Marshall v. Dewey
Decision Date | 10 July 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 79-C-114.,79-C-114. |
Citation | 493 F. Supp. 963 |
Parties | Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff, v. Douglas DEWEY and Waukesha Lime & Stone Co., Waukesha, Wisconsin, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin |
Page H. Jackson, Trial Atty., Arlington, Va., for plaintiff.
Francis R. Croak, Cook & Franke, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants.
On March 9, 1979, after having heard oral argument, this Court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction in which plaintiff sought to enjoin defendants from refusing to permit an agent of the Secretary of Labor to enter and inspect defendants' stone quarry. A formal memorandum and order denying the motion of the Secretary of Labor was signed on March 29, 1979. In that opinion, this Court found sub silentio that warrantless searches of stone quarries as authorized by Congress in the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977 (FMSHA), 30 U.S.C. § 801-960, violated their Fourth Amendment right to be free from such searches. The Secretary moved for reconsideration and in a memorandum and order dated May 30, 1979, the Court again denied ther motion for a preliminary injunction.
In both memoranda, this Court recognized that in limited circumstances warrantless searches are permitted. See United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87 (1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 90 S.Ct. 774, 25 L.Ed.2d 60 (1970). The Supreme Court's opinion in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) was relied upon extensively in the denial of the Secretary's motions. Quoting in part from that case, in the May 30, 1979 memorandum and order this Court stated:
In Barlow's, the Supreme Court articulated why warrantless searches are permissible in certain industries (e. g., liquor and firearms) by stating "when an entrepreneur embarks upon such a business, he has voluntarily chosen to subject himself to a full arsenal of governmental regulation." The court further stated "the element that distinguishes these enterprises from ordinary businesses is a long tradition of close government supervision, of which any person who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware." Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. at 313, 98 S.Ct. at 1821.
Focusing on this language, this Court held that warrantless searches of stone quarries are not constitutionally permissible under FMSHA because such businesses do not have a long tradition of government regulation. It was found that federal regulation of stone quarries did not commence until 1966. See the May 30, 1979 memorandum and order at 3.
The Secretary has now moved for summary judgment in effect asking again for reconsideration of the denial of his motion for a preliminary injunction. Parenthetically, the Secretary is seeking relief under 30 U.S.C. § 818(a)(1)(C) which authorizes the Secretary to seek an injunction when a mine operator or his agent "refuses to admit the Secretary's representatives to the coal or other mine . . .." Plaintiff seeks entry to conduct an inspection of possible safety violations by the defendants.
Subsequent to the May 30, 1979 memorandum and order, Judge Myron L. Gordon of this district in Marshall v. Cedar Lake Sand & Gravel Co., 480 F.Supp. 171 (E.D. Wis.1979) and three circuit courts, Marshall v. Sink, 614 F.2d 37 (4th Cir. 1980), Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., 606 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Nolichuckey Sand Co. v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 100 S.Ct. 1835, 64 L.Ed.2d 261 (1980), and Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co. v. Marshall, 444 U.S. 1015, 100 S.Ct. 665, 62 L.Ed.2d 644 (1980), have each found the preliminary injunction procedure outlined in FMSHA constitutional. In their opinion, warrantless searches of stone quarries and sand pits do not offend the constitution since these are pervasively regulated businesses.
In Stoudt's Ferry the court reached its decision by comparing FMSHA with the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). The court did this to determine the effect of the Supreme Court's holding in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., supra, that the warrantless provisions of OSHA were unconstitutional. The Court in Stoudt's Ferry held:
The court was also impressed by the procedures provided for under 30 U.S.C. § 818, stating:
Another significant difference between the statutes is that the Mine Safety Act provides for immediate judicial review by requiring the Secretary to secure an injunction in the district court if he is refused entry. 30 U.S.C.A. § 818. Any unusual privacy expectations may be fully explored in that proceeding and a reasonable accommodation may be achieved. Marshall v. Stoudt's Ferry Preparation Co., 602 F.2d at 594.
In Marshall v. Nolichuckey Sand Co., supra, the court noted that the sand and gravel extraction industry has neither "the long history of regulation referred to in Colonnade nor the extensive licensing scheme which was present in both Colonnade and Biswell." 606 F.2d at 695. However, the court found that the gravel industry, as recognized by Congress exposes miners to "severe health and safety hazards." Id. Consequently, the court found the warrantless inspection provisions of FMSHA are reasonable.
In Marshall v. Sink, supra, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals echoed the themes of Stoudt's Ferry and Nolichuckey Sand noting the "overriding governmental interest in the safety of miners." 614 F.2d at 39. It further held that "Congress has a legitimate interest in...
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