Taylor v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 23 March 1973
• Parties: Daniel T. TAYLOR, III, Appellant, v. John P. HAYES, Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 737

494 S.W.2d 737

Daniel T. TAYLOR, III, Appellant, v. John P. HAYES, Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court, Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 23, 1973.

Rehearing Denied June 15, 1973.

Daniel T. Taylor, III, Louisville, Robert A. Sedler, Lexington, for appellant.

John P. Hayes, Judge, Jefferson Circuit Court, Louisville, Ed W. Hancock, Atty. Gen., Frankfort, Edwin A. Schroering, Jr., Henry A. Triplett, Louisville, for appellee.

CATINNA, Commissioner.

Daniel T. Taylor, III, appeals from a judgment and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court, Criminal Branch, Second Division, finding him guilty upon eight charges of contempt and committing him to the City of Louisville Jail for a total of three years and five months. He further appeals from an order of the same court prohibiting him from the further practice of law in that particular court because he had been theretofore found guilty of contempt of court.

The charges of contempt against Taylor result from his conduct in the defense of Narvel Tinsley. Narvel Tinsley and his brother, Michael Tinsley, were jointly indicted and charged with the murder of two police officers. The Tinsleys were black men while the police officers were white. The murders created some considerable sensation in Louisville, and feelings in the different communities were very pronounced. The news media tended to publicize each and every phase of the events surrounding the murders, and there was some apparent cooperation on the part of the authorities, as there is mention made of live television coverage of the site where the murders were said to have been committed. A news conference, with television coverage, announced the arrest of the Tinsleys. Later Narvel Tinsley escaped jail, and again newspaper coverage was overly abundant. It was in this situation that the joint trial of Narvel and Michael Tinsley was finally commenced on October 18, 1971.

Daniel Taylor, III, represented Narvel Tinsley while Michael Tinsley was represented by Attorneys Fleming, McCall, and Scott.

The trial lasted from October 18 through October 29, 1971, with Sunday excepted, and it was in the course of this trial that Taylor committed the offenses which were considered contemptuous in nature by the court. The particular acts of contempt as specified by the court in a 'Corrected Judgment and Certificate of Contemptuous Action in the Presence of the Trial Court' were as follows:

'Contempt 1. Mr. Taylor, in questioning a prospective juror, on the second day of Voir Dire, repeatedly ignored the Court's order not to continue a certain line of questioning and to ask his questions to the jury as a whole. He evidenced utter disrespect for prospective jurors.

'Contempt 2. The Court sustained the Commonwealth objection on the use of a prior statement to cross examine Officer Hogan and not to go into the escape of Narvel Tinsley. Mr. Taylor repeatedly and completely ignored the Court's ruling.

'Contempt 3. During the playing of a tape recording of the voice of witness David White, Mr. Taylor wrote on a blackboard. After the playing of the tape it was ordered that the blackboard be removed from the Court and Mr. Taylor was advised by the Court that he could use it in his final summation to the jury. Mr. Taylor was disrespectful to the Court by his tone of voice and manner when he replied, 'I'll certainly keep that in mind, your Honor.'

'Contempt 4. During cross-examination of Narvel Tinsley, by Mr. Schroering, Mr. Taylor interrupted and moved for a recess, was overruled by the Court, and then became most disrespectful to the Court and refused to take his seat at counsel's table as ordered.

'Contempt 5. Complete and utter disrespect by Mr. Taylor in the questioning of Mr. Irvin Foley, an attorney and Legal Advisor to the Louisville Police Department when he continually disobeyed the Court's ruling regarding a press conference which the Court had ruled on unadmissible (sic). Mr. Taylor accused the Court of disallowing admittance of black persons in the Courtroom during the examination of this witness and made a statement in the presence of the jury inferring that only white police officers could enter the courtroom. It has always been the Rule of the Court that there will be no interruption during the examination of a witness or during closing arguments by people coming and going into and from the Courtroom, which rule was known to Mr. Taylor.

'Contempt 6. The witness Jesse Taylor, a Louisville Police Officer, read a statement by witness, David White. A Ruling was made by the Court that the statement spoke for itself, had been introduced in evidence and could not be commented on by Officer Taylor, who merely took the statement. Mr. Taylor continued to disregard the Court's order and ruling by continually reading parts of the statement out of context.

