Marrero-Gutierrez v. Molina

• Decision Date: 20 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-2527.,06-2527.
• Citation: 491 F.3d 1
• Parties: Enid MARRERO-GUTIERREZ; Alejandro Bou Santiago, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Esperanza MOLINA; Ivan Velez; Ileana Echegoyen; Gabriel Alonso; Nilsa Enid Negron; Ramonita Garcia; Wanda Roman; Luis Coss; Myrna Crespo-Saavedra; Housing Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

491 F.3d 1

Enid MARRERO-GUTIERREZ; Alejandro Bou Santiago, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. Esperanza MOLINA; Ivan Velez; Ileana Echegoyen; Gabriel Alonso; Nilsa Enid Negron; Ramonita Garcia; Wanda Roman; Luis Coss; Myrna Crespo-Saavedra; Housing Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 06-2527.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Submitted April 3, 2007.

Decided June 20, 2007.

Lixandra Osorio Felix and Liz Marie Cruz-Jimenez, on brief for appellants.

Salvador J. Antonetti-Stutts, Solicitor General, Susana I. Penagaricano-Brown, Assistant Solicitor General, Mariana Negron-Vargas, Deputy Solicitor General, and Maite D. Oronoz-Rodriguez, Deputy Solicitor General, on brief for appellees.

Before LYNCH, Circuit Judge, HOWARD, Circuit Judge, and YOUNG,^* District Judge.

YOUNG, District Judge.

Enid Marrero-Gutierrez ("Marrero") and Alejandro Bou Santiago ("Bou") (collectively "the Plaintiffs") sued Esperanza Molina ("Molina"), Ivan Velez ("Velez"), Luis Coss ("Coss") a/k/a Tito, Gabriel Alonso ("Alonso"), Ileana Echegoyen, Nilsa Enid Negron, Ramonita Garcia, and Wanda Roman in their personal capacities; Myrna Crespo-Saavedra in her official capacity; and the Housing Department of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Housing Department") (collectively "the Defendants") for political discrimination and violations of the Plaintiffs' rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Plaintiffs also asserted various state-law claims. Acting on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the district court granted judgment to the Defendants on all claims. The Plaintiffs now appeal. After careful consideration, we affirm.

I. Factual and Procedural History

The Plaintiffs are former employees of the Housing Department and active members of the New Progressive Party ("NPP") — a political party that campaigns for Puerto Rican statehood. In 2000, Puerto Rico held its general elections, and the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP") won control of the government. The PDP is a political adversary of the NPP.

Bou worked in the Housing Department for ten years. In May 2000, he received a promotion to the position of Administrative Director II and was appointed as the Director of the Office of Security and Emergency Management of the Housing Department. As a result of PDP's winning the elections that year, Coss — a member of the PDP — was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Housing Department. Bou alleges that Coss gave instructions to the Human Resources personnel of the Housing Department to find a way to replace him with a PDP adherent. Specifically, Bou alleges that Coss made this request to Angel Semidey ("Semidey") who, despite being a PDP adherent, refused to help Coss and subsequently resigned. On March 7, 2001, Bou was demoted. On July 27, 2002, Bou encountered Semidey at a celebration and, for the first time, learned that his demotion resulted from his affiliation with NPP.

Marrero held a career position as Director of the Section 8 Program starting in 1994. Marrero alleges that her job performance garnered only praise from her supervisors. Marrero managed to receive such positive performance feedback despite serving under different party administrations during her career at the Housing Department.

Marrero alleges that after Molina retired in June 2002, the Housing Department was reorganized without following federal guidelines. As part of the reorganization, Alonso was brought in to supervise the Section 8 Program. The reorganization amounted to a constructive demotion of Marrero by reducing her responsibilities and subjecting her to an abusive work environment. Specifically, her new responsibilities failed to include functions that she was entitled to perform under the Housing Department's prior reclassification program. Marrero also alleges that her subordinates often circumvented her, that her supervisors treated her in a discourteous manner by harassing and intimidating her, and that Molina openly disparaged the NPP in front of Marrero and her personnel. Finally, Marrero suffered several humiliating events arising out of her health status. Marrero was surgically treated for cancer in her reproductive system. The Defendants allegedly mocked her as a result of this condition, claiming that she was not really sick and simply attempting to avoid returning to work by faking her illness.

