Hutchins v. Zoll Medical Corp.

Decision Date03 July 2007
Docket NumberNo. 2006-1539.,2006-1539.
PartiesDonald C. HUTCHINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZOLL MEDICAL CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, NEWMAN and DYK, Circuit Judges.

NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from charges of patent and copyright infringement based on a computer-assisted system of administering emergency procedures, primarily cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR). Mr. Donald C. Hutchins charged Zoll Medical Corporation with infringement of Hutchins' United States Patent No. 5,913,685 (the '685 patent) entitled "CPR Computer Aiding." Mr. Hutchins also charged Zoll with copyright infringement and with breach of a contract between Hutchins and Zoll. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted Zoll's motions for summary judgment of non-infringement on the patent and copyright counts, and that there was no breach of contract.1 Hutchins appeals the non-infringement rulings and assigns error to various procedural rulings; he also seeks to reopen the case based on charges of fraudulent non-disclosure by Zoll of relevant information.

The grant of summary judgment receives plenary appellate review, reapplying the standard applied by the district court. Thus we review whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, or if there can be but one reasonable verdict. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). To grant a motion for summary judgment there must be no reasonable view of material facts, with cognizance of the substantive evidentiary standards, whereby a reasonable jury could find for the non-movant. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see, e.g., De Jesus-Rentas v. Baxter Pharm. Servs. Corp., 400 F.3d 72, 73-74 (1st Cir.2005); Depuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1013 (Fed.Cir. 2006).

Patent Infringement

Patent infringement requires that every element and limitation in a correctly construed claim is embodied in the accused system either literally or, if embodied by an equivalent, in compliance with the rules of equivalency as set forth in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002) and Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997) and implementing rulings.

The '685 patent describes and claims an interactive computer-directed system for guiding emergency rescue personnel in conducting on-site administration of CPR. The system instructs rescue personnel to input certain characteristics of the victim, such as the victim's age and state of consciousness; the system then provides detailed step-by-step procedures to be followed by the rescuer in order to administer CPR and resuscitate the victim. Features of the system described in the '685 patent include automated voice and visual signals and instructions, animated images, and audible speech prompts. Claim 1 is the broadest claim:

1. A general purpose computer system adapted for cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) aiding to provide guidance to rescue personnel trained in CPR for resuscitating a victim under an emergency condition, comprising:

a computer terminal, including,

an output comprising a display and an electroacoustical transducer; and an input comprising an interactive display input, wherein the interactive display unit is adapted for selecting from image or text viewed on the display that is representative at least of characteristics of said victim.

Zoll's accused device, trademarked "AEDPlus®," is a portable computer system and defibrillator that provides automated voice and visual signals and instructions to guide rescue personnel through the steps to administer CPR to the victim and to defibrillate if necessary.

The elements of the '685 patent claims on which the district court relied are "general purpose computer" and "interactive display input." The district court found that neither of these elements is present in the Zoll system, and on this basis granted summary judgment of non-infringement.

A

All of the '685 claims require a "general purpose computer system" that is adapted to the specified purposes. The definition of "general purpose computer" was agreed by the parties as

a computer capable of running multiple unrelated programs, which are selected by the user and loaded into the device. It must feature at least: (1) a central processing unit, (2) one or more input devices that are not specific to any one program, (3) memory, (4) mass storage devices (such as a disk drive) for storing large amounts of data, and (5) one or more output devices.

Zoll's device contains a Hitachi SuperH RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) microprocessor. The district court observed that the '685 specification is specific to a general purpose computer and that all of the claims were so limited during prosecution. The court found that it was "implausible" for a RISC microprocessor to be deemed a general purpose computer, for RISC microprocessors have limited functionality. Thus the court held that "general purpose computer," as that term is used in the '685 patent, does not read on a RISC microprocessor and that the Zoll system thereby avoids infringement.

Mr. Hutchins argues that his invention is readily performed using a RISC microprocessor. He points out that the Zoll system is intended to interface and work in conjunction with a standard IBM-PC, which is a general purpose computer, and that the Zoll device includes an interface for connection to a personal computer for purposes of review and archiving of data associated with a rescue; the Zoll manual states the minimum criteria for the personal computer as "Windows . . . IBM-compatible 486 (or higher) computer, 64 MB RAM, VGA monitor or better, CD-ROM drive, IrDA port, 2MB disk space."

The district court accepted the definition of "general purpose computer" that had been agreed by the parties; the court found that a RISC microprocessor does not meet that definition, and that the potential for connecting to a personal computer did not meet the claim limitation. We do not discern error in this finding, for the term "general purpose computer" was added to Hutchins' claims during prosecution in order to distinguish the '685 invention from prior art that showed similar devices with dedicated microprocessor units. This produced an estoppel against reading the term "general purpose computer" to include a dedicated microprocessor such as a RISC, for the claims had been amended in response to the PTO rejection, thereby estopping recovery of the same subject matter that the claims had been amended to exclude. See Alloc v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 342 F.3d 1361, 1371-72 (Fed.Cir.2003) (statements made during prosecution surrendering subject matter binding on later interpretation of the claims); see also Festo, 535 U.S. at 725, 122 S.Ct. 1831 (estoppel arises upon amendment to "surrender the particular equivalent in question"); Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212 F.3d 1241, 1252 (Fed.Cir.2000) (an aspect expressly disavowed during prosecution of the patent cannot be reached under the doctrine of equivalents). The district court's ruling on this aspect is affirmed.

B

Mr. Hutchins also argues that the term "general purpose computer" is not "present in each claim" of the '685 patent. That is incorrect, for the term is recited in each independent claim and accordingly is incorporated into every dependent claim. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 4 ("A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.") Independent claim 1 recites a "general purpose computer system," with dependent claims 2-12. Independent claim 13 recites a "general purpose computer network system," with dependent claims 14-20. Independent claim 21 recites "an article of manufacture adapted for use in a general purpose computer," with dependent claims 22-30. Independent claim 31 recites a "computer program" that is readable by a "general purpose computer," with dependent claims 32-38. Independent claim 39 recites a method for use in CPR with a "general purpose computer," with dependent claims 40-43. No claim is free of this limitation.

C

The district court also ruled that the claim term "interactive display input" could not be found by a reasonable jury to be present in the Zoll apparatus. The parties had agreed on the following definition for this term:

a device for communicating with a computer which allows a user to respond to options presented by the computer by selecting from a menu displayed on a screen.

In the interactive display input described in the '685 patent, rescue personnel select certain "characteristics of the victim relevant to proper performance of CPR techniques." These characteristics include factors such as the consciousness of the victim, whether adult or child or infant, whether the victim is choking, and whether mouth-to-mouth resuscitation is required. The display responds to this information and provides rescue-aiding guidance that can include pictorial and animated instructions.

The Zoll device requires no input from the rescuer, who places electrical contacts as directed by the device; the device then monitors the victim's heart and determines whether CPR or an electric shock is necessary. The district court observed that although the Zoll system analyzes characteristics such as heart rhythm, it does not provide for interactive input by the rescuer. If the Zoll device determines that treatment such as defibrillation is required, the device instructs the rescuer to push the button that administers the electric shock; if CPR is required, the device instructs the...

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