Fitzgerald v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 20 April 2007
• Docket Number: No. CV 03-01876 DDP RZX.,CV 03-01876 DDP RZX.
• Citation: 485 F.Supp.2d 1137
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California
• Parties: Donald FITZGERALD, Delbert Eugene Hudson, Dilworth Menefele and Mario Youngblood, as individual plaintiffs and as representatives of the classes, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Chief of Police William Bratton and Captain Charlie Beck, in their individual and official capacities, and Does 1-10, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

485 F.Supp.2d 1137

Donald FITZGERALD, Delbert Eugene Hudson, Dilworth Menefele and Mario Youngblood, as individual plaintiffs and as representatives of the classes, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Chief of Police William Bratton and Captain Charlie Beck, in their individual and official capacities, and Does 1-10, in their individual and official capacities, Defendants.

No. CV 03-01876 DDP RZX.

United States District Court, C.D. California.

April 20, 2007.

Anne K. Richardson, Dan Stormer, Hadsell and Stormer, Pasadena, CA, Carol A. Sobel, Yvonne Tania Simon, Carol A. Sobel Law Offices, Santa Monica, CA, Mark D. Rosenbaum, Peter Bibring, Peter J. Eliasberg, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Negin Mirmirani, Loeb & Loeb, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiff.

Bruce Monroe, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office Police Employment Law Sec, Cory M. Brente, Kelly N. Kades, Wendy C. Shapero, Los Angeles City Attorney's Office City Hall E-Police Litigation, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO EXTEND INJUNCTION

PREGERSON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs' motion to extend an injunction entered into between Plaintiffs and the City of Los Angeles pursuant to a settlement agreement. After reviewing the papers submitted by the parties and hearing oral argument, the Court grants the motion in the manner outlined below.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Settlement History

Plaintiffs are residents of Los Angeles who live in downtown Los Angeles in the area of the Central City known as Skid Row.¹ On March 18, 2003, Plaintiffs Donald Fitzgerald, Delbert Eugene Hudson, Dilworth Menefele and Mario Youngblood filed a complaint on behalf of themselves and similarly situated individuals challenging the conduct of the Los Angeles Police Department. (Declaration of Anne Richardson ("Richardson Decl."), Ex. 1.) Plaintiffs alleged that they were subjected to an unlawful policy, practice and custom of harassment on the pretext that the police were seeking probation and/or parole violators or absconders. Plaintiffs further alleged that the policy was intended to, and did, create a climate of fear and intimidation among the poorest residents of Los Angeles in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights.

The matter was assigned to the Honor able Nora Manella, who issued a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") on March 31, 2003, enjoining Defendants from engaging in the conduct alleged by Plaintiffs and setting a hearing for a preliminary injunction. On April 14, 2003, Judge Manella issued a Preliminary Injunction identical to the TRO. Thereafter, the parties settled the case, and, on December 9, 2003, Judge Manella approved the settlement.

The settlement agreement constituted a stipulation to a permanent injunction as follows:

1. Officers will not conduct detentions or "Terry" stops without reasonable suspicion that a person is involved in criminal activity or has committed a crime or violated parole or probation. However, officers may continue to engage in consensual encounters with persons, parolees, probationers, or others residing in or otherwise present in the "Skid Row" area of Los Angeles.

2 Officers will not search the persons and/or possessions of those individuals stopped on the public streets and sidewalks of the "Skid Row" area of Los Angeles without probable cause and/or reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime or violated parole or probation. However, nothing shall prohibit officers from performing "pat-down" searches in accordance with the law.

3 Officers will not search residences of persons residing or otherwise present in the "Skid Row" area of Los Angeles except with a valid warrant, other legal justification, or with reasonable suspicion that they are on parole or probation and have violated the terms of their parole or probation.

(Richardson Decl., Ex. 2 at 2-3.) The settlement also provided that the injunction would remain in force for 36 months from the' date on which it was signed by the court, and that:

Plaintiffs may move for an extension of the injunction upon a showing of good cause presented by way of motion filed within the last 120 days, prior to expiration. The duration of the extension granted by the Court will be subject to the Court's discretion, but in any case will not exceed 36 months.

(Id. at 3.)

