Bonin v. California

Citation108 L.Ed.2d 641,494 U.S. 1039,110 S.Ct. 1506
Decision Date19 March 1990
Docket NumberNo. 88-7381,88-7381
PartiesWilliam George BONIN, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

The petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of California.

Denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

Adhering to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting), I would grant the petition for certiorari and vacate the death penalty in this case. Even if I did not take this view, I would grant the petition because it raises several important and recurring questions concerning a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel unburdened by any conflict of interest. First, on what showing must a trial court explore a possible conflict on the part of a defendant's attorney? Second, if a defendant's attorney had an actual conflict, must the defendant demonstrate that the conflict adversely affected the attorney's performance in order to obtain a new trial?

I

On the eve of his trial for several murders and robberies, petitioner William George Bonin moved to replace Earl Hanson, who had been his attorney for over a year, with William Charvet. The prosecution opposed the motion principally on the ground that substituting Charvet would create two conflicts of interest that could jeopardize the effectiveness of Charvet's representation. First, Charvet had maintained an attorney-client relationship with James Munro, Bonin's alleged accomplice and a key prosecution witness against him, during which Charvet and Munro had discussed the facts of the case. Second, the prosecution maintained that Charvet's retainer agreement likely included a provision giving him the literary rights to Bonin's life story. The trial court initially denied Bonin's motion to substitute Charvet for Hanson, in large part because it found that Charvet's relationship with Munro created an actual conflict of interest. The court later permitted Charvet to represent Bonin, however, without addressing either conflict and without obtaining a waiver from Bonin of his right to conflict-free counsel.

Bonin subsequently was convicted of 10 counts of murder and robbery and sentenced to death. The California Supreme Court, in a split decision, affirmed the convictions and sentence, rejecting Bonin's argument that Charvet's alleged and actual conflicts of interest deprived Bonin of effective assistance of counsel. The court held that the trial court did not err by failing to explore the alleged literary rights agreement because the trial court had not been presented with sufficient evidence of such an agreement. Although the State Supreme Court did find that the trial court erred in allowing Charvet's substitution after learning of his- rela tionship with Munro, it refused to reverse the convictions and sentence on the ground that Bonin had not demonstrated that Charvet's performance as counsel was adversely affected by this conflict of interest. 47 Cal.3d 808, 765 P.2d 460 (1989).

II

I would grant Bonin's petition to determine whether the trial court had a duty to inquire into the potential conflict of interest arising from the alleged literary rights deal between Charvet and Bonin. It is well established that the right to effective assistance of counsel carries with it "a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest." Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 1103, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981). It is also apparent that a literary rights agreement may seriously undermine an advocate's loyalty to his client's interests. In a passage quoted in the California Supreme Court's opinion, the American Bar Association underscores the dangers of such arrangements:

"A grave conflict of interest can arise out of an agreement between a lawyer and an accused giving the lawyer the right to publish books, plays, articles, interviews, pictures, or related literary rights concerning the case. . . . [I]t may place the lawyer under temptation to conduct the defense with an eye on the literary aspects and its dramatic potential. If such an arrangement or contract is part of the fee, in lieu of the fee, or a condition of accepting the employment, it is especially reprehensible." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, 4-3.4 (2d ed. 1980).

See also 47 Cal.3d, at 836, 765 P.2d, at 475 (quoting prior draft of ABA Standard).

To protect a defendant's right to conflict-free counsel, a trial court must initiate an inquiry when it knows or reasonably should know of the possibility of a conflict of interest. Wood v. Georgia, supra, at 272, and n. 18, 101 S.Ct., at 1104 and n. 18; see also Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 347, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1717, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). In Wood, the petitioners had been convicted of distributing obscene materials. Their probation was revoked when they failed to pay substantial fines. This Court vacated the probation revocation because the trial court had failed to inquire into a possible conflict of interest on the part of the petitioners' attorney. The possibility of a conflict was apparent not from any concrete evidence, but from the circumstances of the representation. In particular, the petitioners' lawyer, who had been selected and paid by their employer, pressed a constitutional attack rather than arguing for leniency and a reduction in the fines, possibly to create a test case for the petitioners' employer. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S., at 272, 101 S.Ct., at 1103. Moreover, this Court found that the "the fact that the State raised the conflict problem explicitly and requested that the court look into it" should have alerted the trial court to the need for further inquiry. Id., at 273, 101 S.Ct., at 1104. The Court held that although it was difficult to determine from the appellate record whether an actual conflict was present, "the possibility of a conflict of interest was sufficiently apparent at the time of the revocation hearing to impose upon the court a duty to inquire further." Id., at 272, 101 S.Ct., at 1104.

