Monroe v. Arkansas State University
Decision Date | 26 July 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 06-3519.,06-3519. |
Parties | Todd MONROE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARKANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, Department of Nursing; Susan Hanrahan, Dean of College of Nursing and Health Professionals, Arkansas State University; Sue Campbell, Program Director, Arkansas State University, Defendants-Appellants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judges.
Arkansas State University dismissed Todd Monroe from the University's nurse anesthesia program after he took a medical leave of absence and received an "incomplete" grade in his clinical course. Monroe filed suit against the University, as well as Susan Hanrahan and Sue Campbell (Dean of the College of Nursing and Program Director, respectively) in their individual capacities, alleging breach of contract and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed the claim for money damages against the University on the basis of sovereign immunity, but permitted Monroe to proceed against the University for injunctive relief and against the individual defendants for damages. The University and the individual defendants, Hanrahan and Campbell, appeal.
We reverse the district court's (1) partial denial of the University's motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity and (2) denial of Hanrahan's and Campbell's motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity and direct dismissal of the action.
Monroe alleges that, in Spring 2003, he enrolled in the University's nurse anesthesia program. Shortly before completing the program, in April 2005, Monroe voluntarily took a medical leave of absence to receive treatment for chemical dependency. During this time, Monroe entered into a consent agreement with the Arkansas State Board of Nursing (BON). Under this agreement, Monroe was placed on probation for three years. After consulting Hanrahan and Campbell, he informed them of his decision to take medical leave.
Monroe claims that he then attempted without success to speak with Hanrahan and Campbell regarding how he might complete his clinical course work and receive his degree. Finally, at a meeting in September 2005, Hanrahan informed him that he had received an "I" or "incomplete" grade in his unfinished clinical program. Hanrahan also advised him that his "I" would turn into an "F" within a year and that he was dismissed from the program. Monroe states that he requested to complete his clinical course and receive his diploma, but Hanrahan told him that he could not do so until his nursing license was "unencumbered."
Monroe filed this lawsuit against the University, Campbell, and Hanrahan on March 6, 2006. He contends that these facts amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process because the University deprived him of his earning potential, anesthetist certification, and public education without a hearing or any form of due process.
The University, as well as Hanrahan and Campbell, responded to Monroe's allegations with their own version of facts. Essentially, they explain that Monroe agreed to receive an incomplete grade, knew of the "incomplete" grade via the school's electronic grade posting, and never took advantage of the University's avenues for filing a grievance. They also maintain that they did not officially dismiss Monroe until August 2006 when his "I" became an "F," in accordance with school policy that an incomplete grade will revert to an "F" if not completed within one year. The University submitted to the district court its formal letter of dismissal dated August 15, 2006, not long after it sent the letter to Monroe (and during pendency of the motions we now review). The University filed a motion to dismiss arguing that it was entitled to immunity from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. Hanrahan and Campbell likewise urged the district court to dismiss Monroe's claims against them on the basis of qualified immunity.
The court received affidavits and other supporting documentation and construed the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b). The court concluded the Eleventh Amendment barred Monroe's suit for damages against the University, but permitted Monroe to pursue prospective injunctive relief. In addition, the court determined that Hanrahan and Campbell were not entitled to qualified immunity because "there are facts in dispute as to whether defendants denied plaintiff's right to procedural due process."
The University appeals the district court's order permitting the injunctive action to proceed, contending that it is entitled to sovereign immunity even as to prospective injunctive relief. The individuals appeal the order denying them qualified immunity.
The University properly raises the claim of its sovereign immunity on interlocutory appeal. See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 141, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) ( ); see also Williams v. Missouri, 973 F.2d 599, 599 (8th Cir.1992) () (quoting Barnes v. Missouri, 960 F.2d 63, 64 (8th Cir.1992) (per curiam)). Likewise, the individual defendants properly raise the issue of their qualified immunity. See Herts v. Smith, 345 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir.2003) () This court's review of these issues is de novo.
The University argues the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the University for any kind of relief, not merely monetary damages. We agree. While under the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), state officials may be sued in their official capacities for prospective injunctive relief without violating the Eleventh Amendment, the same doctrine does not extend to states or state agencies. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 443 F.3d 1005, 1017 (8th Cir.2006), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 3000, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007) ( ); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 781-82, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978). Accordingly, the district court erred by permitting Monroe to proceed against the University for injunctive relief. We remand to the district court for entry of an order dismissing the University.
The district court denied Hanrahan's and Campbell's motion for summary judgment, rejecting their argument that they are entitled to qualified immunity. We review de novo the district court's denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity, see Sparr v. Ward, 306 F.3d 589, 593 (8th Cir.2002), taking as true those facts asserted by Monroe that are properly supported by the record. Wilson v. Lawrence County, Mo., 260 F.3d 946, 951 (8th Cir.2001).
"[G]overnment officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The district court must consider whether (i) Monroe has alleged the violation of a constitutional right by Hanrahan and Campbell and (ii) that right was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable person would have known that his conduct violated the law. See Wilson, 260 F.3d at 951; see also Herts v. Smith, 345 F.3d 581, 585 (8th Cir.2003) (). Although the defendant bears the burden of proof for this affirmative defense, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the law was clearly established. Sparr, 306 F.3d at 593.
Monroe alleged that Hanrahan and Campbell violated his right to procedural due process, specifically his right to notice and a hearing. For our analysis of his claim, we assume without deciding that Monroe's interest in pursuing his education constitutes a constitutionally protected interest. See Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 222-23, 106 S.Ct. 507, 88 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985) ( ); Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 84-85, 98 S.Ct. 948, 55 L.Ed.2d 124 (1978) ( ).
In support of his proposition that he is entitled to notice and a hearing, Monroe compares his case to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975). Goss dealt exclusively with public high school suspension for disciplinary reasons; Monroe, by contrast, was enrolled in a graduate program at the University and was dismissed for failing to complete his course work,...
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