Guam Federation of Teachers, Local 1581, AFT v. Ysrael
Decision Date | 01 February 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 73-1444.,73-1444. |
Citation | 492 F.2d 438 |
Parties | GUAM FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 1581, OF the AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, a corporation, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Alfred C. YSRAEL, also known as Al Ysrael, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
David M. Shapiro, Agana, Guam, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Howard G. Trapp, of Trapp, Gayle & Co., Agana, Guam, for defendant-appellee.
Before DUNIWAY, TRASK and WALLACE, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs, the Guam Federation of Teachers (Union), and seven of its officers sue Ysrael for libel. The case was tried before a jury. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' case, Ysrael moved for a directed verdict, which was granted. Judgment was entered for Ysrael. Plaintiffs appeal and we reverse.
Ysrael was appointed a member of the Guam Territorial School Board by the Governor of Guam. The Union strenuously opposed the appointment and the matter developed into a public row. In the course of it, Ysrael caused various statements about the Union and its officers to be published in a Guam newspaper, the Pacific Daily News.
On this appeal the parties are in agreement that the Union and its officers are "public officials," or at least "public figures" within the rationale of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 1964, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 and its progeny, particularly Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 1967, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094. It is not contended that the individual plaintiffs, though not specifically named in Ysrael's press statements, are not identifiable members of the group to which Ysrael referred. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 1966, 383 U.S. 75, 86 S.Ct. 669, 15 L.Ed.2d 597. It is not contended that at least some of Ysrael's statements to the press are not libelous. It is not contended that a jury could not find that they are false. The only question is, were the plaintiffs entitled to have their cause go to the jury on the issue of malice?
The test for malice, laid down in New York Times, supra, and repeatedly applied in its numerous progeny is that the statement must have been "made with `actual malice' — that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." (376 U.S. at 279-280, 84 S.Ct. at 726) The court also ruled that the proof of malice must carry "the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands" (Id. at 285-286, 84 S.Ct. at 729).
We have examined the plaintiffs' evidence and we conclude that it would permit a jury to find "actual malice" as defined in New York Times, supra, when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. This is the usual standard for viewing the evidence when a motion for a directed verdict is involved. When such a motion is granted, the losing party is entitled to every reasonable inference that may be drawn from the evidence. Brady v. Southern Ry. Co., 1943, 320 U.S. 476, 64 S.Ct. 232, 88 L.Ed. 239; Shafer v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 9 Cir., 1964, 335 F.2d 932; Girardi v. Gates Rubber Co. Sales Div., Inc., 9 Cir., 1963, 325 F.2d 196. These rules are so well established as to have become clichés.
In this case, Ysrael's own testimony as an adverse witness is enough to get the plaintiffs to the jury under the New York Times standards. He repeatedly admitted that he did not know whether what he said was true. He repeatedly admitted that he did nothing, or almost nothing, to verify his charges. As to most of his statements, he repeatedly admitted that he knew of no facts to support them; he either relied upon unspecified rumor or upon nothing at all. He simply asserted that he believed that what he said was true. Such an assertion is not enough to support a directed verdict in his favor. If it were, mere swearing could, as a matter of law, defeat any action to which the New York Times principles are applicable. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 1968, 390 U.S. 727, 732, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262.
Ysrael's counsel does not really dispute the foregoing general propositions. He argues that they do not apply to this type of case. The district judge, in granting the motion for a directed verdict, took the same position. In his written order, he said:
The views involved in the court's order seem to have been first stated by Judge J. Skelly Wright in his concurring opinion in Wasserman v. Time, Inc., 1970, 138 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 9, 424 F.2d 920, 922-923, an opinion in which Judge Robinson concurred. Judge Wright's position is this:
What Judge Wright said was not necessary to the decision, because in Wasserman the court reversed a summary judgment for the defendant and remanded "for trial on the issues of actual malice, defamation and possible damages." However, we assume that Judges Wright and Robinson may have gone through the exercise that Judge Wright describes.
Judge Wright's views were followed by the Fifth Circuit in Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 5 Cir., 1970, 426 F.2d 858, 864-865. We are not sure, however, as to just how far the court actually went. It summarized the legal position:
(Footnotes omitted.)
We note that this language does not include a reweighing of the evidence, including credibility of witnesses: it merely states the usual rule to be followed when summary judgment is involved. The court's analysis of the facts (pp. 865-867) is similar. It concludes:
The footnote reads:
We find no hint in this language that the judge is to weigh credibility or to refuse to give a party the benefit of inferences that can legitimately be drawn by a jury. However, because the court did cite and quote from Judge Wright's opinion, we assume that the court in fact went through the exercise that Judge Wright suggests.
We agree with our brothers of the District of Columbia and Fifth Circuits that it is important that judges focus attention on the summary judgment, directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict procedures in libel actions. When civil cases may have a chilling effect on First Amendment rights, special care is appropriate. Thus, of the proceeding, closely scrutinizing the evidence to determine whether the case should be terminated in a defendant's favor, provides a buffer against possible First Amendment interferences. The Supreme Court has instructed trial courts to "examine for themselves the statements in issue and the circumstances under which they were made to see . . . whether they are of a character which the principles of the First Amendment . . . protect." To be unprotected, actual malice must be shown with "convincing clarity." New York Times, supra, 376 U.S. at 285-286, 84 S.Ct. at 728-729.
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