Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263

• Decision Date: 06 March 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87-636,87-636
• Parties: Efthimios A. KARAHALIOS, Petitioner v. NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1263
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

489 U.S. 527

109 S.Ct. 1282

103 L.Ed.2d 539

Efthimios A. KARAHALIOS, Petitioner

v NATIONAL FEDERATION OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1263.

No. 87-636.

Argued Jan. 17, 1989.

Decided March 6, 1989.

Syllabus

Petitioner—a language instructor for the Defense Language Institute, a federal agency—was not a union member but was within a bargaining unit for which respondent union was the exclusive bargaining agent. He was promoted to a reopened "course developer" position, which had previously been occupied by one Kuntelos, who was demoted when the Institute first abolished the position. After respondent agreed to arbitrate on behalf of Kuntelos (who was a member of its board) and successfully argued that the position should be declared vacant for refilling, the Institute reassigned the job to Kuntelos, demoted petitioner, and denied his direct protest. Respondent refused to prosecute petitioner's grievances because of a perceived conflict of interest with its previous Kuntelos advocacy. Petitioner then filed unfair labor practice charges with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA), alleging, inter alia, that respondent had breached its duty of fair representation. The FLRA's General Counsel upheld this charge and ordered that a complaint be issued against respondent, which entered into a settlement whereby it posted notice guaranteeing representation to all employees seeking a single position. When the General Counsel rejected petitioner's contention on appeal that the settlement provided him no relief, he filed a damages suit in the District Court, which held that his charge against respondent was judicially cognizable, since the grant of exclusive union representation contained in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act) impliedly gives federal employees a private right of action to safeguard their right to fair representation. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment for petitioner, stating that the CSRA's statutory scheme, which creates both an express duty of fair representation and a remedy in the FLRA for infringement of this duty, precludes implication of a paral el right to sue in federal court.

Held: Title VII of the CSRA does not confer on federal employees a private cause of action against a breach by a union representing such employees of its statutory duty of fair representation. Pp. 531-537.

(a) Title VII's express language does not create a private cause of action, and there is nothing in the Act's language, structure, or legislative history from which a congressional intent to provide such a remedy can be implied. In fact, Title VII's provisions demonstrate that Congress vested exclusive enforcement authority over the duty of fair representation in the FLRA and its General Counsel, since the Title renders a breach of that duty an unfair labor practice, which is adjudicated by the FLRA upon the General Counsel's complaint, and since the Title provides recourse to the courts in only three instances, none of which directly relate to the enforcement of the duty of fair representation. To hold that the district courts must entertain such cases in the first instance would seriously weaken the congressional scheme. Pp. 532-534.

(b) A congressional intent to provide a private CSRA cause of action cannot be implied from that Act's similarities to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and the Railway Labor Act, under which this Court has recognized implicit judicial causes of action to enforce the fair representation duty in the private sector. Unlike the CSRA, neither of those statutes expressly recognizes that duty or provides any administrative remedy for its enforcement. Furthermore, the implication in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842, of a private NLRA cause of action was intended to preserve courts' pre-existing jurisdiction to enforce the fair representation duty after the National Labor Relations Board tardily assumed jurisdiction, whereas, under the pre-CSRA regulatory scheme, there was no equivalent judicial role. Moreover, Vaca and earlier cases stressed that it was critical that unions represent all employees in good faith, since the pertinent statutes deprived bargaining unit employees of their individual rights to bargain by providing for exclusive bargaining agents. In contrast, federal employment does not rest on contract in the private sector sense; the deprivation a federal employee suffers from the election of a bargaining agent—if there is such a deprivation—is not clearly comparable to the private sector predicament; and the collective-bargaining mechanisms created by Title VII do not deprive employees of remedies otherwise provided by statute or regulation. Vaca also rested in part on the fact that private collective-bargaining contracts were enforceable in the courts under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, whereas no provision equivalent to § 301 exists in the CSRA. Pp. 534-536.

