Texas v. New Mexico

• Decision Date: 08 June 1987
• Docket Number: O,No. 65,65
• Citation: 482 U.S. 124,107 S.Ct. 2279,96 L.Ed.2d 105
• Parties: State of TEXAS, Plaintiff v. State of NEW MEXICO. rig
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

482 U.S. 124

107 S.Ct. 2279

96 L.Ed.2d 105

State of TEXAS, Plaintiff

v State of NEW MEXICO.

No. 65, Orig.

Argued April 29, 1987.

Decided June 8, 1987.

Syllabus

The 1949 Pecos River Compact between New Mexico and Texas divides the water of the Pecos River between the States, but, because of the river's irregular flow, does not specify a particular amount of water to be delivered by New Mexico to Texas each year. Instead, Article III(a) of the Compact provides that "New Mexico shall not deplete by man's activities the flow of the Pecos River at the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that available to Texas under the 1947 condition." In 1974, Texas filed this original action to resolve a dispute between the States with respect to the "1947 condition" and other matters. A Special Master was appointed, and this Court previously adopted his report specifying the methodology to be used in calculating Texas' entitlement to water. The case is now before the Court on both parties' exceptions to the Master's recent report calculating the acre-feet shortfall of water that should have been delivered to Texas for the years 1950-1983, and recommending that, in addition to performing its ongoing obligation under the Compact, New Mexico be ordered to make up the accumulated shortfall by delivering a specified amount of water each year for 10 years, with a penalty in kind, i.e., "water interest," for any bad-faith failure to deliver the additional amounts.

Held:

1. Both parties' exceptions with respect to the Master's calculation of the shortfall that is chargeable to New Mexico are rejected. P. 128.

2. There is no merit to New Mexico's contention that this Court may order only prospective relief and may not provide a remedy for past breaches of the Compact. Although a compact, when approved by Congress, becomes a law of the United States, it is still a contract, subject to construction and application in accordance with its terms. There is nothing in the nature of compacts generally or of the Pecos River Compact in particular that counsels against rectifying a failure to perform in the past as well as ordering future performance. Moreover, good-faith differences (as here) about the scope of contractual undertakings do not relieve either party from performance. A court should provide a remedy if the contract's terms provide a sufficiently certain basis for determining both that a breach has occurred and the nature of the remedy. Pp. 128-129 3. New Mexico contends that, in any event, it should be afforded the option of paying money damages for past shortages. Although the Master's report noted that both sides would possibly be better off with monetary repayment, he concluded that the Compact, which does not specify a remedy in case of a breach, contemplates delivery of water and that this Court may not order relief inconsistent with the Compact's terms. However, the Compact itself does not prevent the ordering of a suitable remedy, whether in water or money, and the Eleventh Amendment is no barrier to a monetary judgment, since that Amendment applies only to suits by citizens against a State. Any concern as to difficulties in enforcing judgments against States is insubstantial here, since if money damages were to be awarded, it would only be on the basis that if the sum awarded is not forthcoming in a timely manner, a judgment for repayment in water would be entered. This matter is returned to the Master for such further proceedings as he deems necessary and for his recommendations as to whether New Mexico should be allowed to elect a monetary remedy and, if so, the size of the payment and other terms that New Mexico must satisfy. Pp. 129-132.

4. A decree is entered with respect to New Mexico's current and future obligation to deliver water pursuant to Article III(a) of the Compact. Moreover, both the Master's recommendation that, because applying the approved apportionment formula is not entirely mechanical and involves a degree of judgment, an additional enforcement mechanism be supplied, and his preferred solution—the appointment of a River Master to make the required periodic calculations—are accepted. This Court's jurisdiction over original actions like this one provides it with ample authority to appoint such a master. On remand, the Special Master is requested to recommend an amendment to the decree, specifying as he deems necessary the River Master's duties and the consequences of his determinations. Pp. 133-135.

