Henry v. Brenner

• Citation: 138 Ill.App.3d 609,486 N.E.2d 934,93 Ill.Dec. 401
• Decision Date: 25 November 1985
• Docket Number: No. 3-85-0031,3-85-0031
• Parties: , 93 Ill.Dec. 401 Homer HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bret BRENNER, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 934

486 N.E.2d 934

138 Ill.App.3d 609, 93 Ill.Dec. 401

Homer HENRY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Bret BRENNER, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 3-85-0031.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Third District.

Nov. 25, 1985.

William K. Brown, Goldfine & Bowles, P.C., Peoria, for plaintiff-appellant.

Rex K. Linder and Mr. Edward T. Habecker, Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, Peoria, for defendant-appellee.

STOUDER, Justice:

Plaintiff, Homer Henry, brought this personal injury suit against Defendant, Bret Brenner, for injuries allegedly sustained when the automobile which he was operating was struck from the rear by defendant's automobile. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant, upon which verdict judgment was entered by order of the Circuit Court of Peoria County. Plaintiff appeals on the theory that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Plaintiff also challenges the trial court's allowance of admission into evidence testimony of medical records used by an expert to illustrate and explain the expert's opinion.

The factual situation concerning the question of liability is relatively uncomplicated. The incident occurred on February 5, 1981, in Peoria, near the intersection of University and Northmoor Streets; it was daylight, and the road surface was a combination of snow and slush. Plaintiff was traveling south in the right lane of traffic on University Street when he stopped in a line of traffic for a red light at Northmoor Street. Another auto driven by Kenneth Powell, stopped immediately behind plaintiff. Defendant, also proceeding south on University, was behind a school bus slowing to turn right into the Richwoods High School parking lot. The defendant then moved into the left southbound lane of traffic to pass the school bus. Ahead there was a line of cars stopped for the red light in both the left and right southbound lanes of traffic. Defendant then turned back into the right lane ahead of the school bus and braked to stop but his tires locked causing his auto to slide on the pavement into the curb and then into the Powell auto causing it to be pushed into the rear of plaintiff's auto. Plaintiff's auto was not pushed into the vehicle ahead of it and the only damage to plaintiff's auto was a small dent in the rear bumper.

At the time of the incident, neither the plaintiff, the defendant, nor Mr. Powell made any complaints of physical injury. The following morning plaintiff went to the emergency room at St. Francis Hospital where he complained of pain and stiffness in his neck. After being X-rayed and examined, he was released. Next plaintiff went to Dr. Paul Mroz, a chiropractor, who had been treating plaintiff for a sore back during the past 14 weeks. Dr. Mroz continued to treat plaintiff for the next 15 months following the incident in question. Dr. Mroz testified that plaintiff's condition was aggravated as a result of the accident.

During the trial of this case, expert testimony on behalf of defendant contradicted plaintiff's claim of injury. Dr. Clinton Wentz, a radiologist, had examined the X-rays taken at St. Francis Hospital both after the incident and X-rays taken of plaintiff at St. Francis in 1976. He testified that his examination indicated no change in plaintiff and that both sets of X-rays were considered within normal limits.

Dr. Hugh Cooper, an orthopedic surgeon employed by plaintiff's employer, who had treated plaintiff prior to and after the incident in question, testified that plaintiff had pre-existing problems in the areas of his body which he claimed were injured in the incident and opined that it was this history of problems, rather than the automobile accident, that was the aspect of the problem which resulted in plaintiff's prolonged lost time from work. On cross-examination Dr. Cooper noted that an automobile accident can aggravate a back condition, but that, in his opinion, the back condition of Mr. Henry was not aggravated by the incident.

A third expert's testimony, that of Dr. Walter Cibelli, was introduced by defendant, to testify about prior treatment of the plaintiff. Dr. Cibelli first treated plaintiff for pains in the neck and back in June, 1976, and continued treatment for 3 1/2 years thereafter. Dr. Cibelli noted in his testimony that plaintiff's complaints were a typical story as to this plaintiff.

When a party moves for a directed verdict, or for judgment nov, the trial court must consider all the evidence in the case; If there is any evidence, standing alone, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom which tends to prove the contentions of the opposing party, the motion must be denied. (Palmer v. Poynter (1960), 24 Ill.App.2d 68, 71, 163 N.E.2d 851.)

On the evidence in the case at bar, the trial court properly denied plaintiff's motions for a directed verdict and a new trial. Although plaintiff contends that it is a clear matter of evidence that he suffered some injury, there is ample evidence from which the jury could have concluded the plaintiff sustained no injury nor any aggravation of any previous injury from the incident. Likewise, the jury might not have believed the time lost from work was a result of the injuries herein stated. The issues of liability and damages were substantially in dispute, and it was the function of the jury to resolve these disputes from its assessment of the credibility of the evidence.

Where the medical evidence was strong to the effect that pre-existing problems were no more serious after the accident than they were prior to the accident, and where impact of the vehicles was at a slow speed which caused minimal damage to the plaintiff's automobile we cannot say that the collision was inexcusable or that defendant was negligent as a matter of law. In addition, the plaintiff relies upon the rule in Calvetti v. Seipp (1967), 37 Ill.2d 596, 227 N.E.2d 758 which recognizes that when a motorist crosses into an oncoming lane of traffic, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to show he was not negligent. Here, because defendant's automobile changed from one southbound to another southbound lane, the rule in Calvetti is inapplicable.

Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred in allowing Dr. Cooper's testimony as to the contents of medical records prepared by other doctors in his office. It is plaintiff's contention there is no provision in either Federal Rule 703 or 705 which allows an expert witness to testify as to hearsay/basis for his opinion on direct examination.

Dr. Cooper was of the opinion plaintiff's long absence from work was related to his history of neck and back complaints, rather than the automobile accident in question. Dr. Cooper was further of the opinion plaintiff's back problems were not aggravated by the automobile accident.

With regard to plaintiff's objection, it appears to be well settled law experts may consider not only medical and...