People v. Williams

Decision Date21 November 1985
Docket NumberNo. 61071,61071
Citation109 Ill.2d 391,94 Ill.Dec. 429,488 N.E.2d 255
Parties, 94 Ill.Dec. 429 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Hernando WILLIAMS, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Sheldon Nagelberg, Chicago, for petitioner-appellant.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Chicago, for respondent-appellee; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., Cook County, Chicago, Joan S. Cherry, Kevin Sweeney, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel.

MILLER, Justice:

The petitioner, Hernando Williams, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing his request for post-conviction relief. The petitioner originally pleaded guilty to charges of murder, armed robbery, aggravated kidnaping, and rape and, on the murder conviction, was sentenced by a jury to death; various terms of imprisonment were imposed for the other convictions. This court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal (People v Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari (Williams v. Illinois (1984), 466 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 2364, 80 L.Ed.2d 836. The petitioner then filed, in the circuit court, a petition for post-conviction relief. Following the dismissal of the petition, the State's motion for a direct appeal to this court was allowed (94 Ill.2d R. 302(b) ), and we now affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

The petitioner filed his post-conviction petition on September 10, 1984, raising as grounds for relief questions concerning his guilty plea and the manner in which the sentencing jury was selected. On October 10, 1984, the circuit judge found that the petition was patently without merit and, pursuant to statute, dismissed it without a hearing. (See Ill.Rev.Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 38, par. 122-2.1.) The court's written order explained that the petition did not raise any new issues, that consideration of the issues presented would be precluded by the doctrine of res judicata, and that the petitioner's constitutional rights had not been denied.

On appeal here the petitioner argues that the State's use of its peremptory challenges unconstitutionally excluded blacks from serving on the jury that sentenced him to death; the petitioner is black. The same argument was rejected in the petitioner's original appeal. In an extensive discussion of the question, this court held that the manner in which the prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges was not shown here to have violated the petitioner's right to equal protection under the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; see Swain v. Alabama (1965), 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759) or his distinct right, derived from the sixth amendment, to a jury selected from a fair cross-section of the community (U.S. Const., amend. VI; see Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690). (People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 273-80, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220.) It has been held that res judicata precludes consideration in a post-conviction proceeding of an issue that was determined in the original appeal. (People v. Gaines (1984), 105 Ill.2d 79, 87-88, 85 Ill.Dec. 269, 473 N.E.2d 868.) Ordinarily, then, that result would obtain here.

The petitioner notes that in Gaines, where a similar argument was raised regarding jury selection, the court examined the strength of the evidence on the question, though the same issue had been considered and rejected in the original appeal. The petitioner concludes that a post-conviction showing of necessary evidence may overcome a defense of res judicata, and he argues that that showing was made here. In Swain the Supreme Court suggested that evidence of the State's systematic and purposeful use of peremptory challenges to exclude blacks from juries could be sufficient to raise the constitutional issue. In satisfaction of that threshold requirement, the petitioner here relies on two studies or reports that he incorporated in his post-conviction petition. The first is a collection of statistics compiled by the Illinois Coalition Against the Death Penalty. Those figures reveal the racial composition of juries in recent cases in Illinois in which the death penalty has been imposed; separate figures are shown for black defendants sentenced to death throughout the State and for black defendants sentenced to death in Cook County. The petitioner's second source of information is an article published in the Chicago Tribune summarizing the findings of a month-long study of jury selection in felony trials of black defendants in Cook County.

This court has considered previously the same or similar information and has found it insufficient. An earlier report similar to the one made by the Coalition and submitted here was considered in the petitioner's original appeal. The court said:

"The defendant's briefs in this court in addition contain statements regarding the composition of 43 juries in recent capital cases in this State. Over half of the juries were all white. Most of the rest of the juries contained only one black. How many peremptory challenges were exercised by the defense and by the State is not indicated. There are no other materials to illustrate that the State has regularly and systematically through the exercise of peremptory challenges excused blacks or other minorities in case after case. None of these materials, it would appear, were presented to the trial court." (People v. Williams (1983), 97 Ill.2d 252, 273, 73 Ill.Dec. 360, 454 N.E.2d 220.)

The defects noted on direct appeal are still present here. The Coalition's information provides the racial composition of the various juries, but the manners in which those juries were selected are not shown; there is no evidence regarding the State's use of its peremptory challenges in those cases.

The Chicago Tribune article examined the racial composition of the 31 juries that were...

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4 cases
  • Williams v. Chrans
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • July 5, 1990
    ...seq. (1983). The trial court denied the petition without a hearing and the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. People v. Williams, 109 Ill.2d 391, 94 Ill.Dec. 429 488 N.E.2d 255 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3340, 92 L.Ed.2d 744 (1986). Having exhausted all available state rem......
  • People v. Johnson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 29, 1986
    ...our research reveals the following additional cases decided since Justice Simon filed the Lovelady dissent: People v. Williams (1985), 109 Ill.2d 391, 488 N.E.2d 255; People v. Lyles (1985) 106 Ill.2d 373, 478 N.E.2d 291; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.2d 342, 478 N.E.2d 402; People v. M......
  • People v. Johnson
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • September 29, 1986
    ...our research reveals the following additional cases decided since Justice Simon filed the Lovelady dissent: People v. Williams (1985), 109 Ill.2d 391, 94 Ill.Dec. 429, 488 N.E.2d 255; People v. Lyles (1985), 106 Ill.2d 373, 87 Ill.Dec. 934, 478 N.E.2d 291; People v. Brisbon (1985), 106 Ill.......
  • People v. Mueller
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • November 21, 1985

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