'Contempt 7. Mr. Taylor in examining Mr. Norbert Brown, again referred to a press conference that the Court had previously ordered him not to go into. He also waved his arms at the witness in a derogatory manner indicating the witness was not truthful and showing utter contempt of the Court's ruling.

'Contempt 8. The Court directed Mr. Taylor to call his next witness. He called Lt. Garrett, Louisville Police Department. After this witness was sworn and took the stand, a deputy sheriff advised the Court that Mr. Taylor's aide was not searched, as everyone else had been upon entering the Courtroom. Mr. Taylor ordered the deputy to search his aide. The Court ordered Mr. Taylor to begin his examination, which he refused to do until he was cited for contempt in the Court's chamber.

'Contempt 9. Mr. Taylor repeatedly asked the same question of witness Floyd Miller that the Court had held improper. He was also disrespectful in his tone of voice when referring to a certain police officer as 'this nice police officer."

We have examined the entire record of the Tinsley trial, and it becomes immediately apparent that even before the trial had 'gotten off the ground, so to speak,' Taylor had embarked upon a plan or program designed to disrupt the trial and by any means possible cause the trial court to commit trial errors which might form the basis of an appeal. His actions were such as to clearly illustrate that they were deliberate, delaying, or planned disruptive tactics which did in fact create such an atmosphere in the court that he, if permitted to continue, would have appeared to be the star performer in the center ring of a three-ring circus. He constantly harassed the court by innumerable objections, statements, and requests for conferences in chambers, and, in truth, the record indicates that a great percentage of the trial time was consumed by the court and counsel attending speeches made by Taylor in the court's chambers.

As the trial progressed, there was a constant refusal on the part of Taylor to desist in his arguments, some in the presence of the jury and some at the bench. He refused upon occasions to maintain his seat so that the orderly processes of the court were available to the defendants. He continuously disregarded the court's orders and directions concerning the examination of jurors or witnesses and persisted in repetitious questioning and argument with both jurors and witnesses. Taylor launched a long tirade seeking to have the court remove opaque screens that had been placed over the windows and doors so as to lend some degree of privacy to the proceedings and protect the participants in the trial from the disconcerting demonstrations which were being conducted in and around the building. Taylor claimed that by the screening of the windows and doors his client was not receiving a public trial. Later, he made a monumental production of the fact that the court was refusing to admit spectators in crowds, claiming that by reason of this policy his client was not receiving a public trial. Again, the clearing of the back two rows of benches in the courtroom following laughter, noise, and other disruptive practices by the spectators was claimed by Taylor to be prejudicial to his client's receiving a fair trial.

There is no necessity of detailing the innumerable acts of Taylor which clearly reflected his contempt for the court as well as the judicial system of this Commonwealth. His actions were such as to place on trial the entire judicial system of the Commonwealth and those judges sworn to uphold its Constitution and laws and thereby assure defendants, a fair, orderly, and speedy trial.

Taylor was overbearing, contemptuous, and obnoxiously persistent in his questions and objections, and his misconduct was such that those attorneys representing Michael Tinsley, claiming that his antics prejudiced the rights of their client, were continually objecting to his tactics and moving the court that a severance be granted. The incidents necessitating objections on the part of Michael Tinsley's attorneys were so persistent and so constant that rather than consume the time of the court in a constant repetition of the rather involved objection and motion, the parties got to the place of calling it 'Objection No. 1.' We find all through the record this Objection No. 1 made on behalf of Michael Tinsley.

In the light of the entire record this court can only conclude that Daniel Taylor was guilty of each and every contempt as charged by the court, and if the court had so desired there could have been numerous other charges assessed in the course of the trial. In spite of Taylor's contemptuous conduct throughout the trial, we do not find at any point in the record an occasion where Taylor made any personal attack upon the judge, his integrity, or ability. On the contrary, Taylor was polite to the point of almost being condescending. At no time was his conduct of such a nature as to create a personal controversy between him and the court.

Throughout his brief, Taylor complains continuously of the conduct of the judge. He is identified as 'an activist seeking...