Swackhammer v. Sprint/United Management Co.

• Decision Date: 09 July 2007
• Docket Number: No. 05-3222.,05-3222.
• Citation: 493 F.3d 1160
• Parties: Dena SWACKHAMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

493 F.3d 1160

Dena SWACKHAMMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SPRINT/UNITED MANAGEMENT CO., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 05-3222.

United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.

July 9, 2007.

Frank B.W. McCollum, McCollum & Parks LC, Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Elaine Drodge Koch, Jeremiah J. Morgan, and Heather S. Esau Zerger, Bryan Cave LLP, Kansas City, MO, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before LUCERO, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS and EBEL, Senior Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Senior Circuit Judge.

This appeal arises from a Title VII suit brought by Dena Swackhammer against her former employer, Sprint/United Management Co. ("Sprint"), in which she alleged that the decision to terminate her employment was motivated by gender discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sprint, holding that Swackhammer failed to satisfy her burden under the third step of the McDonnell Douglas¹ evidentiary framework to raise an inference that Sprint's explanation for her termination was a pretext to mask intentional discrimination. We agree. Sprint consistently offered a single explanation for Swackhammer's termination — that she violated the company's ethical policies — and Swackhammer failed to provide either direct evidence that this explanation was false, or evidence of differential treatment sufficient to permit an inference that the true explanation for her termination was intentional discrimination. While Swackhammer provided evidence that she was treated differently than another Sprint employee, the record does not support any reasonable inference of a discriminatory motive arising from this treatment. We therefore agree that Swackhammer failed to establish pretext and AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment for Sprint.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background²

Swackhammer was employed by Sprint as a Vice President from December 1997 until her termination in October 2002. Her supervisor from May 2001 until her termination was Antonio Castanon, at that time Sprint's Senior Vice President of Customer Solutions. As her supervisor, Castanon was responsible for the decision to terminate Swackhammer. Castanon also supervised four other Vice Presidents, including Mark Alan Winters. Swackhammer, in turn, supervised several employees, including Paul Garcia, Senior Director of Database Marketing and Customer Relationship Management.

A. Events Leading to Swackhammer's Termination

Swackhammer's termination was not related to her job performance; the parties agree that she was highly successful during her time at Sprint, receiving positive performance reviews and qualifying for an executive talent pool. However, during the summer of 2002, Sprint received anonymous complaints of unethical behavior within Sprint's Customer Service Group, alleging in particular that Garcia had inappropriately taken advantage of relationships with vendors. As a result of these complaints, Sprint Corporate Security initiated an investigation and interviewed both Swackhammer and Garcia. During Swackhammer's interview, Corporate Security asked her about various business trips and email correspondences with Garcia and confirmed that she was aware of Sprint's policies regarding travel and gifts paid for by vendors. Although Swackhammer later signed a statement prepared by Corporate Security summarizing the contents of her interview, she claims that the statement was incomplete and tended to emphasize information that negatively reflected on her and that, had she known at the time that she, along with Garcia, was the subject of the investigation, she would have been more careful in ensuring that the statement accurately reflected her recollection of the interview. Garcia was asked similar questions in his interview, and also signed a statement summarizing his responses.

Upon completing its investigation, Corporate Security met with Castanon and Jim Kissinger, then Vice President of Human Resources, to review the results. Castanon claimed responsibility for the decision to terminate both Swackhammer's and Garcia's employment during this meeting, based on the evidence presented there. This evidence included Swackhammer's and Garcia's signed interview statements, excerpts from Sprint's policy manual concerning vendor relationships, photographs of Swackhammer and Garcia aboard a Concorde jet during a business trip, and copies of several emails sent by Swackhammer and/or Garcia. The emails contained references to expensive gifts from vendors,³ indications that Garcia intended to bring a friend on a business trip for which Sprint would pay the expenses,⁴ and an exchange that Castanon interpreted to mean that Garcia intended to share confidential bid information with a third-party vendor.⁵

Although Swackhammer argues that the emails were misinterpreted by Castanon and Kissinger and that she did not violate any Sprint policy, Castanon testified that he was convinced that Swackhammer had both violated Sprint's ethical policies and failed to enforce those policies with regard to Garcia. Castanon also testified that, even if the events described in the emails never actually transpired, the "appearance of impropriety" they created was sufficient in his view to justify termination. Kissinger concurred with Castanon's assessment; the record includes notes of "Talking Points" that Kissinger prepared after the meeting, listing concerns that allegedly led to the decision to terminate Swackhammer including: (1) not properly reporting or receiving advance approval for vendor-paid entertainment; (2) participating in or allowing an unreasonable level of vendor-paid or Sprint-paid entertainment; (3) soliciting or encouraging vendor entertainment; and (4) creating potential or apparent conflicts of interest and inappropriate relationships with third parties. Kissinger's notes conclude that, from the evidence presented, there appeared to be "clear violations" of the spirit and intent of Sprint's written policy manual.

On October 14th, 2002, Castanon and Kissinger met with Swackhammer and informed her that her employment was being terminated based on the results of Corporate Security's investigation. Castanon and Kissinger terminated Garcia on the same day.⁶

B. Castanon's Relationship with Winters

While the investigation of Swackhammer and Garcia was ongoing, Sprint Corporate Security began investigating another anonymous complaint, this time involving Castanon and a male Vice-President under his direct supervision, Alan Winters. Winters and Castanon were close personal friends, having been fraternity brothers during college and working together before becoming employed at Sprint. Corporate Security's investigation of Castanon and Winters focused on allegations similar to those brought against Swackhammer and Garcia: that they accepted inappropriate vendor-paid travel and gifts, and that Castanon failed to supervise adequately Winters' compliance with Sprint's vendor policies. Because Castanon and Winters were able to provide sufficient authorization for their travels, Corporate Security apparently was unable to substantiate the allegations against them. Winters, however, admitted during an interview with Corporate Security that he had failed to review expense reports after certain business trips and, as a result, had improperly expensed several items to Sprint including a hotel movie, gift shop charges, airport parking, a meal expense, and a rental car fee from a personal trip.

Corporate Security informed Castanon and Kissinger of Winters' expense report violations at the same meeting where evidence from the investigation of Swackhammer and Garcia was presented. Castanon, however, elected not to terminate Winters; instead, he met with Winters to review the processes for properly recording expenses, and later followed up by checking Winters' expense reports to ensure that they were correctly processed. Castanon testified that, although he and Winters were close personal friends, their personal relationship did not affect his treatment of Winters in the work context. He attributed his decision to provide coaching and counseling to Winters, rather than terminating him, to the lack of evidence of any clear violation of Sprint's ethical policies, an assessment Kissinger agreed with. However, when Castanon was terminated in August 2003 during a work-force reduction, Kissinger cited Castanon's failure to deal with a personal conflict of interest with Winters as one reason for his termination.

II. Procedural History

Swackhammer brought suit against Sprint in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas, alleging gender discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Kansas Act Against Discrimination ("KAAD"), Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-1001 et seq.⁷ She did not offer direct evidence of discrimination, but instead invoked the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas and attempted to establish an inference of discrimination from circumstantial evidence. In support of this attempt, Swackhammer argued that Corporate Security's investigation produced insufficient evidence to support a good-faith decision by Castanon to terminate her and that Castanon's decision to terminate her while not terminating Winters constituted differential treatment that was evidence of intentional discrimination.

Sprint moved for summary judgment in its favor, which the district court granted. The court applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, first holding that Swackhammer satisfied her "light burden" to prove a prima facie case of gender discrimination by showing that she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) was qualified for her position; (3) was discharged despite her qualifications; and (4) was terminated "under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination." Swackhammer, 2005 WL 1319058 at *18 (quoting Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1100 (10th Cir.2005)).⁸ The...