Exceptions to Special Master's report sustained in part and overruled in part; decree entered.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except STEVENS, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Charlotte Uram, Santa Fe, N.M., for defendant State of N.M Renea Hicks, Austin, Tex., for plaintiff State of Tex.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

This original case, which is here for the fourth time, involves the construction and enforcement of the 1949 Compact ¹ between New Mexico and Texas dividing the water of the Pecos River between the two States. Because of the irregular flow of the Pecos River, the Compact did not specify a particular amount of water to be delivered by New Mexico to Texas each year. Instead, Article III(a) of the Compact provides that "New Mexico shall not deplete by man's activities the flow of the Pecos River at the New Mexico-Texas state line below an amount which will give to Texas a quantity of water equivalent to that available to Texas under the 1947 condition." Pecos River Compact, S.Doc. No. 109, 81st Congress, 1st Sess., Art. III(a) (1949). The parties have had different views with respect to the "1947 condition" as well as other matters that could not be resolved through the Pecos River Commission, which Article V of the Compact established to carry out its provisions and which can effectively act only by mutual agreement of the two States.² After years of relatively fruitless negotiation, Texas filed this original action in June 1974. We granted leave to file the complaint, 421 U.S. 927, 95 S.Ct. 1652, 44 L.Ed.2d 84 (1975), and appointed a Special Master, 423 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 351, 46 L.Ed.2d 274 (1975), the Honorable Jean Breitenstein, now deceased, who was then a judge of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and a recognized expert in western water law.

In 1979, the Special Master filed a report defining "the 1947 condition" and proposed a river routing study and adoption of a new inflow-outflow manual to be used in determining how much water Texas should be expected to receive over any particular period for any particular level of precipitation under the consumption conditions prevailing in New Mexico in 1947. We adopted that report in its entirety. 446 U.S. 540, 100 S.Ct. 2911, 64 L.Ed.2d 485 (1980). When the case was next here, we decided against attempting to restructure the Commission to enable it to determine the method for allocating river water, preferring that the case continue in the litigation mode.³ 462 U.S. 554, 103 S.Ct. 2558, 77 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983). On June 11, 1984, we summarily approved the Special Master's report specifying the inflow-outflow methodology to be used in calculating Texas' entitlement.⁴ 467 U.S. 1238, 104 S.Ct. 3505, 82 L.Ed.2d 816.

Special Master Charles Meyers, Judge Breitenstein's successor, 468 U.S. 1202, 104 S.Ct. 3568, 82 L.Ed.2d 868 (1984), then held hearings on the question whether New Mexico had fulfilled its obligation under Article III(a) of the Compact. He issued a report containing his findings and conclusion that for the years 1950-1983, New Mexico should have delivered 340,100 acre-feet more water at the state line than Texas had received over those years. The Master recommended that in addition to performing its ongoing obligation under the Compact, New Mexico be ordered to make up the accumulated shortfall by delivering 34,010 acre-feet of water each year for 10 years, with a penalty in kind, i.e., "water interest," for any bad-faith failure to deliver these additional amounts.

Both sides excepted to the Master's report, and we have heard oral argument. We find no merit in and reject the exceptions filed by Texas and New Mexico with respect to the Master's calculation of the shortfall that is chargeable to New Mexico.⁵

New Mexico also excepts to the proposed remedy for the short deliveries in past years. We find no merit in its submission that we may order only prospective relief, that is, requiring future performance of compact obligations without a remedy for past breaches. If that were the case, New Mexico's defaults could never be remedied. This was not our approach when the case was here in 1983. We then affirmed our authority to hear and decide Texas' claim and remanded the case to the Master for a determination of the shortfall. As we said then, a compact when approved by Congress becomes a law of the United States, 462 U.S., at 564, 103 S.Ct., at 2565, but "[a] Compact is, after all, a contract." Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 285, 79 S.Ct. 785, 792, 3 L.Ed.2d 504 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). It remains a legal document that must be construed and applied in accordance with its terms. West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 28, 71 S.Ct. 557, 560, 95 L.Ed. 713 (1951); 462 U.S., at 564, 103 S.Ct., at 2565. There is nothing in the nature of compacts generally or of this Compact in particular that counsels against rectifying a failure to perform in the past as well as ordering future performance called for by the Compact. By ratifying the Constitution, the States gave this Court complete judicial power to adjudicate disputes among them, Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657, 720, 9 L.Ed. 1233 (1838), and this power includes the capacity to provide one State a remedy for the breach of another.

New Mexico,...