The California Supreme Court departed from Wood in this case by holding that a defendant must present hard evidence to trigger a trial court's duty to investigate a potential conflict of interest. The possibility of a conflict here was at least as apparent as it was in Wood. Bonin, though indigent, was able to hire a private attorney on the eve of the trial in a highly publicized and notorious case. The prosecution specifically objected to the substitution of Charvet because of the likelihood that the retainer agreement included a literary rights deal. When the court asked Charvet whether he had made such a deal with Bonin, he answered evasively, asserting that the prosecution had no right to inquire into his fee arrangement and that this Court would sanction any literary rights agreement. Despite the clear possibility that Charvet had entered into a retainer agreement that could seriously compromise his duty of loyalty to his client, the court failed to inquire further, even after continued objection by the prosecution.

Because the trial court did not conduct the necessary inquiry, it is impossible for this Court to determine from the record whether an actual conflict resulted from a literary rights deal. As in Wood, supra, at 273, 101 S.Ct., at 1104, the only appropriate response in such a circumstance is to vacate the judgment below and remand to the trial court for it to determine whether an actual conflict existed. If the trial court were to find an actual conflict, I believe, for the reasons next set out, that Bonin is entitled to a new trial.

III

I would also grant Bonin's petition to decide whether a criminal defendant denied the right to conflict-free counsel must show that the conflict adversely affected his attorney's performance. The California Supreme Court acknowledged Charvet's prior attorney-client relationship with Munro; it further held that the trial court erred by permitting Charvet to represent Bonin without obtaining a waiver from Bonin of his right to conflict-free counsel.* Nevertheless, the court refused to reverse Bonin's conviction because petitioner had not shown that the conflict adversely affected Charvet's performance. In my view, we should presume adverse effect on counsel's performance once an actual conflict is shown.

This Court has never squarely resolved the question whether proof of adverse effect is required to overturn a conviction once an actual conflict is proved. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court stated that where a trial court has no reason to suspect a possible conflict, a defendant, in order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on appeal, must show that "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." 446 U.S., at 348, 100 S.Ct., at 1718. Sullivan left unclear, however, whether an actual conflict should be presumed to have an adverse effect, or whether a defendant must prove both an actual conflict and an adverse effect. See id., at 358, 100 S.Ct., at 1723 (MARSHALL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Sullivan held merely that "the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction" on appeal. Id., at 350, 100 S.Ct., at 1719 (emphasis added). This Court subsequently appeared to suggest in dictum that Sullivan required separate showings of actual conflict and adverse effect to reverse a criminal conviction. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ("Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's...

To continue reading

Request your trial
116 cases
  • Morales v. Coyle, No. 1:95 CV 2674.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio
    • March 29, 2000
    ... ... 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). that Morales asserts herein, and instead found that another U.S. Supreme Court decision, California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S.Ct. 837, 93 L.Ed.2d 934 (1987), was controlling precedent under the circumstances of this case. See Exhibit GGGG at ... ...
  • Purnell v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • June 17, 2021
    ...of his Sixth Amendment right as surely as if he failed to appear at trial.") (quoting Bonin v. California , 494 U.S. 1039, 1044, 110 S.Ct. 1506, 108 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).283 Mickens , 535 U.S. at 174, 122 S.Ct. 1237.284 One court has referred to the first two subcl......
  • Perez v. Marshall, 94-1666-IEG (POR).
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
    • October 7, 1996
    ... ... Charles D. MARSHALL, Warden, Respondent ... No. 94-1666-IEG (POR) ... United States District Court, S.D. California ... October 7, 1996 ... Page 1522 ... COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED ... Page 1523 ... COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED ... Page 1524 ... ...
  • Personal Restraint of Lord, Matter of
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • February 24, 1994
    ... ...         Lord has submitted several appendices to show that California law does not treat juvenile adjudications as "convictions". 9 PRP apps. 1-6. It does not matter if the adjudication is technically a ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT