Hale v. Henderson
Decision Date | 05 October 1973 |
Docket Number | No. 72-2185.,72-2185. |
Citation | 485 F.2d 266 |
Parties | Albert William HALE, Petitioner-Appellant, v. C. Murray HENDERSON, Warden Tennessee State Penitentiary, Respondent-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Charles Stephen Ralston, New York City, for petitioner-appellant; Walter L. Bailey, Jr., Memphis, Tenn., and Jack Greenberg, New York City, on brief.
James M. Tharpe, Sp. Counsel, State of Tenn., Memphis, Tenn., for respondent-appellee; David M. Pack, Atty. Gen. of Tenn., Nashville, Tenn., of counsel.
Before EDWARDS and MILLER, Circuit Judges, and LAMBROS,* District Judge.
This petitioner, after issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in his favor by the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, appeals the two issues which the District Court decided against him. The state did not appeal from the District Court's grant of the writ of habeas corpus, but does resist reversal of the two issues decided in its favor below. In the interest of judicial economy, we decide both issues sought to be appealed.
Petitioner was indicted and convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1965. Concededly he has exhausted state remedies on the issues concerned.
This case has a lengthy history. Its factual background may be found recited in Hale v. Henderson, 400 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1968) ( ), and in Hale v. Henderson, 336 F.Supp. 512 (W.D.Tenn.1972). On remand of this case after evidentiary hearing, the District Judge found facts warranting issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the basis of an illegal arrest and unconstitutional search, the products of which had been admitted against appellant. But he specifically rejected petitioner's additional claims 1) that the confession which was introduced against him was the product of an illegal and unconstitutional arrest, and 2) that the grand jury which had indicted him was unconstitutionally constituted in that no black foreman or foreman pro tem of the jury had ever been appointed in Shelby County, albeit 150 such appointments had been made by the Court in whom state law placed that authority.1
As to the confession issue, the District Judge found that the arrest of petitioner on the day after the murder was discovered was not based on probable cause and was illegal and violative of petitioner's constitutional rights. The state does not dispute this finding. The District Judge also found that the confession was not the product of the illegal arrest:
The last quoted phrase is found in Wong Sun v. United States in the following sentences:
We now consider whether the exclusion of Toy\'s declarations requires also the exclusion of the narcotics taken from Yee, to which those declarations led the police. The prosecutor candidly told the trial court that "we wouldn\'t have found those drugs except that Mr. Toy helped us to." Hence this is not the case envisioned by this Court where the exclusionary rule has no application because the Government learned of the evidence "from an independent source," Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 40 S.Ct. 182, 183, 64 L.Ed. 319; nor is this a case in which the connection between the lawless conduct of the police and the discovery of the challenged evidence has "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 60 S.Ct. 266, 268, 84 L.Ed. 307. We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959). We think it clear that the narcotics were "come at by the exploitation of that illegality" and hence that they may not be used against Toy. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
Toy's statement had previously been held inadmissible because of an unconstitutional arrest during which the statement was made. The distinction made in this same case holding Wong Sun's statement to be admissible is instructive:
We turn now to the case of the other petitioner Wong Sun. We have no occasion to disagree with the finding of the Court of Appeals that his arrest, also, was without probable cause or reasonable grounds. At all events no evidentiary consequences turn upon that question. For Wong Sun\'s unsigned confession was not the fruit of that arrest, and was therefore properly admitted at trial. On the evidence that Wong Sun had been released on his own recognizance after a lawful arraignment, and had returned voluntarily several days later to make the statement, we hold that the connection between the arrest and the statement had "become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307. Wong Sun v. United States, supra at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419.
In our instant case there was no break in custody (and apparently little break if any in custodial interrogation, see Hale v. Henderson, 400 F.2d 655, 657 (6th Cir. 1968)) prior to petitioner's confession. Contrary to the holding of the District Judge, we do not believe that "the connection between the arrest and the statement had `become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint.'" Wong Sun v. United States, supra at 491, 83 S.Ct. at 419. The confrontations which preceded the statement were made possible by and were a product of the illegal arrest.
Appellee's brief cites only one case in support of its argument for affirmance. Swinney v. United States, 391 F.2d 190 (5th Cir. 1968). We find no reason to disagree with the holdings of the Fifth Circuit in that case, but consider the facts to be completely inapposite. The court there declined to decide whether or not there had been "a primary taint" and held that the arrest and search were lawful and valid.
As to the confession issue, we reverse the District Court and hold that petitioner's custodial statement was a fruit of the poisonous tree and should be excluded at any retrial of this case.
As to the last appellate issue pertaining to the petitioner's claim of unconstitutional racial discrimination in the choice of (or the system of choosing) the grand jury foremen, we affirm the District Court.
Appellant did not raise this issue at the time of his original trial but subsequently did so in a state habeas corpus proceeding. We do not think we can properly dispose of this issue under the rationale of the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 93 S.Ct. 1577, 36 L.Ed.2d 216 (1973). Here the Tennessee Supreme Court passed on the appellant's federal constitutional contention as to the grand jury foreman on the merits. In this situation settled case law holds that the federal courts will likewise reach the merits. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 297 n. 3, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 406, 79 S.Ct. 825, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486, 73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242, 247, 57 S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066 (1937).
As to the grand jury foreman issue the judge who heard the evidence found:
Some additional facts should be added.
It is undisputed that the grand jury which indicted petitioner was headed by a foreman pro tempore who was selected...
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State v. Byers, 43491
...Amendment forbids that their confessions be admitted. Wong Sun v. United States, supra, 371 U.S. at 485, 83 S.Ct. 407; Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266 (6th Cir.1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930, 94 S.Ct. 1442, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974); United States v. Burhannon, 388 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1968); ......
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State v. Byers
...the Fourth Amendment forbids that their confessions be admitted. Wong Sun v. United States, supra, at 485, 83 S.Ct. 407; Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930, 94 S.Ct. 1442, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974); United States v. Burhannon, 388 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1968......
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...constitutional rights are implicated by systematic discrimination in the appointment of federal grand jury forepersons. Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266 (6th Cir. 1973). It is contended that where the grand jury venire was selected in a manner that did not systematically exclude any cognizab......
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U.S. v. Magallanes
...to the initial misconduct. Compare Brown 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (taint not purged with two-hour gap), with Hale v. Henderson, 485 F.2d 266, 267-69 (6th Cir.1973) (taint purged with two-day gap), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 930, 94 S.Ct. 1442, 39 L.Ed.2d 489 (1974), and United States v. O......