Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 73-3088 Summary Calendar.

Decision Date06 March 1974
Docket NumberNo. 73-3088 Summary Calendar.,73-3088 Summary Calendar.
PartiesAnthony T. LEE et al., Plaintiffs, Mrs. James O'Neal et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, United States of America, Plaintiff-Intervenor and Amicus Curiae, National Education Association, Inc., Plaintiff-Intervenor, v. MACON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al., Defendants, (Randolph County Board of Education) et al., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Demetrius C. Newton, Birmingham, Ala., Jack Greenberg, Norman Chachkin, Charles E. Williams, III, New York City, for plaintiffs.

John S. Casey, Heflin, Ala., for defendants.

Ira DeMent, U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., J. Stanley Pottinger, Asst. Atty. Gen., Civ. Rights Div., U. S. D. of Washington, D. C., Solomon S. Seay, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., for other interested parties.

Before BELL, GODBOLD and GEE, Circuit Judges.

GODBOLD, Circuit Judge:

Appellant, Inez Knight, brought this suit on behalf of her daughters, Lillie Mae, 17, and Rose Ella, 14. The two children were pupils in Randolph County High School, located in a largely rural Alabama county. The high school principal, Hulond Humphries, sent the children home from school February 2, 1973. He did not tell them when they would be allowed to return. The same date he wrote two letters to the Randolph County Board of Education listing his various disciplinary contacts with each child and requesting that each be "dismissed" from school. Appellant and her children were not sent copies of the letters or otherwise informed of their existence or content.

February 7 appellant filed a motion for emergency relief in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. She sought the childrens' reinstatement in school, in essence claiming that they had been excluded without due process. Action on the motion was deferred on agreement pending an administrative hearing before the Board of Education. Lillie Mae and Rose Ella remained out of school in the interim.

At the hearing before the Board on March 8, 1973, Principal Humphries testified to having disciplined the children for several infractions. Both girls had fought with other children in the school halls. On one occasion Rose Ella struck Coach Johnson, the football coach, as he was attempting to break up a fight between her and another student. Both girls used abusive language on several occasions when their teachers reprimanded them. Lillie Mae was absent from school without permission for at least one day. She also counseled her younger sister to flout a teacher's orders. Both children disobeyed teachers' directions and resisted corporal and other forms of punishment.

The appellant and the children were present with their lawyer at the Board hearing. Only two witnesses appeared against them, Principal Humphries and School Superintendent Simpson. The latter had no personal knowledge of the children's misbehavior. The former had personal knowledge of their resistence to punishment and their abusive language, but had not observed the fights and other transgressions that had initially caused teachers to recommend punishment.1 The children and their mother were permitted to testify before the Board. Lillie Mae and Rose Ella denied being at fault in the fights and claimed that they had made good faith efforts to complete home work assigned by the principal as punishment but which he had found unacceptable. Mrs. Knight testified that the girls had been the targets of taunts from their fellow students because their uncles, her brothers, had been indicted for murder.

The Board of Education acquiesced in Humphries' request by permanently expelling both children. On July 20, 1973, the District Court denied the motion for emergency relief, holding that there had been no deprivation of due process and that the evidence before the Board of Education was sufficient to support the determination that the children were guilty of the infractions charged. The District Court also held that, although harsh, the penalty assessed — permanent exclusion from school — was not arbitrary in view of the school's interest in avoiding disruption and in view of the principal's assiduous but frustrated efforts to work out the problem by conference with the children and their mother. It appears from the record and briefs that Lillie Mae and Rose Ella have received no schooling at all from February, 1973 to the date of this appeal.

In our view the Board employed an erroneous legal standard in considering the children's cases. During the disciplinary hearing the Superintendent, who is also Secretary of the Board, was interrogated about Board response to a request from the principal for expulsion of a student. He described the Board's policy in this way:

A: . . . Our policy is that the principal exhausts every effort; and once he recommends it, we usually grant it.
Q: And do you know of any exceptions to that rule?
A: I don\'t; white or black.

Thus it appears that rather than bringing to bear its independent judgment on the question of what penalty to assess, the Board made a practice of confirming the principal's judgment. When a serious penalty is at stake a school board must provide a higher degree of due process than when the student is threatened only with a minor sanction. See, e. g., Williams v. Dade County School Board, 441 F.2d 299 (CA5 1971). Here permanent exclusion from the county educational system was the potential penalty. Formalistic acceptance or ratification of the principal's request or...

To continue reading

Request your trial
30 cases
  • Ingraham v. Wright
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • July 29, 1974
    ...Application is limited to the rare case where there is shocking disparity between offense and penalty." Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 5 Cir. 1974, 490 F.2d 458, 460 n. 3. In the present case, as regards Drew Junior High School, there exists "a shocking disparity" between the offen......
  • Gorman v. University of Rhode Island
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • October 14, 1986
    ...conclusions and disciplinary sanctions. See Strickland v. Inlow, 519 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir.1975); Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 490 F.2d 458, 461 (5th Cir.1974) ("Formalistic acceptance or ratification of the principal's request or recommendation as to the scope of punishment, wi......
  • Magyar v. Tucson Unified School Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Arizona
    • March 14, 1997
    ...Criminology 3, 7 (1985). It is well established that getting a high school education is crucial to survival. See Lee v. Macon Bd. of Educ., 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir.1974). When the suspended or expelled child is handicapped, the impact is even greater. Congress, itself, recognized the imm......
  • A.V. v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas
    • February 14, 2022
    ...difficulties faced by school officials in attempting to curb disorderly interferences with ... education," Lee v. Macon Cnty. Bd. of Ed. , 490 F.2d 458, 460 (5th Cir. 1974), a school district cannot read into a statute more authority than was given just because of community pressure. Theref......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT