Norfolk & P. Belt Line R. Co v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 01 December 1904
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: NORFOLK & P. BELT LINE R. CO. v. COMMONWEALTH.

49 S.E. 39

103 Va. 289

NORFOLK & P. BELT LINE R. CO.

v.COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Dec. 1, 1904.

railroads—state corporation commission— fixing of charges—charges for placing cars on scales—review—order of commission — amount of the bate fixed — prima facie evidence.

1. Const. § 156, subsec. "b, " declares that the State Corporation Commission shall have the power of regulating all transportation companies in relation to the performance of their public duties and charges therefor, and that the commission shall enforce such rates as may be reasonable. A transportation company, the business of which consisted of conducting a switch line and handling cars to and from industries with which it had established switching connections, observed the usual custom of placing cars in position to be weighed on consignees' or shippers' individual track scales, which scale service was necessary to the due delivery of goods. Held, that the Corporation Commission had authority to fix the charges for placing the cars in position on such scales.

2. Under Const. § 156, subsec. "f, " providing that the action of the State Corporation Commission shall be regarded as prima facie just and correct, on appeal from an order fixing the charge which a transportation corporation might make for placing cars to be weighed on consignees' or shippers' individual track scales the charges fixed were prima facie correct, and the finding entitled to peculiar weight.

Appeal from State Corporation Commission.

Appeal by the Norfolk & Portsmouth Belt Line Railroad Company from the order of the State Corporation Commission fixing the charge for placing cars in position to be weighed on consignees' or shippers' individual track scales. Order affirmed.

Thos. H. Willcox, for appellant.

W. A. Anderson, Atty. Gen., and A. C. Braxton, for the Commonwealth.

WHITTLE, J. This is an appeal from an order of the State Corporation Commission fixing the charge for placing cars in position to be weighed on consignees' or shippers' individual track scales, located on sidings leading to industries along the line of appellant's railroad, at 25 cents per car for each car, loaded or empty, so placed in position and weighed.

Appellant is a public service corporation, duly incorporated by the Legislature of Virginia, and authorized to acquire land and construct, maintain, and operate a railroad with one or more tracks from any point on the line of the Norfolk & Carolina Railroad Company at or near Pinner's Point, to some point on the line of the Norfolk & Western Railway Company between the eastern and southern branches of Elizabeth river. The road is what is known as a "switching line, " and its business consists of handling cars along its route from the terminus of one railroad to the terminus of another, and to and from the various industries with which it has established switching connections. For this service it receives the uniform compensation of $1.50 for each loaded car hauled by it, without regard to the length of the haul, and nothing for empty cars.

The character of the service which is the subject of this investigation can be best illustrated by that rendered by the railroad company for the F. S. Royster Company, the owners of an extensive fertilizer manufacturing plant, whose property adjoins the belt line.

By agreement with the guano company, appellant, when its road was in course of construction, put in a number of sidings, with necessary switching facilities, connecting the company's buildings with the railroad. A track scale was installed on one of these sidings for the purpose of weighing such of the cars consigned to the company as might be necessary in the proper conduct of theirbusiness. The railroad's part in the performance of that service is to switch the car to be weighed on the scale track, push it on the scale with its engine, and uncouple it. The sworn weighmaster of the guano company takes the weight of the car, which is then pushed off the scales by the next car to be weighed, and that process is repeated until all are weighed. When unloaded, the empty cars, by a reverse course, are in turn pulled on the scales and weighed, and the difference between the weights of the loaded and empty car gives the weight of its lading. The goods of the guano company are handled in car-load lots, and about 6, 000 cars are annually delivered by the railroad company upon their sidings.

Until about one year before the institution of these proceedings, in delivering cars consigned to customers the railroad company imposed a charge of 15 cents for each car placed on the scales, whether loaded or empty, which charge was afterwards increased to 50 cents per car, whereupon complaints were made to the State Corporation Commission by shippers and consignees owning private sidings connected with the railroad that the increased charge was unreasonable and unjust. The proceedings instituted by the commission upon these complaints resulted in the order now under review, which, as remarked, reduced the rate from 50 cents to 25 cents per car.

To this ruling of the commission, appellant assigns two grounds of error:

First. It is insisted that placing cars on private track scales in position to be weighed is a matter of private contract, involving a nonpublic service, which the State Corporation Commission cannot require a railroad company to perform for customers having switching connections with the road; and therefore cannot fix the charges therefor; and

Second. That, even if the commission has jurisdiction over the subject, the rate of compensation fixed by it is unreasonable and unjust.

The principle upon which the state assumes authority to control and regulate the affairs of railroads and other public service corporations rests largely upon the doctrine of agency. Such corporations are founded by the Legislature for public purposes, and are clothed with authority, subject to state regulation and control, to exercise important governmental functions. By their charters they are granted privileges which may not be exercised by private persons, whether individuals or corporations, but always with the reservation, express or implied, that such privileges are subject to reasonable governmental control. Cal. v. Pac. R. R. Co., 127 U. S. 40, 8 Sup. Ct. 1073, 32 L. Ed. 150. This right of control is part of the police power of the state.

As was said by this court in the City of Petersburg v. Petersburg Aqueduct Co., 102 Va. 654, 47 S. E. 848: "Bearing in mind the distinction between public and private corporations in the matter of public control—that the former are regarded as instrumentalities of the state, and liable to visitation and regulation, while the charters of the latter are contracts within the meaning of the contract clauses of the state and federal Constitutions, the obligation of which, in the sense of those clauses, cannot be impaired, * * * nevertheless the police power of the state is a governmental function, the exercise of which neither the Legislature nor any subordinate agency thereof upon which part of its authority may have been conferred can alienate or surrender by grant, contract, or other delegation. Richmond, etc., Co. v. Richmond, 26 Grat. 83; s. c. 96 U. S. 521, 24 L. Ed. 734; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. Ed. 989; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 ...