State Employees Bargaining Agent v. Rowland
| Decision Date | 10 July 2007 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 06-0616-cv. |
| Parties | STATE EMPLOYEES BARGAINING AGENT COALITION, individually, and on behalf of all its members, American Federation of School Administration, Local 61, AFL-CIO, Connecticut Association of Prosecutors, Protective Service Coalition, IAFF, AFL-CIO, Judicial Marshals, International Brotherhood of Police Officers, National Association of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Connecticut State Police Union, Congress of Connecticut Community Colleges, SEIU, AFL-CIO, Connecticut State University American Association of University Professors, Univ. of CT, American Assn. of Univ. Prof., CT Emp. Union Independent, SEIU, AFL-CIO, CT Federation of Ed. & Prof. Emp. AFT, AFL-CIO, District 1199, CT New England Health Care Employees Union, SEIU, AFL-CIO, Council 4, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Emp., AFL-CIO, Denise A. Bouffard, Geneva M. Hedgecock, Dennis P. Hefferman, William D. Hill, and Marcelle Y. Pichanick, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John G. ROWLAND, i/o as Governor of the State of Connecticut, and Marc S. Ryan, i/o as Sec. of Ofc. of Policy & Mgmt. of State of CT, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit |
Allan B. Taylor (Albert Zakarian, Victoria Woodin Chavey, and Douglas W. Bartinik, on the brief), Day Berry & Howard LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendants-Appellants.
David S. Golub (Jonathan M. Levine and Craig N. Yankwitt, on the brief), Silver Golub & Teitell LLP, Stamford, CT, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before: FEINBERG, LEVAL, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.
The question presented in this interlocutory appeal is whether absolute legislative immunity and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity should bar plaintiffs' claims arising from the allegedly unlawful termination of their state employment by executive branch officials of the State of Connecticut. In particular, we consider arguments by defendants John G. Rowland ("Rowland"), former Governor of the State of Connecticut, and Mark S. Ryan ("Ryan"), former Secretary of the Office of Policy & Management of the State of Connecticut ("OPM") (collectively, "defendants"), that the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Alfred V. Covello, Judge) erred when it denied defendants' motion seeking dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint under the doctrines of absolute legislative immunity and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition ("SEBAC"), along with twelve of thirteen unions comprising SEBAC and five individually named union members, on behalf of a putative class of similarly-situated plaintiffs (jointly, "plaintiffs"), filed the instant action in January 2003 seeking damages against defendants in their personal capacities, and injunctive relief against defendants in their official capacities. They filed an amended complaint in May 2003. Plaintiffs' amended complaint alleged constitutional violations arising from the termination of approximately 3,000 unionized state employees beginning in November 2002, assertedly carried out by defendants in retaliation for the employees' political affiliations and union membership. Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief sought reinstatement to their previous positions, or to other positions in the state workforce, and an array of other forms of relief, including a prohibition against retaliating against plaintiffs.
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' amended complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), arguing, inter alia, that plaintiffs' claims were barred on legislative immunity and Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity grounds.1 The District Court decided, in response to defendants' motion, that (1) sovereign immunity barred all of plaintiffs' claims for money damages; (2) further discovery was required to determine whether legislative immunity would bar plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief; and (3) sovereign immunity did not bar plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief. On appeal, defendants challenge the District Court's order insofar as it held that legislative immunity and sovereign immunity did not at this time bar plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief.2
We agree with the District Court that defendants are not entitled to legislative immunity at this stage in the litigation, although we do so on somewhat different grounds than those relied upon by the District Court. We hold, as a threshold matter, that legislative immunity may bar not only claims for damages, but also certain claims seeking injunctive relief against state officials in their official capacities. Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court's holding that discovery is necessary to assess whether legislative immunity may bar any of plaintiffs' claims for reinstatement to their previous positions. Defendants will be entitled to legislative immunity from these claims if the District Court properly concludes, after discovery, (1) that when committing the alleged violations, defendants were acting in their "legislative" capacities under the test set forth in Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 54-56, 118 S.Ct. 966, 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998); and (2) that granting the requested relief would enjoin defendants in their "perform[ance of] legislative functions," id. at 55, 118 S.Ct. 966.3 We further conclude, as a matter of law, that defendants are not entitled to legislative immunity from plaintiffs' claims seeking placement into other, existing positions in the state workforce, because granting this relief would not enjoin defendants in their performance of legislative functions.
As to defendants' argument that sovereign immunity bars plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, we affirm the District Court's denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on that basis. In particular, we affirm the District Court's conclusion that the injunctive relief sought by plaintiffs falls within the exception to sovereign immunity set forth in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), notwithstanding defendants' arguments that plaintiffs allege no ongoing violation that can be remedied by an injunctive order of the District Court.
We set forth below the relevant facts as alleged in plaintiffs' amended complaint and as discussed by the District Court. Because the case comes to us after the denial of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the facts as they are alleged in the amended complaint, as supplemented by undisputed facts that are matters of public record. See Almonte v. City of Long Beach, 478 F.3d 100, 104 & n. 2 (2d Cir.2007).4
In December 2002, defendants Rowland and Ryan announced the termination of the employment of approximately 3,000 unionized Connecticut state workers. As noted by the District Court, the State of Connecticut was facing a budget crisis at the time the dismissals were ordered. See State Employees Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, Civ. No. 3:03CV221 (AVC), 2006 WL 141645, at *1 (D.Conn. Jan.18, 2006) (hereinafter, "Dist. Ct. Op."). Accordingly, we briefly review Connecticut law governing modifications to the state budget process before setting forth plaintiffs' allegations.
Under Connecticut's constitution and statutory law, the Governor and the state legislature share responsibilities for administering the state budget. The Governor is required by law to present a budget plan to the General Assembly every two years. See Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 4-72, 4-73. Each state agency must submit to the Governor, through the Secretary of OPM, a requisition for a quarterly allotment of funds. See id. § 4-85(a). The Governor may deny the request for funds if he determines that a change in circumstances since the adoption of the budget requires a modification. See id. § 4-85(b)(1). Before any modification goes into effect, the Governor must file a report with the joint standing committee of the General Assembly charged with responsibility for budget appropriations. The report must describe the change in circumstances requiring budget reductions. If a deficit of more than one percent of the state's general fund of appropriations is projected, the Governor must also devise and implement a plan to prevent a budget deficit. See id. § 4-85(b)(2).
Plaintiffs filed the instant action in January 2003, approximately two months after the terminations began to take effect. They filed an amended complaint in May 2003, at a time when the terminations allegedly "continued to be implemented and [were] scheduled to continue in the future." Plaintiffs do not refer to Connecticut's budget crisis in their amended complaint. Instead, plaintiffs allege that defendants terminated the plaintiff employees because of anti-union animus and in retaliation for several plaintiff unions' failure to support defendant Rowland in his re-election campaign. In particular, plaintiffs allege that, in November 2002, shortly after Rowland was re-elected Governor, Rowland and Ryan sought changes to the collective bargaining agreements previously reached between the plaintiff unions and the State of Connecticut. Defendants demanded that the unions grant concessions in the form of reduced health care and pension benefits, totaling over $450 million annually. Defendants allegedly threatened that if the unions did not agree to the concessions, defendants would terminate the employment of unionized state workers.
When plaintiffs refused to agree to the proposed concessions, defendants allegedly "carried out their prior threats" and announced that they would terminate approximately 3,000 unionized state employees. Id. ¶ 42. The terminations began to take effect on November 18, 2002, with defendants allegedly "intentionally singl[ing] out only union members for termination." Id. ¶ 44. According to plaintiffs, "[a]ll of the state union employees selected for termination [were] members of the endorsing...
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