People v. Camden
| Decision Date | 28 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 5-84-0765,5-84-0765 |
| Parties | , 94 Ill.Dec. 835 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julie CAMDEN, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Law Offices of Robert L. Douglas, Ltd., Robert L. Douglas, Fred W. Johnson, Robinson, for defendant-appellant.
Jon C. Anderson, State's Atty., Robinson, Kenneth R. Boyle, Director, Stephen E. Norris, Deputy Director, Raymond F. Buckley, Jr., Staff Atty., State's Attys. Appellate Service Com'n., Mt. Vernon, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant was charged by information with the offense of attempt murder based upon an incident which occurred in a tavern in Crawford County, Illinois. The defendant affirmatively raised the defense of diminished capacity along with other affirmative defenses prior to trial. The case proceeded to trial on June 25, 1984, a jury was sworn, and the State presented its evidence, and then rested. Thereafter, defendant began presentation of its case in chief. On June 28, 1984, during a meal recess, one of the jurors indicated to the Sheriff of Crawford County, Richard Hunnicutt, that he was concerned over his ability to render an impartial verdict in the case because of a prior drinking problem. The Sheriff reported the incident to the trial judge, A. Hanby Jones, who thereafter held a hearing in his chambers.
Judge Jones first examined Sheriff Hunnicutt, who testified that he had just been with the jurors during a luncheon recess at the Elk's Club in Robinson. In the Sheriff's words, a juror by the name of Hatton told him that "[h]e could not give a partial [sic] judgment because of his drinking problem in later years". The Sheriff added that the juror told him that because he had been a heavy drinker, he could not be impartial. The Sheriff went on to state that the other jurors overheard every word of this conversation, which prompted some discussion among them.
The judge next examined the juror, Donald D. Hatton, who confirmed that he told the Sheriff that because of his problem, he had reservations about his ability to be fair. Hatton stated that the other jurors overheard him. In particular, the alternate juror told him: "You're going to stick it to me yet." The judge thanked Hatton for his honesty, and commented that his only concern was whether Hatton's remarks influenced any of the other jurors. The court then inquired if the State's Attorney had any questions of the juror and the following colloquy ensued:
At the conclusion of Juror Hatton's testimony, the following exchange occurred:
Following the recess, the court informed the jury that it was declaring a mistrial. In the wake of this announcement, the following discussion took place between the State's Attorney and defense counsel:
On July 19, 1984, the case was set again for jury trial, by agreement, for November 13, 1984. On August 30, 1984, the defendant filed a motion for substitution of judge.
On September 11, 1984, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the mistrial had been declared without affording her an opportunity to object. A hearing was held on this motion on October 31, 1984, and the matter was taken under advisement. In an order filed November 7, 1984, Judge Robert M. Keenan, Jr., who was not the trial judge, denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that she consented to the mistrial. In making this determination, Judge Keenan stated:
"While defendant did not request the mistrial, I deem the record to show consent. After the court heard evidence, the State's Attorney and Defense Counsel apparently had a discussion. After that talk, the content of which is not part of the record, the court announced a mistrial and discharged the jury.
Defendant, although present with counsel, did not object to the declaration. Perhaps, she had no duty to object, although that question is also not before the court. What did occur is that Mr. Anderson [State's Attorney] asked the court to set a new trial date. Mr. Douglas [defense counsel] obviously anticipated going to trial again and stated that the case might be assigned to another judge. Mr. Douglas with Defendant present then waived the prior demand for a speedy trial.
Under these circumstances, there having been no objection to the granting of a mistrial and Defendant, through counsel, having waived the speedy trial demand, Defendant consented to the allowance of a mistrial and may not now raise the issue. * * *"
Defendant thereafter filed an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(f) (87 Ill.2d R. 604(f)) from the denial of her motion to dismiss on the grounds of double jeopardy.
