Bendix Autolite Corp v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc

• Decision Date: 17 June 1988
• Docket Number: No. 87-367,87-367
• Citation: 100 L.Ed.2d 896,486 U.S. 888,108 S.Ct. 2218
• Parties: BENDIX AUTOLITE CORP. v. MIDWESCO ENTERPRISES, INC., et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

486 U.S. 888

108 S.Ct. 2218

100 L.Ed.2d 896

BENDIX AUTOLITE CORP.

v MIDWESCO ENTERPRISES, INC., et al.

No. 87-367.

Argued March 23, 1988.

Decided June 17, 1988.

Syllabus

In 1974, appellant, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio, and appellee Midwesco Enterprises (appellee), an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois, entered into a contract for appellee's delivery and installation of a boiler system at appellant's Ohio facility. After a contract dispute arose, appellant filed this diversity action in the Northern District of Ohio in 1980. When appellee asserted the Ohio statute of limitations as a defense, appellant responded that the limitations period had not elapsed because under an Ohio statute the running of the time is tolled for claims against corporations that are not present in the State and have not designated an agent for service of process. The District Court dismissed the action, finding that the Ohio tolling statute constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: The Ohio tolling statute violates the Commerce Clause, since it imposes an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. To gain the protection of the limitations period, appellee—which has no corporate office in Ohio and is not registered to do business there—would have had to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio and subject itself to the Ohio courts' general jurisdiction. Ohio's statutory scheme thus forces a foreign corporation to choose between exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts or forfeiture of the limitations defense, remaining subject to suit in Ohio in perpetuity. Although statute of limitations defenses are not a fundamental right, they are an integral part of the legal system and are relied upon to project the liabilities of persons and corporations active in the commercial sphere. Such defenses may not be withdrawn from out-of-state persons or corporations on conditions repugnant to the Commerce Clause. The ability to execute service of process on foreign corporations is an important factor to consider in assessing the local interest in subjecting out-of-state entities to requirements more onerous than those imposed on domestic parties. However, Ohio cannot justify its tolling statute as a means of protecting its residents from corporations who become liable for acts done within the State but later withdraw from the jurisdiction, for the parties concede that the Ohio long-arm statute would have permitted service on ap- pellee throughout the period of limitations. Moreover, the suggestion that appellee had the simple alternatives of designating an agent for service of process in its contract with appellant or tendering an agency appointment to the Ohio Secretary of State is not persuasive. Appellant's argument that a finding that the Ohio statute is unconstitutional should be applied prospectively only, and not to the parties in this case, will not be considered by this Court, since the argument was not presented to the courts below. Pp. 891-895.

820 F.2d 186, affirmed.

KENNEDY, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, STEVENS, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, post, p. 895. REHNQUIST, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 898.

Noel C. Crowley, Southfield, Mich., for appellant.

Ira J. Bornstein, Chicago, Ill., for appellee.

Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Ohio recognizes a 4-year statute of limitations in actions for breach of contract or fraud. The statute is tolled, however, for any period that a person or corporation is not "present" in the State. To be present in Ohio, a foreign corporation must appoint an agent for service of process, which operates as consent to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts. Applying well-settled constitutional principles, we find the Ohio statute that suspends limitations protection for out-of-state entities is a violation of the Commerce Clause.

I

Underlying the constitutional question presented by the Ohio statute of limitations rules is a rather ordinary contract dispute. In 1974, Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., agreed with Bendix Autolite Corporation to deliver and install a boiler system at a Bendix facility in Fostoria, Ohio. Dissatisfied with the work, Bendix claimed that the boiler system had been installed improperly and that it was insufficient to produce the quantity of steam specified in the contract. This diversity action was filed against Midwesco in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio in 1980. Bendix is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio; Midwesco is an Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Illinois.

When Midwesco asserted the Ohio statute of limitations as a defense, Bendix responded that the statutory period had not elapsed because under Ohio law running of the time is suspended, or tolled, for claims against entities that are not within the State and have not designated an agent for service of process.¹ Midwesco replied that this tolling provision violated both the Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The District Court dismissed the action, finding that the Ohio tolling statute constituted an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Ohio statute constituted discrimination in violation of the Commerce Clause because it required a foreign corporation to choose between " 'exposing itself to personal jurisdiction in [state] courts by complying with the tolling statute, or, by refusing to comply, to remain liable in perpetuity for all lawsuits containing state causes of action filed against it in [the State].' " 820 F.2d 186, 188 (1987) (quoting McKinley v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 575 F.Supp. 942, 945 (Idaho 1983)). The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that an agent for service of process could have been appointed by Midwesco either in the contract or by giving notice to the Ohio Secretary of State. Bendix appealed, and we noted probable jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the Ohio tolling statute. 484 U.S. 923, 108 S.Ct. 283, 98 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). We now affirm.

II

Where the burden of a state regulation falls on interstate commerce, restricting its flow in a manner not applicable to local business and trade, there may be either a discrimination that renders the regulation invalid without more, or cause to weigh and assess the State's putative interests against the interstate restraints to determine if the burden imposed is an unreasonable one. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 578-579, 106 S.Ct. 2080, 2084-2085, 90 L.Ed.2d 552 (1986). The Ohio statute before us might have been held to be a discrimination that invalidates without extended inquiry. We choose, however, to assess the interests of the State, to demonstrate that its legitimate sphere of regulation is not much advanced by the statute while interstate commerce is subject to substantial restraints. We find that the burden imposed on interstate commerce by the tolling statute exceeds any local interest that the State might advance.

The burden the tolling statute places on interstate commerce is significant. Midwesco has no corporate office in Ohio, is not registered to do business there, and has not appointed an agent for service of process in the State. To gain the protection of the limitations period, Midwesco would have had to appoint a resident agent for service of process in Ohio and subject itself to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts.² This jurisdiction would extend to any suit against Midwesco, whether or not the transaction in question had any connection with Ohio. The designation of an agent sub- jects the foreign corporation to the general jurisdiction of the Ohio courts in matters to which Ohio's tenuous relation would not otherwise extend. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). The Ohio statutory scheme thus forces a foreign corporation to choose between exposure to the general jurisdiction of Ohio courts or forfeiture of the limitations defense, remaining subject to suit in Ohio in perpetuity. Requiring a foreign corporation to appoint an agent for service in all cases and to defend itself with reference to all transactions, including those in which it did not have the minimum contacts necessary for supporting personal jurisdiction, is a significant burden. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 1033, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987).

Although statute of limitations defenses are not a fundamental right, Chase Securities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945), it is obvious that they are an integral part of the legal system and are relied upon to project the liabilities of persons and corporations active in the commercial sphere. The State may not withdraw such defenses on conditions repugnant to the Commerce Clause. Where a State denies ordinary legal defenses or like privileges to out-of-state persons or corporations engaged in commerce, the state law will be reviewed under the Commerce Clause to determine whether the denial is discriminatory on its face or an impermissible burden on commerce. The State may not condition the exercise of the defense on the waiver or relinquishment of rights that the foreign corporation would otherwise retain. Cf. Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282, 42 S.Ct. 106, 66 L.Ed. 239 (1921); Allenberg Cotton Co. v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20, 95 S.Ct. 260, 42 L.Ed.2d 195 (1974).

The ability to execute service of process on foreign corporations and...