Utah Division of State Lands v. United States

• Decision Date: 08 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1772,85-1772
• Citation: 482 U.S. 193,96 L.Ed.2d 162,107 S.Ct. 2318
• Parties: UTAH DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

482 U.S. 193

107 S.Ct. 2318

96 L.Ed.2d 162

UTAH DIVISION OF STATE LANDS, Petitioner

v UNITED STATES et al.

No. 85-1772.

Argued March 23, 1987.

Decided June 8, 1987.

Syllabus

After the Federal Government, in 1976, issued oil and gas leases for lands underlying Utah Lake, a navigable body of water located in Utah, the State brought suit in Federal District Court for injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that it, rather than the United States, had title to the lakebed under the equal footing doctrine. Under that doctrine, the United States holds the lands under navigable waters in the Territories in trust for the future States, and, absent a prior conveyance by the Federal Government to third parties, a State acquires title to such lands upon entering the Union on an "equal footing" with the original 13 States. The Utah Enabling Act of 1894 provided that Utah was to be so admitted. The United States answered in the District Court that title to the lakebed remained in federal ownership by operation of a United States Geological Survey official's selection of the lake as a reservoir site in 1889 pursuant to an 1888 Act that provided that all lands which might be so selected were reserved as the property of the United States and were not subject to entry, settlement, or occupation. Although the 1888 Act was repealed in 1890, the 1890 Act provided that "reservoir sites heretofore located or selected shall remain segregated and reserved from entry or settlement as provided by [the 1888 Act]." The District Court granted summary judgment for the United States, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Title to Utah Lake's bed passed to Utah under the equal footing doctrine upon Utah's admission to the Union. Pp. 200-209.

(a) Even assuming, arguendo, that a federal reservation of the lakebed—as opposed to a conveyance by the Federal Government to a third party—could defeat Utah's claim to title under the equal footing doctrine, such defeat was not accomplished on the facts here. There is a strong presumption against finding congressional intent to defeat a State's title, and, in light of the longstanding policy of the Federal Government's holding land under navigable waters for the ultimate benefit of future States absent exceptional circumstances, an intent to defeat a State's equal footing entitlement could not be inferred from the mere act of reservation itself. The United States would not merely be required to establish that Congress clearly intended to include land under navi- gable waters within the federal reservation, but would additionally have to establish that Congress affirmatively intended to defeat the future State's title to such land. Pp. 200-202.

(b) The 1888 Act fails to make sufficiently plain a congressional intent to include the bed of Utah Lake within the Federal Government's reservation. The Act's language did not necessarily refer to lands under navigable waters, which lands were already the property of the United States, and were already exempt from sale, entry, settlement, or occupation under the general land laws. Moreover, the concerns that motivated Congress to enact the statute—concerns as to homesteaders' possible monopolization of and speculation in arid lands suitable for reservoir sites or irrigation works—had nothing to do with the beds of navigable waters. There is no merit to the Federal Government's contention that, in view of remarks made by the Geological Survey in reserving Utah Lake, Congress' enactment of the 1890 Act ratified the Survey's reservation of the lakebed. The Survey's references to the "segregation" of the lakebed, placed in the proper context, could refer to the segregation of the lands adjacent to the lake. Moreover, neither the language nor the legislative history of the 1890 Act supports the conclusion that Congress intended to ratify a reservation of the lakebed. Pp. 202-207.

(c) Even assuming that Congress did intend to reserve the lakebed in either the 1888 Act or the 1890 Act, Congress did not clearly express an intention to defeat Utah's claim to the lakebed under the equal footing doctrine upon entry into statehood. The 1888 Act's structure and history strongly suggest that Congress had no such intent. Moreover, the transfer of title of the lakebed to Utah would not necessarily prevent the Federal Government from subsequently developing a reservoir or water reclamation project at the lake in any event. The broad sweep of the 1888 Act, which had the practical effect of reserving all of the public lands in the West from settlement, cannot be reconciled with an intent to defeat the States' title to the land under navigable waters under the equal footing doctrine. Pp. 208-209.

780 F.2d 1515 (CA10 1985), reversed.

O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 209.

Dallin W. Jensen, Salt Lake City, Utah, for petitioner.

Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, D.C., for respondents.

Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

The issue in this case is whether title to the bed of Utah Lake passed to the State of Utah under the equal footing doctrine upon Utah's admission to the Union in 1896.

I

A.

The equal footing doctrine is deeply rooted in history, and the proper application of the doctrine requires an understanding of its origins. Under English common law the English Crown held sovereign title to all lands underlying navigable waters. Because title to such land was important to the sovereign's ability to control navigation, fishing, and other commercial activity on rivers and lakes, ownership of this land was considered an essential attribute of sovereignty. Title to such land was therefore vested in the sovereign for the benefit of the whole people. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11-14, 14 S.Ct. 548, 551-553, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894). When the 13 Colonies became independent from Great Britain, they claimed title to the lands under navigable waters within their boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English Crown. Id., at 15, 14 S.Ct., at 553. Because all subsequently admitted States enter the Union on an "equal footing" with the original 13 States, they too hold title to the land under navigable waters within their boundaries upon entry into the Union. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How. 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845).

In Pollard's Lessee this Court announced the principle that the United States held the lands under navigable waters in the Territories "in trust" for the future States that would be created, and in dicta even suggested that the equal footing doctrine absolutely prohibited the United States from taking any steps to defeat the passing of title to land underneath navigable waters to the States. Id., 3 How. at 230. Half a century later, however, the Court disavowed the dicta in Pollard's Lessee, and held that the Federal Government had the power, under the Property Clause, to convey such land to third parties:

"By the Constitution, as is now well settled, the United States, having rightfully acquired the Territories, and being the only government which can impose laws upon them, have the entire dominion and sovereignty, national and municipal, Federal and state, over all the Territories, so long as they remain in territorial condition. . . .

"We cannot doubt, therefore, that Congress has the power to make grants of lands below high water mark of navigable waters in any Territory of the United States, whenever it becomes necessary to do so in order to perform international obligations, or to effect the improvement of such lands for the promotion and convenience of commerce with foreign nations and among the several States, or to carry out other public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the United States hold the Territory." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S., at 48, 14 S.Ct., at 566.

Thus, under the Constitution, the Federal Government could defeat a prospective State's title to land under navigable waters by a prestatehood conveyance of the land to a private party for a public purpose appropriate to the Territory. The Court further noted, however, that Congress had never undertaken by general land laws to dispose of land under navigable waters. Ibid. From this, the Court inferred a congressional policy (although not a constitutional obligation) to grant away land under navigable waters only "in case of some international duty or public exigency." Id., at 50, 14 S.Ct., at 566.

The principles articulated in Shively have been applied a number of times by this Court, and in each case we have consistently acknowledged congressional policy to dispose of sovereign lands only in the most unusual circumstances. In recognition of this policy, we do not lightly infer a congressional intent to defeat a State's title to land under navigable waters:

"[T]he United States early adopted and constantly has adhered to the policy of regarding lands under navigable waters in acquired territory, while under its sole dominion, as held for the ultimate benefit of future States, and so has refrained from making any disposal thereof, save in exceptional instances when impelled to particular disposals by some international duty or public exigency. It follows from this that disposals by the United States during the territorial period are not lightly to be inferred, and should not be regarded as intended unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain." United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55, 46 S.Ct. 197, 199, 70 L.Ed. 465 (1926).

We have stated that "[a] court deciding a question of title to the bed of a navigable water must . . . begin with a strong presumption against conveyance by the United States, and must not infer such a conveyance unless the intention was definitely declared or otherwise made very plain, or was rendered...