The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy represents a policy of finality in criminal prosecutions to protect defendants from being forced to go through a trial more than once. (United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543.) In the case at bar, where the jury had already been impaneled and evidence taken, jeopardy had clearly attached at the time the first trial ended. (People v. Johnson (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 368, 374, 69 Ill.Dec. 285, 290, 447 N.E.2d 502, 507.) A second trial, however, is not necessarily barred merely because jeopardy had attached in the first proceedings. It depends upon the circumstances of each case. (People ex rel. Mosley v. Carey (1979), 74 Ill.2d 527, 534-35, 25 Ill.Dec. 669, 672, 387 N.E.2d 325, 328, cert. denied (1979), 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 292, 62 L.Ed.2d 306.) Where a mistrial has been declared on defendant's motion or is attributable in some manner to the defendant, reprosecution is not barred, as defendant cannot, by his or her own act, avoid the original jeopardy and then assert it as a bar to subsequent proceedings. (People v. Johnson (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 367, 375, 69 Ill.Dec. 285, 290, 447 N.E.2d 502, 507.) If the defendant has either initiated or consented to the declaration of a mistrial, even where the alleged error necessitating the mistrial was the prosecutor's or the judge's, reprosecution may be permissible absent prosecutorial or judicial over-reaching or bad faith. (People v. Rogers (1984), 123 Ill.App.3d 780, 787, 79 Ill.Dec. 73, 78, 463 N.E.2d 211, 216; People ex rel. Roberts v. Orenic (1981), 88 Ill.2d 502, 509-10, 59 Ill.Dec. 68, 71-72, 431 N.E.2d 353, 356-57; United States v. Jorn (1971), 400 U.S. 470, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543.) In some circumstances, a declaration of mistrial will not prevent a second trial, even though defendant objects, if the jury was discharged because of "manifest necessity". (People v. Johnson (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 367, 375, 69 Ill.Dec. 285, 290, 447 N.E.2d 502, 507; United States v. Perez (1824), 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165, 166.)
In the case at bar, the record is clear that the defendant did not move for a mistrial. Unless defendant can be said to have consented to the declaration of the mistrial, the question of whether a retrial is possible depends on whether there was a "manifest necessity" for the mistrial. We turn first to the question of whether defendant consented to the mistrial. The trial court, in denying defendant's motion to bar further prosecution, found that while defendant did not request the mistrial, she impliedly consented to the mistrial by failing to object to the court's declaration of a mistrial. The trial court found that by not objecting to the granting of a mistrial and by waiving the speedy trial demand through counsel, defendant consented to the allowance of a mistrial and could not now claim double jeopardy. We disagree. Defendant's silence and failure to object to the court's declaration of a mistrial sua sponte does not constitute consent to a mistrial so as to permit retrial. See People v. Williams (1984), 130 Ill.App.3d 11, 17, 85 Ill.Dec. 168, 173, 473 N.E.2d 536, 541; People v. Wiley (1979), 71 Ill.App.3d 641, 27 Ill.Dec. 875, 389 N.E.2d 1283.
Where a mistrial is declared without the defendant's consent, the balance weighs more heavily in favor of defendant, because the risks sought to be avoided by the double jeopardy prohibition are subtle and because the prohibition is not against being twice punished, but rather against being twice put in jeopardy. (People v. Williams (1984), 130 Ill.App.3d 11, 15, 85 Ill.Dec. 168, 172, 473 N.E.2d 536, 539.) The purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to protect the defendant's valued right to have a trial completed by a particular tribunal and the right is not limited to cases of prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, but applies to any situation in which a mistrial is...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Escobar
......Mays (1962), 23 Ill.2d 520, 525-26, 179 N.E.2d 654, 656. . Defendant also erroneously contends that his silence, before the trial judge declared the mistrial, did not constitute consent. Defendant relies on People v. Camden (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 488 N.E.2d 1082, where the Appellate Court for the Fifth District held, as a matter of law, that mere silence does not constitute consent to a mistrial. (140 Ill.App.3d 480, 485, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 838, 488 N.E.2d 1082, 1085.) Our supreme court, ......
-
Camden v. Circuit Court of Second Judicial Circuit, Crawford County, Ill.
...... 1 The majority of an Illinois appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of Camden's motion and found that the trial court's mistrial declaration was neither supported by manifest necessity nor consented to by Camden. People v. Camden, 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 488 N.E.2d 1082, 94 Ill.Dec. 835 (5th Dist.1986). In a dissenting opinion, Justice Karns found that Camden had impliedly consented to the trial court's mistrial declaration and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. 140 Ill.App.3d at 488-89, 488 N.E.2d ......
-
People v. Cooper, 1-88-0132
...(Jorn, 400 U.S. at 483, 91 S.Ct. at 556.) We judge the contrary to be true in this case. Defendant also cites People v. Camden (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 480, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 488 N.E.2d 1082, rev'd on other grounds (1987), 115 Ill.2d 369, 105 Ill.Dec. 227, 504 N.E.2d 96 and People v. Campbell ......
-
People v. Camden, 63174
...Ill.2d R. 604(f)). A majority of the appellate court reversed and remanded the cause with directions that the defendant be discharged (140 Ill.App.3d 480, 488, 94 Ill.Dec. 835, 488 N.E.2d 1082). We allowed the People's petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (87 Ill.2d R. The issues pre......