494 U.S. 344 (1990), 88-512, Michigan v. Harvey
|Docket Nº:||No. 88-512|
|Citation:||494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293, 58 U.S.L.W. 4288|
|Party Name:||Michigan v. Harvey|
|Case Date:||March 05, 1990|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued Oct. 11, 1989
CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MICHIGAN
Following respondent Harvey's arraignment on rape charges and the appointment of counsel for him, he told a police officer that he wanted to make a statement, but did not know whether he should talk to his lawyer. Although the record is unclear as to the entire context of the discussion, the officer told Harvey that he did not need to speak with his attorney, because "his lawyer was going to get a copy of the statement anyway." Harvey then signed a constitutional rights waiver form and made a statement detailing his version of the events on the night in question. When his testimony at his state court bench trial conflicted with his statement to the police, the court allowed the State to use the statement to impeach his testimony. He was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed. That court ruled that the statement was inadmissible even [110 S.Ct. 1177] for impeachment purposes, because it was taken in violation of Harvey's Sixth Amendment right to counsel, citing Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625. The State concedes that the police transgressed the rule of Jackson, which held that, once a defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, any waiver of that right -- even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards -- is presumed invalid if given in a police-initiated discussion, and that evidence obtained pursuant to that waiver is inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief.
Held: A statement to police taken in violation of Jackson may be used to impeach a defendant's testimony. The Jackson rule is based on the identical "prophylactic rule" announced in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, in the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Moreover, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, and subsequent cases have held that voluntary statements taken in violation of Fifth Amendment prophylactic rules, while inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief, may nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's conflicting testimony. There is no reason for a different result in a Jackson case. Harvey's argument for distinguishing such cases from Fifth Amendment cases -- that, because the adversarial process is commenced at the time of a Jackson violation, postarraignment interrogations implicate the constitutional guarantee of the Sixth Amendment itself, whereas prearraignment Fifth Amendment violations relate only to procedural safeguards that are not themselves constitutionally protected rights -- is without merit. Nothing in the
Sixth Amendment prevents a suspect charged with a crime and represented by counsel from voluntarily choosing, on his own, to speak with police in the absence of an attorney. Cf. Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285. Moreover, Harvey's view would render the Jackson rule wholly unnecessary, because even waivers given during defendant-initiated conversations would be per se involuntary or otherwise invalid, unless counsel were first notified. Harvey's alternative assertion -- that the police officer who took his statement affirmatively mislead him as to his need for counsel and therefore violated the "core value" of the Sixth Amendment's constitutional guarantee, such that his purported waiver is invalid and the statement may not be used even for impeachment purposes -- is also unavailing, since the present record is insufficient to determine whether there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth Amendment rights. Pp. 348-354.
Reversed and remanded.
REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which WHITE, O'CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined, post, p. 355.
REHNQUIST, J., lead opinion
Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), the Court established a prophylactic rule that once a criminal defendant invokes his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a subsequent waiver of that right -- even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards -- is presumed invalid if secured pursuant to police-initiated conversation. We held that statements obtained in violation of that rule may not be admitted as substantive evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The question presented in this case is whether the
prosecution may use a statement taken in violation of the Jackson prophylactic rule to impeach a defendant's false or inconsistent testimony. We hold that it may do so.
Respondent Tyris Lemont Harvey was convicted of two counts of first degree criminal sexual conduct in connection with the rape of Audrey Sharp on June 11, 1986. Harvey was taken into custody on July 2, 1986, and on that date, he made a statement to an investigating officer. He was arraigned later on July 2, and counsel was appointed for him. More than two months later, Harvey told another police officer that he wanted to make a second statement, but did not know whether he should talk to his lawyer. Although the entire context of the discussion is not clear from the record, the officer told respondent that he did not need to speak with his attorney, because "his lawyer was going to get a copy of the statement anyway." App. 3233 (stipulation of prosecution). Respondent then signed a constitutional rights waiver form, on which he initialed the portions advising him of his right to remain silent, his right to have a lawyer present before and during questioning, and his right to have a lawyer appointed for him prior to any questioning. App. to Pet. for Cert. 3a-4a.1 Asked whether he understood his constitutional rights, respondent answered affirmatively. He then gave a statement detailing his version of the events of June 11.
At a bench trial, Sharp testified that Harvey visited her home at 2:30 a.m. on the date in question and asked to use the telephone. After placing a call, Harvey confronted Sharp with a barbecue fork, and a struggle ensued. According to Sharp, respondent struck her in the face, threatened her with the fork and a pair of garden shears, and eventually threw her to the floor of her kitchen. When she ran to the living room to escape, Harvey pursued her with the weapons,
demanded that she take off her clothes, and forced her to engage in sexual acts.
Harvey testified in his own defense and presented a conflicting account of the night's events. He claimed that he had gone to Sharp's home at 9 p.m. and invited her to smoke some crack cocaine, which he offered to supply in return for sexual favors. She agreed, but after smoking the cocaine, she refused to perform the favors. When respondent would not leave her house, Sharp allegedly grabbed the barbecue fork and threatened him, triggering a brief fight during which he grabbed the fork and threw it to the ground. The two then moved to the living room, where, according to Harvey, Sharp voluntarily removed her clothes. He testified, however, that the two never engaged in sexual intercourse, and that he left shortly thereafter.
On cross-examination, the prosecutor used Harvey's second statement to police to impeach his testimony. Before doing so, the prosecutor stipulated that the statement "was not subject to proper Miranda," App. 32, and therefore could not have been used in the case-in-chief. But because the statement was voluntary, the prosecutor argued that it could be used for impeachment under our decision in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). Defense counsel did not object, App. 34; App. to Pet. for Cert. 5a, and the trial court permitted the questioning. The prosecutor then impeached certain of Harvey's statements, including his claim that he had thrown the barbecue fork to the floor, by showing that he had omitted that information from his statement to the police. App. 36-45.2 The trial judge believed the victim's testimony, and found respondent guilty as [110 S.Ct. 1179] charged.
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court noted that, if the second statement had been taken only in violation of the rules announced in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), it could have been used to impeach Harvey's testimony. It held, however, that the statement was inadmissible even for impeachment purposes, because it was taken "in violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See e.g., Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)." App. to Pet. for Cert. 6a-7a. Because the trial "involved a credibility contest between defendant and the victim," the court concluded that the impeachment was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 7a. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal, three justices dissenting, and we granted certiorari. 489 U.S. 1010 (1989). We now reverse.
To understand this case, it is necessary first to review briefly the Court's jurisprudence surrounding the Sixth Amendment. The text of the Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." The essence of this right, we recognized in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), is the opportunity for a defendant to consult with an attorney, and to have him investigate the case and prepare a defense for trial. Id. at 58, 71. More recently, in a line of cases beginning with Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and extending through Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), the Court has held that...
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