Blilie, Matter of, No. C6-91-2444

Citation494 N.W.2d 877
Decision Date22 January 1993
Docket NumberNo. C6-91-2444
PartiesIn the Matter of Lorraine BLILIE.
CourtSupreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Syllabus by the Court

1. The repeal of Minn.Stat. Sec. 525.753 (1949), under which appellant's guardianship was commenced, did not also terminate her guardianship.

2. Under Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.03, subd. 6a (1992), mentally retarded patients are entitled to the same procedural protections as mentally ill persons, but the consent of a public guardian may be substituted for the approval of an independent guardian ad litem.

Peter M. Rosene, Andrew E. Staab, Rosene & Haugrud, Chartered, St. Paul, for appellant.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., David P. Iverson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for Com'r of Human Services.

Richard H. Hoffman, Asst. Ramsey County Atty., St. Paul, for Ramsey County.

Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.

KEITH, Chief Justice.

Lorraine Blilie ("Blilie") is a 54-year-old woman who has been diagnosed with developmental disabilities (i.e., mental retardation) and mental illness. She has a secondary diagnosis of conduct disorder, undersocialized aggressive.

Blilie was born on March 14, 1938, and in January 1952, at the age of 13, she was committed to Owatonna State School as mentally deficient, with the Director of Public Institutions appointed guardian. She was later placed in Rochester State Hospital and on July 4, 1957, was sent to Cambridge State Hospital ("Cambridge").

Between 1952 and 1984, Blilie remained at Cambridge without judicial action being taken. The statutes governing commitment and guardianship, however, were modified, with Minn.Stat. ch. 253A replacing Minn.Stat. Secs. 525.749-.79 (1949). This statute was, in turn, replaced by Minn.Stat. ch. 253B, the current commitment act, effective August 1, 1982. Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, 1982 Minn.Laws 1329.

Pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.12, a hearing was held in 1984 on the continued commitment of Blilie as a mentally retarded person. At that time, she was being treated with various types of neuroleptic medication. The court extended her commitment for an indefinite period, finding that she continued to engage in maladaptive behavior and was unlikely to provide the necessary food, clothing, shelter, and medical care for herself.

In 1987, another commitment hearing was held in response to this court's requirement that all indeterminate commitments be reviewed at least every three years. In re Harhut, 385 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Minn.1986). The trial court found that she needed supervision and care on a 24-hour basis and that she had delusional thinking, loose associations, and was aggressive to others. The court determined, however, that if the hospital wanted to continue to treat her with neuroleptics, they would have to get a Jarvis order. See Jarvis v. Levine, 418 N.W.2d 139 (Minn.1988). This court-ordered commitment was due to expire on March 12, 1990.

On April 30, 1990, another commitment petition was brought. The court confirmed the diagnosis of mild mental retardation and conduct disorder, but concluded that she should be placed in the community because Cambridge was a more restrictive placement than Blilie needed. The court also noted that Blilie was still being treated with neuroleptics without a Jarvis hearing. In an order dated August 17, 1990, the court denied the petition for judicial commitment. Blilie nevertheless continued to reside at Cambridge, apparently because no appropriate community placement was available.

A new petition was filed on September 26, 1990, and the court once again determined that continued commitment was unnecessary because her condition had not changed from the time of the previous petition. Blilie remained at Cambridge, however, despite the court's finding that the lack of funding for alternative placement was not an acceptable reason for continuing to commit her to Cambridge.

On May 29, 1991, Blilie's counsel petitioned the district court pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 252A.19, subd. 2 (1990), requesting that the court hold that the original appointment of the commissioner as guardian was terminated in 1968 by the repeal of Minn.Stat. Sec. 525.753 (1949), that the court declare Minn.Stat. Sec. 253B.03, subd. 6a (Supp.1991), unconstitutional because it authorizes neuroleptic treatment upon guardian consent without court review, and that the court order the commissioner to show cause why she continued to provide residential services to Blilie at Cambridge without a commitment. The trial court denied the petition in its entirety. The court of appeals affirmed. 484 N.W.2d 34.

On January 2, 1992, Blilie was discharged from Cambridge and transferred to a private residential placement facility. The Commissioner claims that this action makes this appeal moot because the state no longer provides residential services or neuroleptic drugs to her. Blilie opposes this motion and continues to challenge the statute on appeal.

I.

Blilie asserts that her guardianship was terminated upon repeal of the guardianship statute under which she was committed. When Blilie was committed, the statute provided: "If the patient is found to be mentally deficient or epileptic, the court shall appoint the director guardian of his person and commit him to the care and custody of such director." Minn.Stat. Sec. 525.753, subd. 2 (1949). This statute was part of the general commitment statute. See Minn.Stat. Secs. 525.749-.79 (1949).

In 1968, this statute was repealed and replaced by Minn.Stat. ch. 253A. Minnesota Hospitalization and Commitment Act, ch. 638, 1967 Minn.Laws 1294. The new statute contained a savings clause, see Minn.Stat. Sec. 253A.21, subd. 7 (1967), but the duties of the commissioner as public guardian continued to be governed by the general guardianship provisions of Minn.Stat. Secs. 525.54-.612, which are still in effect today. See Minn.Stat. Secs. 525.539-.705 (1992). Contrary to Blilie's assertion, the savings provision addressed only the commitment status of previously committed persons, not the guardianship status of those individuals.

Blilie next claims that the adoption of the Mental Retardation Protection Act, Minn.Stat. ch. 252A, with the corresponding repeal of section 253A.07, subd. 17(b), indicates that all public guardianships created under the prior statute would terminate. What this statute did, instead, was separate the responsibilities of the commissioner as public guardian from the commitment proceedings of chapter 253A and the general guardianship provisions of chapter 525. Instead of repealing prior guardianships, chapter 252A was intended to apply to all public guardianships, including Blilie's, that were previously governed by the general guardianship provisions of chapter 525.

In 1982, chapter 253A was repealed and replaced by chapter 253B, the current commitment statute. Minnesota Commitment Act of 1982, ch. 581, 1982 Minn.Laws 1329. Chapter 253B, like its predecessor, contained a savings clause, which provides that:

For persons 16 years or older, involuntarily residing in a regional center pursuant to an order of guardianship, and not committed pursuant to an order issued under Minnesota Statutes, chapter 253B, or Minnesota Statutes 1980, chapter 253A, the following review procedures will apply:

(a) The person shall have a commitment hearing according to Minnesota Statutes, section 253B.08, prior to August 1, 1985. The head of the regional center shall notify the responsible county which shall initiate the petition for commitment.

* * * * * *

(c) A finding by the committing court that the individual does not satisfy the commitment criteria of Minnesota Statutes, chapter 253B, shall not terminate the guardianship or constitute a restoration to capacity. An order of restoration to capacity may only be obtained under Minnesota Statutes, section 525.61.

Act of May 2, 1984, ch. 623, Sec. 10, 1984 Minn.Laws 1555, 1559-60 (emphasis added). This language evidences a legislative intent to continue guardianships until they are explicitly terminated under the general guardianship provisions of chapter 525. There is no indication that the repeal of the earlier commitment statutes extinguished Blilie's public guardianship. Instead, the commissioner, ward, or any interested person must petition the court to restore Blilie to capacity. See Minn.Stat. Sec. 252A.19, subd. 2 (1992); Minn.Stat. Sec. 525.61, subd. 1 (1992). We hold that, absent such a petition, Blilie's guardianship continues.

II.

Blilie also contends that her right to privacy was not adequately protected because the statutory scheme subjects mentally retarded or developmentally disabled persons to intrusive forms of therapy without any independent judicial review. Blilie asserts that the approval system, whereby the hospital staff prescribes neuroleptic medication and the public guardian approves, inadequately protects her right to privacy because the state, or its delegate, is both recommending the treatment and approving it as public guardian.

Respondent counters that the statute itself provides support for the commissioner's actions and further asserts that the case itself is moot because Blilie was discharged from Cambridge on January 3, 1992, is no longer being treated with neuroleptic medication by the commissioner, and is now residing at a private residential placement facility. With respect to this mootness challenge, however, this case is "capable of repetition yet evading review," In re Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d 824, 826 (Minn.1989), because Minn.Stat. Sec. 525.56, subd. 3(1) (1990) authorizes a guardian to admit a ward to a treatment center for temporary care for up to 90 days. Neuroleptic medication may be administered during this temporary stay, thereby indicating that this issue may recur and yet evade review. See Schmidt, 443 N.W.2d at 826. Thus, this court chooses to reach the merits of Blilie's claim.

In evaluating challenges to the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
89 cases
  • State v. Bussmann, A05-1782.
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • November 1, 2007
    ...re Haggerty, 448 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1989). Constitutional challenges are questions of law, which we review de novo. In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993). I. Bussmann argues that the clergy sexual conduct statute is unduly vague, in violation of due process. The relevant portion......
  • Humenansky v. Minnesota Bd. of Medical Examiners
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • December 20, 1994
    ... ... In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993) ...         Humenansky seeks a declaration that ... ...
  • Holmberg v. Holmberg, KALIS-FULLER
    • United States
    • Minnesota Court of Appeals
    • June 12, 1998
    ...doctrine. Any analysis must begin with an acknowledgment that Minn.Stat. § 518.5511 is presumed to be constitutional. In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993). This presumption can be overcome only by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statute is unconstitutional. Id. This is t......
  • State v. Machholz
    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
    • January 22, 1998
    ... ... , this court recognizes that the interpretation of statutes is a question of law." In re Blilie, 494 N.W.2d 877, 881 (Minn.1993) (citation omitted). Accordingly, "this court 'is not bound by the ...       KEITH, C.J., and BLATZ, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this matter ... --------------- ... 1 For ease of discussion, throughout the remainder of this opinion we will ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT