491 U.S. 299 (1989), 88-1, Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives' Association
|Docket Nº:||No. 88-1|
|Citation:||491 U.S. 299, 109 S.Ct. 2477, 105 L.Ed.2d 250, 57 U.S.L.W. 4742|
|Party Name:||Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway Labor Executives' Association|
|Case Date:||June 19, 1989|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued February 28, 1989
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Since its formation in 1976, petitioner Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail) has required its employees to undergo physical examinations periodically and upon return from leave. Those examinations routinely included a urinalysis for blood sugar and albumin and, in some circumstances, for drugs. In 1987, Conrail announced unilaterally that urinalysis drug screening would be included as part of all periodic and return-from-leave physical examinations. Respondent Railway Labor Executives' Association opposed this unilateral additional drug testing. The question presented by this case is whether Conrail's drug testing program gives rise to a "major" or a "minor" dispute under the Railway Labor Act (RLA).
1. Where an employer asserts a contractual right to take a contested action, the ensuing dispute is minor if the action is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. Where, in contrast, the employer's claims are frivolous or obviously insubstantial, the dispute is major. Pp. 302-307.
2. If an employer asserts a claim that the parties' agreement gives the employer the discretion to make a particular change in working conditions without prior negotiation, and if that claim is arguably justified by the terms of the parties' agreement, the employer may make the change and the courts must defer to the arbitral jurisdiction of the Adjustment Board. Pp. 307-311.
3. Conrail's contractual claim is not obviously insubstantial, and therefore the [109 S.Ct. 2479] controversy constitutes a minor dispute that is within the Adjustment Board's exclusive jurisdiction. Pp. 311-320.
845 F.2d 1187, reversed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 320. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 321.
BRENNAN, J., lead opinion
JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case, we must examine the concepts of "major" and "minor" disputes in the area of railway labor relations, articulate a standard for differentiating between the two, and apply that standard to a drug testing dispute.
Since its formation in 1976, petitioner Consolidated Rail Corporation (Conrail), has required its employees to undergo physical examinations periodically and upon return from leave. These examinations include the testing of urine for blood sugar and albumin and, in some circumstances, for drugs. On February 20, 1987, Conrail announced unilaterally that urinalysis drug screening would be included henceforth as part of all periodic and return-from-leave physical examinations. Respondent Railway Labor Executives' Association (the Union), an unincorporated association of chief executive officers of 19 labor organizations which collectively represent Conrail's employees, opposes this unilateral drug testing addition.1
The parties agree that Conrail's inclusion of drug testing in all physical examinations has created a labor dispute the resolution of which is governed by the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 44 Stat. 577, as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.2 The question presented by this case is what kind of labor dispute we have before us: whether Conrail's addition of a drug screen to the urinalysis component of its required periodic and return-to-duty medical examinations gives rise to a "major" or a "minor" dispute under the RLA.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania agreed with Conrail that this case involves a minor dispute, because Conrail's policy of conducting physical examinations, which the parties agree is an implied term of their collective bargaining agreement, arguably gave Conrail the discretion to include drug testing in all physical examinations. The Third Circuit reversed, ruling that
the undisputed terms of the implied agreement governing medical examinations cannot be plausibly interpreted to justify the new testing program.
845 F.2d 1187, 1193 (1988). Although we find the question to be a close one, we agree with the District Court, and with those Courts of Appeals that have held, on similar facts, that disputes concerning the addition of a drug testing component to routine physical examinations are minor disputes. See, e.g., Railway Labor Executives Assn. v. Norfolk [109 S.Ct. 2480] & Western R. Co., 833 F.2d 700, 705-706 (CA7 1987); Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 802 F.2d 1016, 1024 (CA8 1986).
This Court has not articulated an explicit standard for differentiating between major and minor disputes. It adopted the major/minor terminology, drawn from the vocabulary of rail management and rail labor, as a shorthand method of describing two classes of controversy Congress had distinguished in the RLA: major disputes seek to create contractual rights, minor disputes to enforce them. Elgin, J. &. E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 723 (1945).
The statutory bases for the major dispute category are § 2 Seventh and § 6 of the RLA, 48 Stat. 1188, 1197, 45 U.S.C. § 152 Seventh and § 156. The former states that no carrier
shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed in such agreements
or through the mediation procedures established in § 6. This statutory category
relates to disputes over the formation of collective agreements or efforts to secure them. They arise where there is no such agreement or where it is sought to change the terms of one, and therefore the issue is not whether an existing agreement controls the controversy. They look to the acquisition of rights for the future, not to assertion of rights claimed to have vested in the past.
Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
In the event of a major dispute, the RLA requires the parties to undergo a lengthy process of bargaining and mediation.3 §§ 5 and 6. Until they have exhausted those procedures, the parties are obligated to maintain the status quo,
and the employer may not implement the contested change in rates of pay, rules, or working conditions. The district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to enjoin a violation of the status quo pending completion of the required procedures, without the customary showing of irreparable injury. See Detroit & T. S. L. R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 396 U.S. 142 (1969) (upholding status quo injunction without discussing equitable constraints); Division No. 1, Detroit, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218 (CA6 1988). Once this protracted process ends and no agreement has been reached, the parties may resort to the use of economic force.
In contrast, the minor dispute category is predicated on § 2 Sixth and § 3 First (i) of the RLA, which set forth conference and compulsory arbitration procedures for a dispute arising or growing
out of grievances or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions.
This second category of disputes
contemplates the existence of a collective agreement already concluded or, at any rate, a situation in which no effort is made to bring about a formal change in terms or to create a new one. The dispute relates either to the meaning or proper application of a particular provision with reference to a specific situation or to an omitted case. In the latter event, the claim is founded upon some incident of the employment relation, or asserted one, independent of those covered by the [109 S.Ct. 2481] collective agreement, e.g., claims on account of personal injuries. In either case, the claim is to rights accrued, not merely to have new ones created for the future.
Burley, 325 U.S. at 723.
A minor dispute in the railroad industry is subject to compulsory and binding arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, § 3, or before an adjustment board established by the employer and the unions representing the employees.
§ 3 Second.4 The Board (as we shall refer to any adjustment board under the RLA) has exclusive jurisdiction over minor disputes. Judicial review of the arbitral decision is limited. See § 3 First (q); Union Pacific R. Co. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93 (1978). Courts may enjoin strikes arising out of minor disputes. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & I. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957). Although courts in some circumstances may condition the granting of a strike injunction on a requirement that the employer maintain the status quo pending Board resolution of the dispute, see Locomotive Engineers v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960), this Court never has recognized a general statutory obligation on the part of an employer to maintain the status quo pending the Board's decision. Cf. id. at 531, n. 3 (leaving open the question whether a federal court can require an employer to maintain the status quo during the pendency of a minor dispute at the union's independent behest, where no strike injunction has been sought by the employer).5
Although experience in the rail industry suggested to Congress that the second category of disputes involved "comparatively minor" issues that seldom led to strikes, the Court recognized in Burley that this was not invariably the case. See 325 U.S. at 724; see also Trainmen, supra. Thus, the formal demarcation between major and minor disputes does not turn on a case-by-case determination of the importance of...
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