Finally, the settlement stated:

Notwithstanding this injunction, defendants will continue to be permitted to engage in law enforcement and other conduct necessary and appropriate measures to protect and promote the public safety and welfare and enforce and promote the laws of the State of California, the United Stated, and the City of Los Angeles. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to abrogate existing search and seizure law .... should the standard for detention and searches of parole or probationers be changed by the United States Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit, this injunction will be modified by operation of law accordingly to incorporate the current legal standard.

(Id. at 3-4.)

B. Instant Motion

In November 2006, counsel for Plaintiffs allegedly learned that the police were purportedly engaging in a widespread practice of searching the residents of Skid Row and that the police were arbitrarily stopping, detaining, and searching individuals and groups of individuals who appeared to be homeless or to be residents of Skid Row, without any prior knowledge whether the person was on parole or probation and without any reasonable suspicion that the individuals were engaged in criminal activity. (Mot. 4:7-13.) Counsel for Plaintiffs also allegedly learned that, although such stops often included asking the subject whether he or she was on parole or probation, the search often continued regardless of how the person responded. (Id. 4:14-16.) Plaintiffs claim that police frequently detain and begin to search the subject before the subject is asked whether he or she is on probation. (Id. 4:16-18.)

Plaintiffs now move the Court to extend the injunction entered into as part of the prior settlement agreement.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Motion

As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' motion was untimely filed. Pursuant to the terms of the injunction, December 9, 2006 was the latest date Plaintiffs could seek to extend the injunction. Plaintiffs submitted their motion to the Clerk's office on Friday, December 8, 2006. The motion was marked "lodged" and was not filed until Wednesday, December 13, 2006.

Plaintiffs did not fail to meet the deadline. The Clerk's office likely marked the motion as "lodged" instead of "filed" either because Judge Manella, who previously presided over the case, is no longer with the Central District, or because the case was technically "closed" at the time of the entry of the permanent injunction. But for the administrative procedures of the Clerk's Office, the motion would have been timely filed. Thus, the Court deems the motion timely.

B. Procedural Filing Requirements

Defendants also contend that Plaintiffs failed to comply with Local Rule 7-3, which requires parties to meet and confer before filing a motion. Plaintiffs claim that they did attempt to contact Defendants several times as soon as they decided to file the motion, and that they were given oral permission from Defendants to file their motion by the December 8, 2006 deadline. (Richardson Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.) They also argue that they could not have met and conferred any earlier because they only learned of the alleged violations in late November. (Id. ¶ 3.) Finally, Plaintiffs argue that, to the extent the purpose of Local Rule 7-3 is to allow nonmovants time to evaluate proposed motions and oppose or reach agreement in a considered fashion, Defendants have not been prejudiced because the Court's briefing schedule gave Defendants' more than adequate time to respond to Plaintiffs motion.

The Court understands that the unique time constraints in this case prevented Plaintiffs from meeting and conferring the required twenty days prior to the filing of the motion. The Court also understands that Plaintiffs' late notice to Defendants gave Defendants little time to familiarize themselves with this case before the December 8, 2006 deadline. (See generally Declaration of Kelly N. Kades.) However, due to the Court's management of its docket, Defendants had one month to respond to Plaintiffs' motion. Defendants took the full month to respond.² Accordingly, the Court finds that they have not been prejudiced by the Plaintiffs' actions.

Therefore, while the Court has the power to strike Plaintiffs' motion for failure to comply with Local Rule 7-3, see, e.g., Green v. Baca, 226 F.R.D. 624, 656 n. 62 (C.D.Cal.2005), in the interest of deciding this case on the merits, it elects to hear the motion.

C. Plaintiffs' Burden: "Good Cause"

By the terms of the settlement, a court may extend the injunction for up to thirty-six months upon Plaintiffs' showing of "good cause." The term "good cause" is not defined in the injunction. Unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs and Defendants dispute the meaning of term "good cause" and the burden it requires Plaintiffs to satisfy before the Court may extend the injunction.

Defendants argue that the "good cause" showing is the same as that which would be required by Plaintiffs to obtain a permanent injunction in the first instance. By contrast, Plaintiffs contend that, had the parties intended to allow for an extension only upon a showing sufficient to justify a permanent injunction in the first instance, they would have stated so in the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs also argue that where a party is subject to an injunction, a single violation of that injunction can subject that party to contempt. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, it is logical that "good cause" for an extension is satisfied by a showing that Defendants have "engaged in anything more than an isolated instance or two of violations of the...