Rivera v. Minnich, 86-98

Citation107 S.Ct. 3001,483 U.S. 574,97 L.Ed.2d 473
Decision Date25 June 1987
Docket NumberNo. 86-98,86-98
PartiesGregory L. RIVERA, Appellant v. Jean Marie MINNICH
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

Appellee, an unmarried mother, filed a child-support suit in a Pennsylvania court against appellant, alleging that he was the child's father. The judge denied appellant's pretrial motion seeking a ruling that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was violated by a state statute providing that the burden of proving paternity "shall be by a preponderance of the evidence," and requesting a jury instruction that paternity must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Applying the preponderance standard, the jury found that appellant was the father, but the judge later reconsidered his ruling on the burden of proof issue and granted appellant's motion for a new trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the statute was constitutional and reinstated the jury's verdict.

Held: Pennsylvania's preponderance standard for determining paternity is constitutionally permissible. The preponderance standard is applied most frequently in litigation between private parties in every State and, more specifically, is the standard that is applied in paternity litigation in the majority of American jurisdictions that regard such proceedings as civil in nature (as does Pennsylvania). Such a legislative judgment is entitled to a powerful presumption of validity when challenged under the Due Process Clause. This case is not controlled by the holding in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), that the Constitution requires clear and convincing evidence before a State may terminate the parental relationship. Appellant's contention to the contrary rests on the erroneous tacit assumption of an equivalence between the State's imposition of the legal obligations accompanying a biological relationship between parent and child and the State's termination of a fully existing parent-child relationship. The collective judgment of the many state legislatures that adhere to a preponderance standard for paternity proceedings rests on legitimate and significant distinctions between termination and paternity proceedings. Pp. 577-582.

509 Pa. 588, 506 A.2d 879 (1986), affirmed.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and SCALIA, JJ., joined. O'CONNOR, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. ----. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. ----.

William Watt Campbell, Lancaster, Pa., for appellant.

Mary Louise Barton, Lancaster, Pa., for appellee.

Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Pennsylvania statute governing proceedings brought against a defendant to establish his paternity of a child born out of wedlock specifies that the "burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the evidence." 1 This appeal presents the question whether a determination of paternity by that evidentiary standard complies with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We agree with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania's conclusion that applying the preponderance standard to this determination is constitutionally permissible.

I

On May 28, 1983, appellee Jean Marie Minnich, an unmarried woman, gave birth to Cory Michael Minnich. Three weeks later, appellee filed a complaint for child support in the Common Pleas Court of Lancaster County, Pennsylvania, against appellant Gregory Rivera, alleging that he was the father of her son. In advance of trial appellant requested the court to rule that the statutory burden of proof of paternity violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and to instruct the jury that paternity must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The trial judge denied the motion. Applying the preponderance standard, the jury unanimously found that appellant is the father of the child. On appellant's post-trial motions, the trial judge reconsidered his ruling on the burden of proof issue and granted appellant's motion for a new trial. Appellee appealed directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which held that the statute is constitutional and reinstated the jury's verdict. 509 Pa. 588, 506 A.2d 879 (1986).

The State Supreme Court noted that the standard was entitled to the presumption that legislative enactments are valid, and is the same as that approved by a majority of the jurisdictions that regard paternity suits as civil proceedings. Then, after reviewing the respective interests of the putative father, the mother, and the child,2 as well as "the interest of the Commonwealth in seeing that fathers support their children who are born out of wedlock so that those children do not become public charges," the Court concluded that the preponderance standard is one that "does not unduly risk the erroneous deprivation of any of them." 3 The Chief Justice of that court dissented. Relying on our holding in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), that the Constitution requires clear and convincing evidence before the State may terminate the parental relationship, he reasoned that the same degree of proof should be required to create the relationship.4 We noted probable jurisdiction, 479 U.S. 960, 107 S.Ct. 454, 93 L.Ed.2d 400 (1986), and now affirm.

II

The preponderance of the evidence standard that the Pennsylvania Legislature has prescribed for paternity cases is the standard that is applied most frequently in litigation between private parties in every State.5 More specifically, it is the same standard that is applied in paternity litigation in the majority of American jurisdictions that regard such proceedings as civil in nature.6 A legislative judgment that is not only consistent with the "dominant opinion" throughout the country but is also in accord with "the traditions of our people and our law," see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76, 25 S.Ct. 539, 547, 49 L.Ed. 937 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), is entitled to a powerful presumption of validity when it is challenged under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The converse of this proposition is that a principal reason for any constitutionally mandated departure from the preponderance standard has been the adoption of a more exacting burden of proof by the majority of jurisdictions. In each of the three cases in which we have held that a standard of proof prescribed by a state legislature was unconstitutional, our judgment was consistent with the standard imposed by most jurisdictions. Thus, in explaining our conclusion that proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required, we stated:

"Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judg- ment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 1450, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-362, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1070-1071, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

Similarly, in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), our rejection of Texas' argument that a preponderance standard of proof was sufficient in a civil proceeding to commit an individual to a state mental hospital involuntarily was supported by the fact that a majority of the States had chosen to apply either a clear and convincing standard, id., at 431-432, nn. 6, 7, and 8, 99 S.Ct., at 1812, nn. 6, 7, and 8, or the even more demanding criminal law standard, id., at 430-431, and n. 5, 99 S.Ct., at 1812, and n. 5. And in Santosky v. Kramer, which presented the question whether New York could extinguish a pre-existing parent-child relationship without requiring greater factual certainty than a fair preponderance of the evidence, we began our analysis by noting that 38 jurisdictions required a higher standard of proof in proceedings to terminate parental rights. 455 U.S., at 749-750, 102 S.Ct., at 1392-1393.

Appellant's principal argument is that the standard of proof required by our holding in Santosky to terminate the parent-child relationship is also constitutionally required to create it. This view of Santosky rests on the tacit assumption of an equivalence between the State's imposition of the legal obligations accompanying a biological relationship between parent and child and the State's termination of a fully existing parent-child relationship. We are unable to accept this assumption. The collective judgment of the many state legislatures which adhere to a preponderance standard for paternity proceedings rests on legitimate and significant distinctions between termination and paternity proceedings.

First, there is an important difference between the ultimate results of a judgment in the two proceedings. Resolving the question whether there is a causal connection between an alleged physical act of a putative father and the subsequent birth of the plaintiff's child sufficient to impose financial liability on the father will not trammel any pre- existing rights; the putative father has no legitimate right and certainly no liberty interest in avoiding financial obligations to his natural child that are validly imposed by state law. In the typical contested paternity proceeding, the defendant's nonadmission of paternity represents a disavowal of any interest in providing the training, nurture, and loving protection that are at the heart of the parental relationship protected by the Constitution. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2993, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983).7 Rather, the primary interest of the defendant is in avoiding the serious economic consequences that flow from a court order that establishes paternity and its correlative obligation to provide...

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