On or about May 3, 2002, while still on medical leave, Marrero received a letter dated April 18, 2002, stating the intention to remove her from office. This letter, and a subsequent one, accused her of failing to perform job duties and of committing illegal acts. These accusations mirrored ones levied against Velez — a member of the PDP — who directly supervised Marrero during this time. The Housing Department also notified Velez that it intended to terminate him. Velez was initially demoted and later terminated. In both letters, Marrero was summoned to an informal hearing, which she alleges was a sham designed to tarnish her reputation. Despite her characterization of the hearing, Marrero was able to proffer evidence rebutting the accusations against her. Marrero was allowed to continue working at the Housing Department pending the final disposition. The hearing officer submitted a negative report. On March 10, 2002, the Housing Department notified Marrero of her separation from employment and salary, which constituted the last alleged act of discrimination by the Defendants.

This action commenced in the district court on March 10, 2003. The Housing Department successfully moved to dismiss, on Eleventh Amendment grounds, the claims against it for monetary relief. Marrero does not appeal this ruling. Thereafter, upon motions duly briefed by both sides, the district court granted the Defendants judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). The appeal of this order is before this Court.

II. Analysis

The standard of review of a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Pasdon v. City of Peabody, 417 F.3d 225, 226 (1st Cir.2005); Collier v. City of Chicopee, 158 F.3d 601, 602 (1st Cir.1998). Courts of appeals review de novo a district court's decision to allow a motion to dismiss, taking as true the well-pleaded facts in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Vistamar, Inc. v. Fagundo-Fagundo, 430 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir.2005).

A. Statute of Limitations

Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1983 creates a private right of action for violations of federally protected rights. Because it has no internal statute of limitations, section 1983 claims "borrow[] the appropriate state law governing limitations unless contrary to federal law." Poy v. Boutselis, 352 F.3d 479, 483 (1st Cir.2003).

The parties do not dispute that the relevant statute of limitations for civil rights claims in Puerto Rico takes a one-year limitation period from P.R. Laws Ann. Tit. 31, § 5298(2). Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. v. Feliciano de Melecio, 406 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2005); Benitez-Pons v. Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.1998).

The parties do dispute, however, the date from which the one-year statute of limitation ought accrue. Bou argues that the injury occurred in July 2002, when Semidey revealed the wrongful reasons for his demotion. The Defendants counter that the proper accrual date is March 7, 2001, the date of the actual demotion.

Federal law determines the date on which the statute of limitations begins running. Carreras-Rosa v. Alves-Cruz, 127 F.3d 172, 174 (1st Cir.1997). The first step in such an inquiry is to determine the actual injury on which the plaintiff rests the cause of action. Guzman-Rivera v. Rivera-Cruz, 29 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir.1994). Here, there is no dispute that the actual injury of which Bou complains is his demotion. Bou's argument, and the dispositive point on this issue faced by this Court, is thus properly framed as whether the date of that injury ought be tolled until he learned of the discriminatory animus that made his demotion wrongful.

As a general principle, section 1983 claims accrue "when the plaintiff knows, or has reason to know, of the injury on which the action is based." Id.; Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 96-97 (1st Cir.2004); Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41 n. 5 (1st Cir.1990). A claimant is deemed to "know" or "learn" of a discriminatory act at the time of the act itself and not at the point that the harmful consequences are felt. See Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981); Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980).

In the employment discrimination context, this circuit has rejected the contention that claims do not accrue until the plaintiff knows of both the injury and the discriminatory animus. Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of P.R., 27 F.3d 746, 749-50 (1st Cir.1994); cf. Vistamar, Inc., 430 F.3d at 66 (holding that the statute of limitations period for a section 1983 claim seeking to redress an unlawful taking of property began to accrue on the date of the wrongful appropriation). In Morris v. Government Development Bank of Puerto Rico, we dismissed the identical theory proffered by Bou when we rejected the appellant's contention that "his cause of action existed in what amounts to a state of suspended animation until he became aware of the racial and political motives behind the adverse employment decision." 27 F.3d at 749-750.

Following this clear precedent, the statute of limitations period for Bou's claim began to accrue at the first discrete act of discrimination. See id.; cf. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2162, 2164, 167 L.Ed.2d 982 (2007) (holding that the limitations period for a ...