486 F.2d 691 (7th Cir. 1973), 18790, Shirck v. Thomas
|Citation:||486 F.2d 691|
|Party Name:||Ruth SHIRCK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert S. THOMAS et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||April 06, 1973|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit|
Rehearing Denied Nov. 2, 1973.
Joseph R. Napoli, Peoria, Ill., Richard J. Medalie, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellant.
Richard N. Molchan, Peoria, Ill., for defendants-appellees.
Stephen J. Pollack, David Rubin, Washington, D. C., amicus curiae.
Before SWYGERT, Chief Judge and FAIRCHILD and STEVENS, Circuit Judges.
STEVENS, Circuit Judge.
On April 1, 1969, defendants notified plaintiff that she would not be reemployed as a high school teacher for the 1969-1970 academic year. The question is whether that action deprived her of "property" or "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiff received notice of the reasons for her nonrenewal as required by Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 122, § 24-10. As we explained when the case was first before us, those reasons "related to her performance in her work, particularly her failure to coordinate her teaching with that of the other German teacher so that students who needed to transfer at the end of a semester would not be handicapped." 447 F.2d 1025, 1026. Our decision that she was entitled to the kind of hearing required by Roth v. Board of Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971), which was then the law of this circuit, was vacated and we have been directed to reconsider in the light of the Supreme Court's opinion in that case. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548. See Thomas v. Shirck, 408 U.S. 940, 92 S.Ct. 2848, 33 L.Ed.2d 764. The parties have filed extensive supplemental briefs; we now affirm the summary judgment entered by the district court in favor of defendants.
Plaintiff had no contractual entitlement, either express or implied, to future employment. Since she received notice of nonrenewal before completion of her second year of teaching, she had no statutory tenure. She argues, however, that the Illinois statute requiring that she be given such notice created a sufficient "property" interest to bring the due process clause into play. This argument confuses the decisive distinction between procedure and substance. 1 Since the Illinois statutory procedure was observed, that statute affords plaintiff no substantive right.
Plaintiff also contends that the reason assigned by defendants for their nonrenewal decision deprived her of "liberty." She argues alternatively that as a matter of law those reasons imposed a "stigma" sufficient to foreclose her "freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities," cf. Roth, 408 U.S. at 578, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, or, at the very least, that a question of...
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