, window bars, or between the window and the screen. Tape, tacks, glue, etc. may not be used to attach anything to the interior of the cell (for example, on walls, the ceiling, the door, furniture or fixtures).
The prison prohibits inmates from affixing items to their cell walls, door and windows for several reasons. First, most inmates share cells with another person. By prohibiting inmates from affixing items to cell walls, the' rule promotes safety by reducing the opportunity for inmates to fight about what items are placed on walls and who gets the most or best "wall space" for his items. The rule also eliminates the risk that contraband will be concealed behind objects on windows, doors or walls, or that items will cause physical damage to the cell doors or walls when they are removed.
On May 1, 2003, defendants Brown and Dohms participated in a program review committee meeting, regarding plaintiff's institutional placement. Before attending the meeting, defendant Brown reviewed a report prepared by plaintiffs social worker. According to the report, when the social worker met with plaintiff in April 2003, plaintiff did not make any specific requests regarding his institutional placement or upcoming program review committee meeting. In her report, plaintiffs social worker indicated that plaintiff was eligible for placement in a minimum security institution, and recommended that his placement be determined "by bed space and program needs." Prior to the May 1, 2003 meeting, defendant Dohms and defendant Brown had not spoken with each other or anyone else about plaintiffs institutional placement.
After providing plaintiff with an opportunity to give his views at the May 1 program review committee meeting, the committee deliberated privately, as it always does. The committee noted that plaintiff was eligible for placement in a minimum security institution and that he was two years away from his mandatory release date (August 19, 2005). The committee found that plaintiff had shown positive institutional adjustment, had a low risk rating and was scheduled for parole review in nine months.
Generally, as inmates approach their mandatory release date, the program review committee tries to move them to lower security facilities close to their homes, so they can more easily reconnect with their families and communities in preparation for release. In addition, the committee...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Schlemm v. Frank, 11-cv-272-wmc
...First Amendment"). Thus, any claim that fails under the RLUIPA invariably fails under the First Amendment. See Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1090 (W.D. Wis. 2006); Perez v. Frank, 433 F. Supp. 2d 955, 964 (W.D. Wis. 2006). Because Schlemm failed to demonstrate that the restrictio......
-
Rufus W. v. Grams
...S.Ct. 2113. The protections offered by RLUIPA are broader than those extended under the Free Exercise Clause. Cf. Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1090 (W.D.Wis.2006) (if a claim fails under RLUIPA, then it will inevitably fail under the First Amendment's more stringent requirements o......
-
Smith-Bey v. Dodd
..."any claim that fails under RLUIPA will fail inevitably under the First Amendment's more stringent requirements." Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1090 (W.D.Wis. 2006). Because the free exercise clause allows states to enforce neutral laws of general applicability even when those laws......
-
Lagar v. Tegels
...Exercise claim. “The protections offered by the First Amendment are more limited than those extended under RLUIPA.” Mark v. Gustafson, 482 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1090 (W.D.Wis.2006). Traditional First Amendment jurisprudence protects only the observation of central religious beliefs, while RLUIPA ......