487 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1973), 6-2, United States v. State of Ohio
|Citation:||487 F.2d 936|
|Party Name:||UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The STATE OF OHIO et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Case Date:||October 25, 1973|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit|
Paul T. Michael, Washington, D. C. (Irving Jaffe, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., William E. Nelson, Stanley D. Rose, William C. White, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., on the brief), for appellant.
Robert B. Meany, Asst. Atty. Gen. (William J. Brown, Atty. Gen. on the brief), for appellee, State of Ohio.
John A. Brown, Lucas, Prendergast, Albright, Gibson, Brown & Newman, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee, Successful Relators, Ernest Fry and Thelma Boehm in Supreme Court of Ohio.
Jerry L. Riseling, Columbus, Ohio, for appellee, Jesse T. Kaiser.
Stephen S. Boynton, McIntosh & Boynton, Washington, D. C., for amicus curiae, Governmental Employees.
Leonard S. Sigall, Reynoldsburg, Ohio, for Successful Relators, James C. Ervin, and others in the Tenth District Court of Appeals.
Before TAMM, Chief Judge, and VAN OOSTERHOUT and HASTINGS, Judges.
VAN OOSTERHOUT, Judge.
This case has been certified to this court for appropriate proceedings in accordance with § 211(c) of the Economic Stabilization Act as amended 1, herein-after called the Act, by the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The certification was filed in this court on July 3, 1973.
The issue certified is whether the Act "authorizes the Pay Board and other administrative machinery created by said Act and the executive orders and regulations thereunder, to control the salaries of employees of the State of Ohio in a manner which is in derogation of Senate Bill 147, Section 143.10(A), Ohio Revised Code. [Hereinafter called Pay Bill]."
This action was commenced in the United States District Court by the Government pursuant to §§ 209 and 211 of the Act. The Government seeks a permanent injunction to prevent the State of Ohio from violating the Act and Executive Order 11695 by paying wages and salaries provided by the Ohio Pay Bill to State employees in excess of the amount permitted by the Pay Board Order of March 10, 1973. The certification is based upon the trial court's determination that a substantial constitutional issue is presented.
Section 211(c) provides:
In any action commenced under this title in any district court of the United States in which the court determines that a substantial constitutional issue exists, the court shall certify such issue to the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. Upon such certification, the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals shall determine
the appropriate manner of disposition which may include a determination that the entire action be sent to it for consideration or it may, on the issues certified, give binding instructions and remand the action to the certifying court for further disposition.
The determination of whether appropriate action by this court should be limited to consideration of the constitutional issue certified or whether all issues presented by the litigation should be resolved by this court must be made upon a case-to-case basis. Consideration must be given to the fact that this court is not well equipped to conduct an extensive evidentiary hearing in event such hearing is required, and the fact that the time of three judges living in scattered parts of the country would be consumed in conducting such hearing.
In our present case, all of the record before the trial court is before us. In addition all parties except James C. Ervin, et al., relators in State ex rel. Ervin v. Gilligan, et al., in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Ohio, have entered into and filed with us an agreed statement of facts. Ervin, et al., state in their brief that they agree with the statement of facts set forth in the briefs of the other appellees. Thus it appears that all matters of fact are before us and that no dispute exists as to the basic material facts. Under such circumstances, it is appropriate for us under § 211(c) to hear and dispose of all issues presented by this litigation.
This court has granted plaintiff's motion for an injunction pending final disposition of this case.
The issues here presented may be summarized as follows:
1. Did Congress intend to include the regulation of wages and salaries of State and local government employees within the coverage of the Act.
2. Does Congress under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution have power to regulate State and local government salaries in light of State sovereignty and the Tenth Amendment.
3. Did Congress have a rational basis for regulating the salaries of State employees.
For the reasons hereinafter set forth, we answer all of such questions in the affirmative and grant the Government the injunctive relief it seeks.
The appellees Ervin, et al., alone raise the issue that the judgment of the Franklin County, Ohio, Court of Appeals in State of Ohio ex rel. Ervin v. Gilligan, 35 Ohio App.2d 84, 300 N.E.2d 225 (1973), holds that Congress did not intend the Act to be applicable to the State employees, barring the Government from pursuing this action under the doctrine of res judicata. We reject such contention for the reasons hereinafter stated.
The Pay Bill Act passed by the Ohio General Assembly became effective on January 20, 1972, upon being signed by the Governor. The bill provides for wage and salary increases for State employees by way of salary adjustments, reclassifications, and step increases amounting to an average increase of 10.6% for all employees affected by the bill. Approximately 65, 000 employees of the State, the State University and the County Welfare Departments were granted the increase here involved, effective for the pay period beginning with the one that included January 1, 1972.
On February 10, 1972, the case of State of Ohio ex rel. Ervin v. Gilligan was filed in the Franklin County Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus requiring Ohio officials to pay the salary increases provided for in the Pay Bill. Such relief was granted by a decision handed down on May 29, 1973, reported at 35 Ohio App.2d 84, 300 N.E.2d 225.
The State of Ohio filed an application with the Pay Board for permission to pay salary increases provided in the Pay
Bill. An evidentiary hearing was afforded. The Pay Board by decision and order of March 10, 1972, denied the State's application for exception to the extent the requested increase was in excess of 7% for the current year. The State filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied. Additional requests for authority to pay the remaining amount of the salary increases provided by the Pay Bill and for reconsideration were denied.
On June 20, 1973, the Supreme Court of Ohio in the consolidated cases of Fry v. Ferguson, State ex rel. Boehm v. Legatt, and State ex rel. Kaiser v. Ferguson, 34 Ohio St.2d 252, 298 N.E.2d 129, determined that the state officials must pay the entire salary increases provided by the Pay Bill. The Government was not a party to that action. The decision is based on the court's determination that Congress had not authorized the regulation of State salaries and wages.
It is agreed that the salary increases involved in this litigation are those for work performed between the pay period that included January 1, 1972, and March 1972, and that pursuant to Pay Board Order of March 10, 1972, State employees had been receiving the total salary increases provided by the Pay Bill since March of 1972. 2 Approximately $10.5 million is involved in the salary increases here involved and funds have been appropriated and encumbered pending payment. In addition, approximately five million dollars in wage and salary increases which have not been paid to State University and County Welfare Department employees is involved.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION ISSUE.
The State urges that Congress did not by the Economic Stabilization Act intend to authorize control over State wage and salary practices. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Ferguson, supra. In that case, the Ohio court held that a federal administrative body lacks jurisdiction to prevent enforcement of a State statute establishing the rate of compensation of State employees in the absence of a specific statutory grant of such power. The State relies on Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943), and California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733, 69 S.Ct. 841, 93 L.Ed. 1005 (1949), to support its contention. Reliance on such cases is misplaced. They did not go to the extent of holding that preemption of a field constitutionally authorized can be accomplished only by an express statement that the law applies to states. It is quite true, as stated in the cases relied upon, that preemption is not to be lightly inferred. Moreover, California v. Zook makes mention of lack of supporting legislative history.
The argument that the Act should not be construed so as to include a state within the enumerated list made subject to price regulation, rests largely on the premise that Congress does not ordinarily attempt to regulate state activities and that we should not infer such an intention in the absence of
plain and unequivocal language. Petitioner presses this contention so far as to urge us to accept as a general principle that unless Congress actually uses the word "state", courts should not construe regulatory enactments as applicable to the states. This Court...
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