Wray v. City of New York
| Decision Date | 18 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 05-3341-cv. |
| Citation | 490 F.3d 189 |
| Parties | Raymond WRAY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Daniel Martorano, William Weller, James McCavera and New York City Police Department, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Alan Beckoff, Assistant Corporation Counsel (Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of the City, of New York, on the brief; Stephen J. McGrath, Liora Jacobi, of counsel), New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellants.
Dawn M. Cardi (Robert Rosenthal, on the brief), New York, NY, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: JACOBS, Chief Judge, POOLER, and GIBSON, Circuit Judges.*
Having prevailed in federal habeas proceedings and avoided retrial on the charge of armed robbery, Raymond Wray brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various parties he deemed responsible for the constitutional violation that led to his conviction. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Weinstein, J.) granted the defendants summary judgment on all claims but two. In denying summary judgment on those two claims—Wray's claims against Officer William Weller of the New York City Police Department and the City of New York—the district court recited that immediate appellate review of that ruling is desirable because they involve controlling questions of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), we accepted defendants' interlocutory appeal.
This interlocutory appeal raises two controlling issues of law: where the admission of testimony at trial regarding a witness identification violated a defendant's right to due process and a fair trial, whether the defendant [i] can establish a § 1983 claim against the officer who conducted the identification procedure; and [ii] can establish a § 1983 "failure to train and supervise" claim against the police department. We answer both questions in the negative. The district court's denial of summary judgment is therefore reversed and we remand to the district court with instructions to enter judgment for defendants on Wray's remaining two claims.
A detailed background of Wray's arrest, prosecution, and conviction is found in our opinion reversing the denial of Wray's habeas petition. See Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 517-24 (2d Cir.2000). We summarize only the facts that bear on the issues presented on this appeal, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wray, as the non-moving party. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 69 (2d Cir. 2005).
Three New York City police officers were conducting a stakeout observation from the roof of a Queens restaurant in November 1990, when they saw a man wearing a long black coat and a hat who was pointing a gun at another man and took his jacket. The victim and the robber were each accompanied by another man.
Officers William Weller and James McCavera left the rooftop and apprehended on the street the person who was with the robber (Dennis Bailey). Having learned that the man in the coat and hat had gone inside the restaurant, Officers Weller and McCavera went in, found the stolen jacket, and arrested Raymond Wray, who was wearing a long black coat and a hat.
The victim of the robbery, Melvin Mitchell, and Craig Williams (who accompanied him) were no longer at the scene; but Mitchell was told shortly thereafter by another officer that the robbers had been apprehended and that he should go to the police station. Within hours of the arrests, Mitchell and Williams went to the station. According to the police, each was taken to look at Wray, who was in a holding cell, and each independently confirmed that Wray was the gunman. Williams later testified that he believed the name of the officer who conducted the showup identification "starts with a W. Wellie"— which could reasonably be found to be Officer Weller.
Wray was indicted on multiple counts of first-degree robbery and weapons possession. Bailey pled guilty to one count of criminal possession of a weapon, but went to trial on the robbery and other weapons charges. At the start of his trial in New York Supreme Court, Queens County, in April 1992, the trial court held a Wade hearing on Wray's motion to suppress the stationhouse showup identifications. Mitchell, Williams, and Officer Daniel Martorano (the third officer at the scene) testified as to the identification procedure. After the hearing, the trial court granted Wray's motion to suppress Mitchell's stationhouse identification, but ruled that Williams could testify as to his identification of Wray at the stationhouse.
Williams so testified, and the jury convicted Wray of two counts of first-degree robbery, one count of second-degree criminal possession of a weapon, and one count of third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department, ruled that the trial court had erred in admitting testimony regarding Williams's stationhouse showup identification, because it was the product of unduly suggestive police procedures; but the Appellate Division nonetheless confirmed the conviction on the ground that the error was harmless. People v. Wray, 225 A.D.2d 718, 640 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1996). Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. People v. Wray, 88 N.Y.2d 1025, 651 N.Y.S.2d 25, 673 N.E.2d 1252 (1996).
Wray petitioned for a federal writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of New York, arguing that the admission of testimony regarding Williams's showup identification violated his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial. The district court denied the petition on the ground of harmless error. Wray v. Johnson, No. 96 CV 5139, 1998 WL 426569, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10625 (E.D.N.Y. June 18, 1998). On February 2, 2000, this Court concluded that the error was not harmless and reversed, granting the petition conditionally unless Wray was retried Wray within 90 days. Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515 (2d Cir.2000). The Queens District Attorney's Office declined to retry Wray, and he was released after eight years in prison.
On July 20, 2001, Wray filed this § 1983 action in the Eastern District of New York. His second amended complaint was filed on August 8, 2003 naming as defendants Officers Weller, Martorano, and McCavera, the New York City Police Department, and the City of New York. The complaint alleges violations of the United States Constitution and state law, including denial of due process, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and failure to train and supervise police officers.
On April 14, 2004, defendants moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R.Civ.P. 56, arguing probable cause, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim. By opinion and order dated October 18, 2004, the district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all but two of Wray's claims, but noted the desirability of an interlocutory appeal of its decisions with respect to the two remaining claims against: [i] Officer Weller for performing an unduly suggestive showup, and [ii] the City of New York for failing to adequately train and supervise its police officers on proper identification procedures. Wray v. City of New York, 340 F.Supp.2d 291 (E.D.N.Y.2004).
Both parties sought interlocutory review of the district court's opinion and order. On June 30, 2005, this Court denied Wray's motion but granted defendants'.
We review de novo the district court's denial of summary judgment. Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664, 667 (2d Cir.1996). In doing so, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. Maguire v. Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc., 147 F.3d 232, 235(2d Cir.1998) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). Summary judgment is appropriate only where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).
Wray alleges that Officer Weller violated his constitutional due process and fair trial rights by conducting the unduly suggestive showup identification, and seeks damages under § 1983 for his conviction and incarceration. Officer Weller argues that he cannot be held liable for Wray's conviction or incarceration because, even assuming (as we must on summary judgment) that Officer Weller conducted the suggestive showup identification, superseding acts by both the prosecutor and trial judge broke the chain of causation between Weller's conduct and the violation of Wray's constitutional rights.
As we explained when we conditionally granted Wray's habeas petition, we have not held that a suggestive identification alone is a constitutional violation; rather, the constitutional violation is that Wray's right to a fair trial was impaired by the admission of testimony regarding the unreliable identification:
In the context of an identification following a police procedure that was impermissibly suggestive, the due process focus is principally on the fairness of the trial, rather than on the conduct of the police, for a suggestive procedure "does not itself intrude upon a constitutionally protected interest."
Wray, 202 F.3d at 524(quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113, n. 13, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)) (emphasis added); see also Wray, 340 F.Supp.2d at 302( that there is no constitutional right not to be subjected to an unconstitutionally suggestive identification). "Suggestive procedures are disapproved `because they increase the likelihood of misidentification,' and it is the admission of testimony carrying such a `likelihood of misidentification which violates a defendant's right to due process.'" Wray, 202 F.3d at 524(quoting Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct....
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