State v. Williams

• Citation: 490 N.E.2d 906,23 OBR 13,23 Ohio St.3d 16
• Decision Date: 26 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-7,85-7
• Parties: , 23 O.B.R. 13 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

Page 16

23 Ohio St.3d 16

490 N.E.2d 906, 23 O.B.R. 13

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. WILLIAMS, Appellant.

No. 85-7.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

March 26, 1986.

Samuels, Nicholson, and Robinson were driving down the Samuels driveway around 10:30 p.m. when Samuels saw appellant and Chmielewski at her door. They honked the horn, but appellant motioned for the car to proceed without him. When Nicholson and Samuels returned, a little over an hour later, Nicholson went across the street to find that the door was open and Chmielewski's body was on the floor. Nicholson returned to the Samuels residence, whereupon Samuels called appellant's mother's home, then the police.

When the police arrived, at approximately 1:00 a.m., January 21, 1983, they found not only the body, but also several coins scattered near the doorway, numerous bank envelopes throughout the house and down to the street corner, decedent's purse with its contents emptied on the bedroom closet shelf, decedent's false teeth on the floor next to the body, and the phone off the hook. A subsequent police investigation revealed an imprint on the hem of the nightgown decedent was wearing which matched a portion of a shoe appellant was wearing the day of his arrest. Appellant's jacket sleeve cuff also contained a trace of lead powder.

In addition to the above evidence, the state presented two witnesses who were former cellmates of appellant while he was confined to the Cuyahoga County Jail pending trial. Michael Anderson and Navarro Brooks each testified that appellant had told them he had murdered the decedent. Specifically, Anderson testified that appellant had said he "stuck the gun in her mouth" to get her "to shut up." Brooks testified that appellant was worried about blood on his shoes apparently from rolling decedent's body over with his foot. After this testimony, the state rested, as did the appellant, without presenting any evidence.

The jury found appellant guilty of aggravated murder in violation of R.C. 2903.01, and the accompanying specification under R.C. 2929.04(A)(7) of having committed the aggravated murder in the course of committing an aggravated robbery, for which the death penalty could be imposed. The jury also found appellant guilty of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, as well as the firearm specification contained in R.C. 2929.71.

On October 13, 1983, the sentencing phase of the trial commenced. Appellant presented three witnesses, his father, sister, and a friend, in addition to making an unsworn statement on his own behalf. The evidence in mitigation was essentially: that appellant was relatively young (twenty-four); that he loved his mother more than himself, but that she rejected him; and that he elected to pursue a life of crime in order to compensate for a lack of love during his childhood. After more than twenty-three hours of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict, finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the factors offered in mitigation, and sentencing appellant to death. This conviction and sentence were affirmed by both the trial court and the court of appeals, after each made an independent determination that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors.

The cause is now before this court upon an appeal as of right.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., Thomas S. Hudson and Thomas J. Sammon, Cleveland, for appellee.

Hyman Friedman, County Public Defender, Marillyn Fagan Damelio and Richard L. Gedeon, Cleveland, for appellant.

PER CURIAM.

Today we are called upon to review the conviction and death sentence of appellant. The court of appeals held that appellant's assignments of error were not well-taken and that the death penalty statutes are constitutional and were constitutionally applied in the instant case. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the appellate court's ruling and uphold the death penalty sentence.

Appellant's first proposition of law urges that he was denied his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and R.C. 2945.25(C), when the trial court excused five jurors for cause. Upon review of the record, we determine that there was reasonable cause for the trial court to excuse a number of jurors on the basis of their own health, or personal problems at home needing their attention. Appellant, in his second proposition of law, argues that these rights were further denied by the so-called death-qualification process, authorized by Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , and its progeny, prior to the guilt determination phase of his trial. These constitutional requirements have been embodied in R.C. 2945.25(C) and this court's decisions in State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 473 N.E.2d 264, certiorari denied (1985), 473 U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3514, 87 L.Ed.2d 643, paragraph two of the syllabus, and State v. Maurer (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 473 N.E.2d 768, paragraph two of the syllabus. A review of the record demonstrates that the jurors were excused under the constitutional principles embodied in Witherspoon, supra; Adams v. Texas (1980), 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581, and Jenkins, supra; i.e., their beliefs would lead them to ignore the law or violate the judge's instructions.

In his third proposition of law appellant argues that he was denied his right to confront witnesses by the trial court's protective order as to two of the state's witnesses. Confrontational rights are guaranteed to an accused through the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Pointer v. Texas (1965), 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, and by Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution. Such rights are legitimately constrained by Crim.R. 16(B)(1)(e) which provides the trial court with authority to forbid disclosure of the names and addresses of witnesses "if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the court that to do so may subject the witness or others to physical or substantial economic harm or coercion." Certification is not satisfied by the prosecutor merely stating his or her conclusion that a witness might be subject to harm, but requires the state's reasons for requesting witness protection to appear on the record. State v. Owens (1975), 51 Ohio App.2d 132, 147, 366 N.E.2d 1367 . The reasons for withholding the identity of the state's witnesses who were also incarcerated in the Cuyahoga County Jail at the time, i.e., the high risk of repercussions for producing evidence against a fellow prisoner, do appear on the record. In any event, these witnesses' identities were not absolutely withheld, as they were present at the trial and subject to cross-examination. Appellant has failed to show the sufficient degree of prejudice to his ability to defend himself required for a conviction reversal (State v. Parson [1983], 6 Ohio St.3d 442, 453 N.E.2d 689, syllabus), given his failure to exercise the options offered by the trial court of requesting indefinite continuances and using investigators to prepare his cross-examination.

In his fourth proposition of law, appellant contends the trial court committed reversible error in finding him competent to stand trial. Appellant failed to produce any evidence to rebut the presumption, contained in R.C. 2945.37(A), that a criminal defendant is competent. Since the adequacy of the data relied upon by the expert who examined the appellant is a question for the trier of fact, and since there was some reliable, credible evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that appellant understood the nature and objective of the proceedings against him, this court will not disturb the finding that appellant was competent to stand trial. See 5 Ohio Jurisprudence 3d (1978) 212, Appellate Review, Section 608.

Appellant next contends, in his fifth proposition of law, that he was denied his right to an impartial jury by admission of prejudicial or otherwise irrelevant evidence, specifically photographs of the scene of the crime and bank envelopes found outside the victim's home. We have recently held that: "Properly authenticated photographs, even if gruesome, are admissible in a capital prosecution if relevant and of probative value in assisting the trier of fact to determine the issues or are illustrative of testimony and other evidence, as long as the danger of material prejudice to a defendant is outweighed by their probative value and the photographs are not repetitive or cumulative in number." State v. Maurer, supra, paragraph seven of the syllabus. In applying that statement of the law to the present case, we find, from an examination of the admitted photographs, no merit to appellant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion by authorizing their admission.

In his sixth proposition of law, appellant maintains that the trial court impermissibly allowed the state to comment upon his failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California (1965), 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 , and that the prosecutor made several comments which inflamed the jury's passions to a degree justifying reversal. Specifically, appellant takes exception to the following portions of the prosecutor's closing argument:

"MR. SAMMON: Here they [Anderson and Brooks] come in and testify to you what this man [appellant] told them. And, again, ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, they [appellant] tell you they [Anderson and Brooks] were lying, but they offer no evidence to rebut that. * * * They could have brought somebody through those doors * * * and put them on the stand and say, 'No, Novarro Brooks and Michael Anderson were lying. It never took place.' * * * There is absolutely no evidence to contradict what they testified to, ladies and gentlemen."

A reference by the prosecutor in closing argument to uncontradicted evidence...