Nyberg v. City of Virginia, 73-1686.

• Decision Date: 19 February 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1686.,73-1686.
• Citation: 495 F.2d 1342
• Parties: George W. NYBERG et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The CITY OF VIRGINIA et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

495 F.2d 1342 (1974)

George W. NYBERG et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. The CITY OF VIRGINIA et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 73-1686.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted December 12, 1973.

Decided February 19, 1974.

Rehearing and Rehearing Denied June 3, 1974.

O. C. Adamson, II, Minneapolis, Minn., for defendants-appellants.

Newton S. Friedman, Duluth, Minn., for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before BRIGHT and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges, and STUART, District Judge.^*

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied June 3, 1974.

STEPHENSON, Circuit Judge.

The single issue to be decided in this case is the constitutionality of a resolution adopted by the municipal hospital at Virginia, Minnesota. The resolution prohibits the use of hospital facilities for the performing of any abortion which is not necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Because we find that the resolution unduly restricts what the United States Supreme Court has held to be a fundamental right, we are compelled to hold the resolution unconstitutional. We therefore affirm.

The Virginia Municipal Hospital is a public hospital operated by the City of Virginia, Minnesota through a hospital Commission. The Commission adopted Resolution 2606 on February 5, 1973 and reaffirmed the resolution on February 19, 1973.¹

Appellants sought relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 and the Civil Right Acts, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 claiming that the resolution was an encroachment of their constitutionally guaranteed rights.

The District Court dismissed the Nybergs, the Arpis, Melodie Wilson and James E. Williams, leaving the two physicians, Doctors Mock and Tietz with standing to bring the action. The City of Virginia was dismissed as a party defendant by the court.

Resolution No. 2606 was declared by the court to be null and void and further:

Defendants are permanently enjoined from attempting to enforce Resolution No. 2606 or any similar resolution or regulation and are required and mandated to make the Virginia Municipal Hospital facilities available to any duly licensed physician within a period of 30 days from date hereof for the performance of female abortions within and subject to the rules and principles stated in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 153 113 at p. 164 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).²

The members of the hospital commission and the hospital administrator appeal.

Appellants initially contend that the appellee-doctors have no standing to bring this action. Standing, of course, entails

such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962).

We think that the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973) has clearly paved the way for physicians to assert their constitutional rights to practice medicine, which now includes the right to advise and perform abortions. Justice Blackmun writing for the Court in Roe v. Wade, supra at 163, of 410 U.S. at 732 of 93 S.Ct. stated:

For the period of pregnancy prior to this "compelling" point, the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient\'s pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.

The opinion states further at 165, 93 S.Ct. at 733:

This decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the physician.

The impact of the court's discussion cannot be fairly said to limit standing to sue in abortion cases to pregnant women. Neither can these opinions be read so narrowly as to accord standing only to a physician threatened with criminal prosecution. See Doe v. Bolton, supra at 188-189 of 410 U.S., 93 S.Ct. 739. Clearly the claims of medical doctors to "freely practice medicine according to the highest medical standards without arbitrary outside restraints" are inextricably bound up with the privacy rights of women who seek abortions. YWCA v. Kugler, 342 F.Supp. 1048, 1055 (D.N.J.1972). This is sufficient to present a justiciable controversy and confer standing on the physicians who bring this action. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965); Abele v. Markle, 452 F.2d 1121, 1125 (CA2 1971); stay granted, 409 U.S. 908, 93 S.Ct. 212, 34 L.Ed.2d 169 (1972), remanded for consideration in light of Roe and Doe, 410 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 1417, 35 L.Ed.2d 683 (1973); Doe v. Turner, 361 F.Supp. 1288, 1289 (D.Iowa 1973) (3 judge court); Freeman & Bass, P. A. v. State of N. J. Com'n of Invest., 359 F. Supp. 1053, 1059 (D.N.J.1973); cf. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Furthermore, the practical effect of the stringent limitation on the use of hospital facilities for performing abortions is to arbitrarily bar the physicians from activities that directly affect their economic interests. Abele v. Markle, supra, 452 F.2d at 1125; see also, Data Processing Service v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 89 S.Ct. 266, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968).

Turning to the merits, we find the focal point to be whether a public hospital can deny its facilities to doctors and their patients who seek abortions, using the same basic language that the Supreme Court has held to be unconstitutional in statutes providing criminal penalties.

The language of Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton expressed the plain view that the abortion decision and its implementation is a fundamental right of personal liberty embraced within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is thereby protected from undue infringement by the State.³ In other words, absent compelling circumstances of state interest, regulation of "certain fundamental rights," including abortion, is unconstitutional. Roe v. Wade, supra at 155 of 410 U.S., 93 S.Ct. 705, 708 and citations.

The "compelling point"⁴ was set out in a tripart test by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. The district court quoted the test and we quote it again here:

(a) For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman\'s attending physician.

(b) For the stage subsequent to approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.

(c) For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.

While the Roe and Doe decisions dealt with state statutes providing criminal penalties, those decisions cannot be read so narrowly. As the several noncriminal cases cited by the court in Roe v. Wade point out, the issue is the existence of certain fundamental rights. If any of the defined fundamental rights is found to be present the state must then show "compelling state interest" if it wishes to limit or regulate. Roe v. Wade, supra at 155-156, 93 S.Ct. 705 and citations; Roe v. Wade, supra at 211, 93 S.Ct. 705 (Mr. Justice Douglas concurring); Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701, 705 (CA1 1973) & n. 2.

We find — as have several courts before us, including the district court in the instant case — that a plain reading of the Roe and Doe decisions can lead to only one conclusion: Where the state fails to take cognizance of the separate trimesters of pregnancy in its regulation of abortion procedures, the regulation is overbroad and invalid. Doe v. Bolton, supra at 195 of 410 U.S., 93 S.Ct. 739; Roe v. Wade, supra at 163 of 410 U.S., 93 S.Ct. 705; Roe v. Wade, supra at 218, 93 S.Ct. 705 (Mr. Justice Douglas concurring); Nyberg v. City of Virginia, supra at 939 of 361 F.Supp.; Doe v. Woodahl, 360 F.Supp. 20 (D.C.1973); Doe v. Israel, 482 F.2d 156, 159 (CA1 1973); cf. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, supra at 706 of 475 F.2d.

Appellant frames the issue to be whether the state has an affirmative duty under Roe and Doe to provide abortion facilities. This record does not present a situation where the hospital would be required to establish new or different facilities and staff in order to perform the operations. For reasons set out below, we find that the district court in this case was correct in ordering the Virginia Municipal Hospital to make its existing facilities available for the performing of abortions.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital:

But it seems clear, after Roe and Doe, that a fundamental interest is involved, requiring a compelling rationale to justify permitting some hospital surgical procedures and banning another involving no greater risk or demand on staff and facilities.

* * * * * *

It is clear under Roe and Doe that a complete ban on a surgical procedure relating to the fundamental interest in the pregnancy decision is far too broad when other comparable surgical procedures are performed. 475 F.2d 701, 705-706.

The court concluded:

Once the state has undertaken to provide general short-term

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