Laundry, Dry Clean. & DH Wkrs. Int. U., Loc. 93 v. Mahoney
Decision Date | 22 January 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 72-1731.,72-1731. |
Citation | 491 F.2d 1029 |
Parties | LAUNDRY, DRY CLEANING AND DYE HOUSE WORKERS INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 93, OF SPRINGFIELD, MISSOURI, Appellee, v. Robert M. MAHONEY et al., Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Donald W. Jones, Springfield, Mo., for appellants.
Benjamin J. Francka, Springfield, Mo., for appellee.
Before MEHAFFY, Chief Judge, and GIBSON, LAY, HEANEY, BRIGHT, ROSS, STEPHENSON and WEBSTER, Circuit Judges, en banc.
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied February 13, 1974.
This matter comes before the Court en banc on a petition for rehearing. The sole issue is whether the trial court erred in requiring the parties to a collective bargaining agreement to submit a mid-contract wage dispute to binding arbitration.1
On August 8, 1968, the Union entered into a collective bargaining agreement with the then owner of the business. Article XX of the agreement provides:
Thereafter, most of the assets of the business were sold to the Bormon Investment Company, and that firm became obligated to abide by the terms of the agreement as a successor employer.
The Union and the Employer exercised their option to reopen the contract on wages and seniority by giving a timely notice. The parties were unable to reach an agreement on either issue. The Union demanded that the unresolved issues be submitted to arbitration. The Employer refused on the grounds that it was not obligated to arbitrate these issues. The Union then brought an action seeking to require the Employer to submit the dispute to arbitration.
The agreement generally establishes wage rates and working conditions. It specifically provides:
The matter was submitted to the trial court on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court initially determined that the question of arbitrability was for it to decide. It then held, on the authority of the United Steel Workers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960), that the dispute was arbitrable because no forceful evidence of an intent or purpose to exclude the dispute from arbitration was evidenced.
The Employer argues on appeal: (1) that they are under no obligation to arbitrate any wage and seniority issues; (2) that their only obligation under the agreement is to negotiate on the two issues, and they have fulfilled that obligation; (3) that arbitration is only available to resolve employee grievances, and then only after such grievances have been processed in accordance with Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Article XIV of the agreement; and (4) that, here, no grievance exists, and that the dispute between the Employer and the Union was not processed in accordance with the above sections.
The trial court correctly held that the issue of arbitrability was one for it to decide. John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 84 S.Ct. 909, 11 L.Ed.2d 898 (1964); Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, 370 U.S. 254, 82 S.Ct. 1346, 8 L.Ed.2d 474 (1962).
The trial court also properly decided that the midterm contract dispute between the Employer and the Union over wages and seniority is an arbitrable one.
Warrior teaches:
United Steel Workers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. supra at 582, 584-585, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 1353, 1355. Accord, Local Union No. 4, IBEW, AFL-CIO v. Radio Thirteen-Eighty, Inc., 469 F.2d 610 (8th Cir. 1972); Builders Ass'n of Kansas City v. Greater Kansas City Lab. D. C., 326 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 917, 84 S.Ct. 1182, 12 L.Ed.2d 186 (1964).2
We are convinced, as was the trial court, that it cannot be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.3 Although the "Grievance and Arbitration" clause speaks of employee grievances, the "purpose" clause of the agreement asserts that the agreement is intended to provide "procedures for the * * * equitable adjustment of all grievances and disputes arising between the Employer and the Union * * *". If the contract is to be read as a whole, as it must, Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. N. L. R. B., 455 F.2d 1088 (8th Cir. 1972), effect should be given to this language. The savings clause speaks of submitting matters other than grievances to "arbitration as herein provided," thus negating an intent to limit the arbitration clause in the manner suggested by the appellant. Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement includes an absolute "no strike, no lockout" clause. This inclusion lends support to the view that the collective bargaining agreement was intended to...
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