Com. v. Zoller

Decision Date11 June 1985
Citation507 Pa. 344,490 A.2d 394
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. John ZOLLER, Appellee. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Despina SMALIS, a/k/a Pepe Smalis, Appellee. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Ernest SMALIS, a/k/a Anastasios Smalis, Appellee.
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Edward Tocci, Dist. Atty., John Lee Brown, Anthony Berosh, Dale M. Fouse, Theresa Ferris-Dukovich, Asst. Dist. Attys., Beaver, for appellant in No. 26.

Robert E. Colville, Dist. Atty., Robert L. Eberhard, Deputy Dist. Atty., Melinda G. Tell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Pittsburgh, for appellant in No. 62.

Bernard Rabik, Beaver, for appellee in No. 26.

Thomas A. Livingston, Pittsburgh, for Ernest Smalis, etc.

Norma Chase, Pittsburgh, for Despina Smalis, etc.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, HUTCHINSON, ZAPPALA and PAPADAKOS, JJ.

OPINION

NIX, Chief Justice.

We are here called upon to consider the broad question as to the applicability of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 upon a trial court order granting a defendant's motion to terminate the trial in his favor before verdict. Specifically, the issue raised is whether our procedure which permits a trial court's order sustaining a demurrer to the Commonwealth's evidence to be reversed upon appeal, allows a new trial where the order was erroneously entered. For the reasons that follow we are satisfied that our procedure does not offend double jeopardy.

I.

This appeal concerns two consolidated cases, Commonwealth v. Smalis, 331 Pa.Super. 307, 480 A.2d 1046 (1984), and Commonwealth v. Zoller, 318 Pa.Super. 402, 465 A.2d 16 (1983), both of which ended when the trial judge, sitting in a non-jury trial, granted defendants' demurrers to the prosecution's case. In Smalis defendants were charged with two counts of murder by arson. After the prosecution presented its evidence, the trial court found as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence to link the defendants to the setting of the fire and sustained defense demurrers. The Commonwealth appealed. A panel of the Superior Court analogized the demurrer to an acquittal, and quashed the appeal on double jeopardy grounds. On reargument, en banc, the Superior Court affirmed the panel's decision.

Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Zoller, supra, the trial court determined that the evidence did not establish the element of general criminal intent and sustained defense demurrers to charges of aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering another person and criminal conspiracy. On appeal, the Superior Court found that the trial court erred when it sustained the motions for demurrer, but concluded that it was unable to grant the Commonwealth any relief in light of its earlier ruling in Commonwealth v. Smalis, supra.

II.

Double jeopardy has been recognized as having three separate and distinct objectives: the protection of the integrity of a final judgment, the prohibition against multiple prosecutions even where no final determination of guilt has been made and the proscription against multiple punishment for the same offense. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The question of multiple punishments for the same offense is not implicated in the instant appeals and therefore need not require our attention. We are called upon to examine the first two objectives to determine whether they are in any way offended by a redetermination of the trial courts decisions to grant the motion for demurrer.

A.

The notion of the sanctity of the finality of a judgment in a criminal case developed from the common-law pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon which required a final judgment of guilt or innocence by the finder of fact. The most frequent articulation of this theory has been "... that the State with all of its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense...." United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 86, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2191, 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978), quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88, 78 S.Ct. 221, 223-24, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). Under this approach, the protection of the rule applies only after a defendant has been convicted or acquitted--after the complete disposition of the action against him. Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 33, 98 S.Ct. 2156, 2159, 57 L.Ed.2d 24 (1978). However, this concept has not been interpreted as an absolute foreclosure of review of a judgment of the trial court in its disposition of criminal cases. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896). Thus we must examine the federal precedent to ascertain those factors which determine when the trial judgment is to be given the cloak of finality precluding further review.

The key question in the examination of this aspect of the double jeopardy protection is what is considered a final determination of guilt or innocence for this purpose. Interestingly, the concept of finality was never interpreted as precluding review of the entry of judgment in a criminal case by way of appeal. Rather, the focus was upon the second prosecution which was deemed offensive.

In the course of the debates over the Bill of Rights, there was no suggestion that the Double Jeopardy Clause imposed any general ban on appeals by the prosecution.... Nor does the common-law background of the Clause suggest an implied prohibition against state appeals. Although in the late 18th century the King was permitted to sue out a writ of error in a criminal case...., the principles of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict imposed no apparent restrictions on this right. It was only when the defendant was indicted for a second time after either a conviction or an acquittal that he could seek the protection of the common-law pleas. The development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its common-law origins thus suggests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial.

United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 342, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1021, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975).

This concept of the protection intended to be afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause is clearly reflected in the U.S. Supreme Court's articulation of the central design of the guarantee:

"... [to] protect an individual from being subjected to the hazard of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged offense.... The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the state with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent, he may be found guilty."

Green v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at 187-88, 78 S.Ct. at 223-24 (1957). See also, Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 445, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 1861, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981); United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 127, 101 S.Ct. 426, 432, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980); United States v. Scott, supra, 437 U.S. at 95, 98 S.Ct. at 2196; Crist v. Bretz, supra, 437 U.S. at 35, 98 S.Ct. at 2160; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 11, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 2147, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978); Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 n. 13, 98 S.Ct. 824, 829 n. 13, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 606, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 387-88, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1061-63, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975); United States v. Wilson, supra, 420 U.S. at 353, 95 S.Ct. at 1027; United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971). 2

Following this approach it has been firmly established where review would not subject the defendant to a second trial, a trial order favoring a defendant could be appealed without offending double jeopardy. United States v. Morrison, 429 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 24, 50 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976) (per curiam) (Double jeopardy does not bar prosecutorial appeal from trial court order applying retroactively an appellate suppression ruling subsequent to the entering of a guilty verdict in a bench trial.) Successful appeal from the post-verdict suppression ruling would merely result in reinstatement of a guilty verdict rather than a retrial or "further proceedings ... devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged." United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 370, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975). An exception to the rule that denies the state the opportunity to appeal from an acquittal is where the judgment of acquittal is entered by a trial court following a jury verdict of guilty. No retrial is required because the original verdict can be reinstated. Cf. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569-70, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353-54, 51 L.Ed.2d 642 (1977) (prosecution is precluded by double jeopardy bar from appealing from a directed verdict of acquittal following a hung jury).

B.

Our inquiry must now turn to when appellate review is permissible where the grant of a second trial is required to remedy the asserted claim of error. Although double jeopardy is a right afforded to protect the defendant, it is interesting to note that originally it was thought that a new trial was unavailable after appeal, whether requested by the prosecution or the defendant. See United States v. Gibert,...

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