Me. Brd.. Co. Inc. v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co.

• Citation: 49 A.2d 224
• Parties: MAINE BROADCASTING CO., Inc., v. EASTERN TRUST & BANKING CO. et al.
• Decision Date: 19 October 1946
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

49 A.2d 224

MAINE BROADCASTING CO., Inc.,

v.EASTERN TRUST & BANKING CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Oct. 19, 1946.

Suit by Maine Broadcasting Company, Incorporated, against Eastern Trust & Banking Company and Thompson L. Guernsey for a declaratory judgment. From a decree, the defendant bank appeals.

Appeal sustained and case remanded with directions.

Verrill, Dana, Walker, Philbrick & Whitehouse, of Portland, for petitioner.

Edgar M. Simpson and James E. Mitchell, both of Bangor, for defendant Eastern Trust & Banking Co.

Eaton & Peabody, of Bangor, for defendant Thompson L. Guernsey.

Before STURGIS, C. J., and THAXTER, HUDSON, TOMPKINS, and FELLOWS, JJ.

THAXTER, Justice.

We are concerned here with a petition for a declaratory judgment brought under the provisions of Pub.Laws 1941, Ch. 233, now embodied in Rev.Stat.1944, Ch. 95, Secs. 38-50. The original petition sought to have declared invalid as ultra vires an alleged endorsement by the petitioner on a promissory note for $50,500 given by the defendant, Thompson L. Guernsey, to the defendant, Eastern Trust & Banking Co. Guernsey filed an answer to this petition; the defendant, Eastern Trust & Banking Co., demurred on the grounds (1) that the facts as stated did make out a case, (2) that the plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, and (3) that the court had no jurisdiction. This demurrer was overruled by the sitting justice and the defendant, bank, reserved exceptions. It then filed an answer, one allegation of which was that it did not hold any note of the defendant, Guernsey, endorsed by the petitioner. The plaintiff then moved to amend by substituting a new petition setting forth that the plaintiff was a joint maker with Guernsey on a demand note for $50,500 dated June 25, 1941 payable on demand to the said Eastern Trust & Banking Co.; that the signing of the note by the plaintiff was for the accommodation of Guernsey and was ultra vires, and because of such invalidity it asked for a decree that it was not liable on the note. The defendant, bank, objected to the allowance of the amendment, on the ground that it introduced a new cause of action, and to the overruling of its objection took an appeal. Both defendants then answered the amended petition; and, after the filing of replications by the petitioner, the case went to a hearing. The sitting justice filed carefully considered findings and entered a decree sustaining the prayer of the petition and holding that the plaintiff was free of any liability on the note. From this decree the defendant, bank, has appealed.

This appeal brings before us among other issues that raised by the demurrer to the original petition, that the court to which the petition was presented had no jurisdiction. It is to this vital question that we shall address ourselves.

This is the first case under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to be brought before this court. Most of the states have statutes on this subject and the majority have acts similar to our own. There is also a federal statute giving to the United States courts the right to grant this form of relief. Act of June 14, 1934, 48 Stat. at L. 955, chap. 512, Judicial Code, § 274d, 28 U.S.C.A. § 400. These acts have uniformly been held constitutional. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 53 S.Ct. 345, 77 L.Ed. 730, 87 A.L.R. 1191; Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., 150. It is essential that a controversy exist; for otherwise the petition would seek only an advisory opinion of the court. As to what constitutes a controversy see the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes speaking for a unanimous court in AEtna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn., v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 667, 81 L.Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000. A proceeding for a declaratory judgment may be maintained even though another remedy is available. To hold otherwise would do violence to the statute which provides in Sec. 1 that the remedy is available ‘whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.’ For a discussion of this subject see Stephenson v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 406, 408; Schaefer v. First National Bank of Findlay, 134 Ohio St. 511, 18 N.E.2d 263, 265. It should furthermore be borne in mind that the statute in question is remedial and should receive a liberal interpretation in order that the purpose which the legislature had in mind in enacting it may not be thwarted. The act declares in Sec. 15, now Rev.Stat.1944, c. 95, Sec. 50, that its provisions ‘shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact them, and to harmonize, as far as possible, with federal laws and regulations on the subject of declaratory judgments and decrees; * * *.’

The purpose of this statute is not to enlarge the jurisdiction of the courts to which it is applicable but to provide a more adequate and flexible remedy in cases where jurisdiction already exists. The act by its very terms so indicates. It says in section 1, Pub.Laws 1941, Ch. 233, ‘Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power * * *.’ Mr. Anderson says: ‘* * * it is the undoubted weight of authority, sustained upon unassailable reasons, that the declaratory judgment statutes do not have the effect of increasing or enlarging the jurisdiction of the courts.’ Anderson, Declaratory Judgments, 81. And Mr. Borchard in his work on this subject says: ‘It is an axiom that the Declaratory Judgments Act has not enlarged the jurisdiction of the courts over subject matter and parties, although it manifestly has opened to prospective defendants-and to plaintiffs at an early stage of the controversy-a right to petition for relief not heretofore possessed. In that sense, it has decidedly extended the power of courts to grant relief in cases otherwise within their jurisdiction to pass upon.’ Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 2d Ed., 233. Such also has been the view of the majority of courts which have had this problem before them. As examples we call attention to the following cases: AEtna Casually & Surety Co. v. Quarles, 4 Cir., 92 F.2d 321; Davis v. American Foundry Equipment Co., 7 Cir., 94 F.2d 441, 115 A.L.R. 1486; Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. City of Jackson, 5 Cir., 116 F.2d 924; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Wallace, supra; AEtna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, supra. See also for a discussion of this subject Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 792, 128 So. 258. All of these cases indicate that the purpose of Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act is to...