U.S. v. Ferrer-Montoya

Decision Date19 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. 06-3751.,06-3751.
Citation483 F.3d 565
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Oscar Manuel FERRER-MONTOYA, also known as Nomar Barron-Escalante, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Michael H. Said, Des Moines, IA, for appellant.

Lester Alan Paff, Des Moines, IA, for appellee.

Before MELLOY, BOWMAN, and GRUENDER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

A grand jury indicted Oscar Manuel Ferrer-Montoya for possessing fifty or more grams of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court1 denied Ferrer-Montoya's motion to suppress evidence and statements he made to police officers after his arrest. Ferrer-Montoya entered a conditional guilty plea that preserved his right to appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress, and that appeal is now before us. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Ferrer-Montoya was driving in excess of the posted speed limit on Interstate 80 near Des Moines when Troy Hildreth, an Iowa State Patrol trooper, pulled him over. Ferrer-Montoya had no title to the vehicle or proof of insurance, and he handed Hildreth a Mexican driver's license that gave his name as Nomar Barron-Escalante. Hildreth asked Ferrer-Montoya for proof of his legal immigration status, and Ferrer-Montoya eventually admitted to Hildreth that he had entered the country illegally. Also, Ferrer-Montoya's description of his travel plans was vague and inconsistent. Suspicions aroused, Hildreth gave Ferrer-Montoya a citation for speeding and asked whether there were any drugs in the vehicle. Ferrer-Montoya said he "didn't think so" and gave Hildreth both verbal and written consent to search the vehicle. Hildreth told Ferrer-Montoya that he would search the vehicle, and advised Ferrer-Montoya that "if you need to holler at me [during the search], just go ahead and do that."

A local officer with a drug-sniffing dog arrived at the scene, and the officers directed the dog around and through the vehicle. The dog did not alert to the presence of any drugs. The officers then physically searched the vehicle. Hildreth, an experienced officer with training in drug interdiction and the use of hidden compartments in vehicles to smuggle contraband, noticed scarring on two screws that held the console panel in place. Hildreth removed the screws, lifted the panel, and noticed that someone had cut the frame underneath to create a hidden compartment. Within that compartment, he found two packages containing methamphetamine.

Hildreth placed Ferrer-Montoya under arrest, verbally informed him of his Miranda rights, and gave him a written copy of the rights in Spanish. Ferrer-Montoya said he understood his Miranda rights. Hildreth asked Ferrer-Montoya if he wanted to say anything, and Ferrer-Montoya asserted that he had "told you before [of my travel plans]. . . . I just told you what I know. . . . What else can I say?" Hildreth did not engage in further substantive interrogation regarding the narcotics.

Hildreth took Ferrer-Montoya to a nearby highway patrol post, where they were met by state narcotics agents Patrick Waymire and Kelly Maggers. Hildreth told Waymire that Hildreth had previously advised Ferrer-Montoya of his Miranda rights. Waymire and Maggers asked Ferrer-Montoya about Hildreth's assertion, and Ferrer-Montoya confirmed that he had been read his Miranda rights approximately one hour earlier and that he understood them. He then cooperated in answering substantive questions from Waymire and Maggers.

A grand jury indicted Ferrer-Montoya on a drug-trafficking charge, and Ferrer-Montoya moved to suppress the packages of methamphetamine and his statements to Waymire and Maggers. The district court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. Ferrer-Montoya thereafter pled guilty to the charge, but he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. On appeal, he argues that the district court's denial of the motion was erroneous in two respects. First, he argues that the removal of the scarred screws and lifting of the console panel exceeded the scope of his consent to search the vehicle. Second, he argues that his self-incriminating statements to Waymire and Maggers were made after he had invoked his right to remain silent and without a fresh recantation of the Miranda warnings, and therefore his statements were inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. We address these arguments in turn.

II. DISCUSSION

We review a district court's factual findings relating to a motion to suppress evidence for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Jimenez, 478 F.3d 929, 931 (8th Cir.2007). Under the Fourth Amendment, we determine the scope of a suspect's consent to a search under an "`objective' reasonableness" standard; that is, "what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the suspect?" Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). "The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object," id., and therefore an officer may reasonably interpret a suspect's unqualified consent to search a vehicle for drugs to include consent to, inter alia: "search containers within that car which might bear drugs," id.; probe underneath the vehicle, United States v. Siwek, 453 F.3d 1079, 1082-83, 1085 (8th Cir.2006); and open compartments that appear to be false, United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 530 (8th Cir.2004), or puncture such compartments in a minimally intrusive manner. United States v. Martel-Martines, 988 F.2d 855, 858 & n. 3 (8th Cir.1993).

In the present case, Ferrer-Montoya placed no qualifications or limitations upon his consent to Hildreth's search of the vehicle for drugs. During the search, Hildreth noticed the scarred screws and believed, based upon his experience, that they may have concealed a compartment where one could hide drugs. He opened the compartment in a minimally intrusive manner by removing the screws, and he did no damage to the vehicle in the process. At no time did Ferrer-Montoya object or suggest that he wished to withdraw his consent to the search. Therefore, under our precedent, we cannot say that the search of the false compartment exceeded the scope of Ferrer-Montoya's general consent to search the vehicle for...

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