Brazones v. Prothe, 17448

Decision Date17 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 17448,17448
Citation489 N.W.2d 900
PartiesGerald E. BRAZONES, Special Administrator of the Estate of Karl Joseph Brazones, Larry Martin, Irene Martin, Allan D. Hansen, and Charlotte L. Hansen, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jean PROTHE as the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Willard H. Prothe, and Danny B. Thornburg, Defendants and Appellees. James SNYDER and Sunshine Snyder, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jean PROTHE as the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Willard H. Prothe, and Danny B. Thornburg, Defendants and Appellees. Joan MAGER, as Special Administratrix of the Estate of Ronald L. Mager, and in her individual capacity; and Jay E. Mager, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. Jean PROTHE as the Special Administratrix of the Estate of Willard H. Prothe, Danny B. Thornburg, and Robert Shipman, Defendants and Appellees.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

Rick W. Orr, Lawrence L. Piersol, Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Mark K. Blongewicz, Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., Tulsa, Derald W. Wiehl, May, Johnson, Doyle & Becker, P.C., Sioux Falls, for defendants and appellees.

HENDERSON, Justice.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY/ISSUES

Gerald Brazones (special administrator of the estate of Karl Brazones), Larry Martin, Irene Martin, Allan Hansen, Charlotte Hansen, James Snyder, Sunshine Snyder, Joan Mager (special administratrix of estate of Ronald Mager, and in her individual capacity), and Jay Mager 1 commenced this action against Jean Prothe (special administratrix of estate of Willard Prothe), Danny Thornburg and Robert Shipman, respectively, arising out of a petroleum storage tank explosion, near Milford, Iowa, resulting in either injury or death to the plaintiffs. All relevant lawsuits were consolidated in this one action in July 1987.

In May and June of 1987, defendants filed motions to dismiss plaintiffs' complaints for failure to state a claim. Defendant Keearns also separately raised in his motion the issue of lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court overruled all defendants' motions to dismiss, except Keearns on July 2, 1987. The court permitted defendants to re-assert these motions later and held in abeyance a decision on the jurisdictional issue raised by Keearns. The court subsequently granted Keearns' motion based on lack of jurisdiction, dismissing the complaints against him.

In November of 1988, defendant Prothe filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages. In February of 1989, the court granted this motion.

In January of 1990, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on an intervening decision by this Court. Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D.1989). At the May 1990 hearing on this motion, the trial court allowed plaintiffs additional time to file a motion to amend their complaints. In ruling on plaintiffs' motion to amend, the trial court granted plaintiffs leave to amend but refused to permit plaintiffs to join Williams Pipe Line (WPL) as a party-defendant. Following the amendment, the trial court entered its Order granting judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment as to Count I of appellants' amended complaints. On December 28, 1990, the court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on Count II of the amended complaints.

On appeal, plaintiffs raise the following issues:

I. Did the trial court err in applying South Dakota law to this action?

II. Did the trial court err in entering an order for summary judgment?

III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant plaintiffs' motion to amend pleadings to state a claim against Williams Pipe Line Company?

IV. Did the trial court err in ordering partial summary judgment in favor of estate of Prothe?

V. Did the trial court err in dismissing Ray Keearns as a party defendant?

Based on our decision in Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, 488 N.W.2d 63 (S.D.1992), we affirm. Due to our determination on the first two issues, we need not consider plaintiffs' remaining issues.

FACTS

This case arises out of an explosion at a petroleum storage tank owned and maintained by WPL in Milford, Iowa on July 2, 1986. In July, 1986 plaintiffs Hansen, Brazones, Martin, Mager and Snyder were members of a maintenance crew employed by WPL. At the time of the incident, all of the plaintiffs were residents of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, worked for WPL and were based in Sioux Falls, although they served and worked in a multi-state area, including Iowa and Minnesota.

At the time of the incident, defendants were plaintiffs' superiors at WPL. Willard Prothe was the foreman of the plaintiffs' crew at Iowa and was a resident of Sioux Falls at that time. Danny Thornburg was division manager for WPL and was supervisor of all employees at the Sioux Falls terminal. He had responsibility over the Milford storage terminal. He lived and had his office in Sioux Falls. Robert Shipman was district manager of one of two geographical districts within the division. He was a Sioux Falls resident whose office was in Sioux Falls and he reported directly to Thornburg. His district included the Milford terminal, but not the Sioux Falls terminal. Ray Keearns, then WPL's manager of Environmental Affairs and Pipeline Safety was based in WPL's corporate office in Oklahoma. Keearns has responsibility for review and revision of WPL safety manuals, interpretation of pipeline safety and environmental regulations and liaison activities with regulatory agencies. Keearns lived in South Dakota from 1954 to 1960. He had been a resident of Oklahoma since 1967. He visited South Dakota four times in his corporate capacity since 1980 and had not visited the state on personal business for over twenty-five years.

WPL was the corporate employer of all the parties in July 1986. It is a common carrier of refined petroleum products by pipeline. WPL's corporate offices are located in Tulsa, Oklahoma where many of its operating functions are conducted. WPL's pipelines are located in ten midwestern states along with various pumping stations and terminal storage facilities. The company has been qualified to do business in South Dakota since 1965.

On July 2, 1986, the fatal explosion occurred inside the Milford storage tank, while plaintiffs were engaged in cleaning the tank. Snyder, Martin, Mager and Brazones were burned while inside the tank. Hansen and Prothe were outside the tank but also burned. Mager, Brazones and Prothe died as a result of their injuries. Snyder, Martin and Hansen sustained serious injuries from burns.

Many theories were identified as possible causes for the explosion. The most probable cause agreed upon was that the explosion was created by a spark from use of a metal scraper, thereby causing ignition of the fumes and vapors inside the tank. The Iowa State Fire Marshal agreed with this probable conclusion.

DECISION

I. Did the trial court err in applying South Dakota law to this action? We hold that it did not.

As pertains here, an issue of a "conflict of laws" approach in South Dakota is a legal concern which has been in a state of flux since 1989, when the case of Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D.1989) was decided. In Owen, the nominal "majority" continued the application of the doctrine of lex loci delicti in multi-state tort actions, albeit adopting a public policy exception to that rule. Chief Justice Miller wrote a special concurrence in Owen, with which this author and Justice Sabers joined. This special writing advocated the rejection of the lex loci delicti approach completely and concomitant adoption of the choice-influencing considerations approach when facing conflicts of law problems. However, lex loci, with the added public policy exception, ostensibly held the day in South Dakota after our decision in Owen.

We have recently had an opportunity to revisit this question of which choice of laws approach to apply in multi-state tort actions. The recent decision by this Court in Chambers v. Dakotah Charter, 488 N.W.2d 63 (1992), settled this question in South Dakota. This Court in Chambers adopted the most significant relationship approach to govern multi-state tort conflicts. Chambers, at 67-68. We now apply that approach to the case before us.

Initially, we must define and delineate the most significant relationship approach:

(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in Sec. 6.

(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of Sec. 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include:

(a) the place where the injury occurred,

(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,

(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of business of the parties, and

(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.

These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.

Chambers, at 67-68 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws Sec. 145 (1971)). The principles to be considered under Sec. 6 are:

(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law.

(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include

(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,

(b) the relevant policies of the forum,

(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,

(d) the protection of justified expectations,

(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,

(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and

(g) ease in the...

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