821 F.2d 1389 (CA9 1987), affirmed.

WHITE, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Thomas R. Duffy, Monterey, Cal., for petitioner.

H. Stephen Gordon, for respondent.

Richard G. Taranto, Washington, D.C., for U.S., as amicus curiae, supporting the respondent, by special leave of Court.

Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question before the Court is whether Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA or Act), 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (1982 ed. and Supp. IV), confers on federal employees a private cause of action against a breach by a union representing federal employees of its statutory duty of fair representation. Because we decide that Congress vested exclusive enforcement authority over this duty in the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) and its General Counsel, we agree with the Court of Appeals that no private cause of action exists. Hence we affirm.

Petitioner, Efthimios Karahalios, is a Greek language instructor for the Defense Language Institute/Foreign Language Center, Presidio of Monterey, California (Institute). Karahalios was not a union member but was within a bargaining unit of professional employees for which respondent, the National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263 (Union), was the exclusive bargaining agent. In 1976, the Institute reopened its "course developer" position, for which opening Karahalios applied. Previously, the position had been occupied by one Simon Kuntelos, who had been demoted to instructor in 1971, when the Institute first abolished the course developer position. Because Kuntelos declined to seek the reopened job through the competitive application process, Karahalios won the position after scoring 81 on the required examination.

Kuntelos filed a grievance, asserting that the Institute's job award to Karahalios infringed the collective-bargaining agreement, and that Kuntelos should have been assigned the position without a competitive application process. The Union agreed to arbitrate on behalf of Kuntelos (a Union board member), and successfully argued that the position be declared vacant for refilling. Because promotion selection procedures had altered, Kuntelos was permitted considerably more time on the examination. He scored 83, and in May 1978, the Institute reassigned the course developer opening to Kuntelos and demoted Karahalios to instructorship status.

The Institute denied Karahalios' direct protest against the substitution; likewise, the Union refused to prosecute his grievances because of a perceived conflict of interest with its previous Kuntelos advocacy. Karahalios filed unfair labor practice charges with the FLRA challenging both adverse decisions: He alleged, first, that the Institute violated its collective-bargaining agreement; and, second, that the Union breached its duty of fair representation. The General Counsel of the FLRA upheld Karahalios' second charge, and ordered that a complaint be issued against the Union. The Union and the FLRA's Regional Director, however, entered into a settlement whereby the Union posted notice guaranteeing representation to all employees seeking a single position. The General Counsel rejected Karahalios' contention on appeal that the settlement provided him no relief.

Karahalios then filed a damages suit in the District Court, restating his charges against the Institute and the Union. The District Court, in its first of three published orders, dismissed on jurisdictional grounds Karahalios' claim against the Institute, but declared judicially cognizable his unfair labor practice charge against the Union. Specifically, the District Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 supports jurisdiction because the CSRA's grant of exclusive union representation impliedly supplies to federal employees a private right of action to safeguard their right to fair representation. After trial, the District Court ruled that the Union's actions—notably its decisions to arbitrate for Kuntelos without consulting or even notifying, Karahalios, and, subsequently, to refuse to represent Karahalios—breached its duty of fair representation owed to him. The court confined damages to attorney's fees, however, explaining that both applicants were too similarly matched to allow judicial distinction.

The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the CSRA's statutory scheme, which creates both an express duty of fair representation and a remedy in the FLRA for infringement of this duty, precludes implication of a parallel right to sue in federal courts. We granted Karahalios' petition for certiorari. 486 U.S. 1041, 108 S.Ct. 2032, 100 L.Ed.2d 617 (1988).

Prior to 1978, labor relations in the federal sector were governed by a 1962 Executive Order administered by a Federal Labor Relations Council whose decisions were not subject to judicial review. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S. 89, 91-92, 104 S.Ct. 439, 441-442, 78 L.Ed.2d 195 (1983). Since 1978, Title VII of the CSRA has been the controlling authority....