People v. Anderson, 56043
| Citation | 495 N.E.2d 485,113 Ill.2d 1,99 Ill. Dec. 104 |
| Decision Date | 20 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 56043,56043 |
| Parties | , 99 Ill.Dec. 104 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Clifford ANDERSON, Appellant. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
Page 485
v.
Clifford ANDERSON, Appellant.
[113 Ill.2d 3] Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Mark L. Rotert, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Richard M. Daley, State's Atty., County of Cook, Chicago, Michael E. Shabat, Joan S. Cherry, Timothy J. Joyce, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel.
James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago, for appellant; Karen A. Popek, Richard E. Cunningham, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel.
Justice SIMON delivered the opinion of the court:
On September 5, 1978, the defendant, Clifford Anderson, shot and killed the manager and the engineer of the apartment
Page 486
[99 Ill.Dec. 105] building where he lived and was employed as a janitor. He was indicted on two counts of murder and two counts of armed violence. At trial he defended on the ground of insanity. His first trial in the circuit court of Cook County ended in a mistrial when the jury could not reach a verdict. Ten days later the defendant was tried a second time and found guilty on all counts. After [113 Ill.2d 4] a bifurcated sentencing hearing, the jury sentenced him to death. The case is before us on direct appeal (87 Ill.2d R. 603).The defendant concedes that the only material issue at trial was his sanity, and thus an extended discussion of the facts is unnecessary. To establish his defense, the defendant called a psychiatrist, his roommate, and his sister. The psychiatrist had interviewed Anderson and reviewed various psychiatric and criminal records, as well as letters written by or at the direction of Anderson. In response to a hypothetical question, the expert testified that the defendant could not conform his conduct to the requirements of the law at the time of the shootings. On cross-examination he stated that the defendant probably was unable to appreciate the criminality of his acts.
The defendant's roommate and cousin, Ora Russell, related that Anderson had been concerned for months that the building was "going condo" and that Anderson had him write two or three hundred letters to various agencies complaining about what Anderson perceived was happening. Anderson was apparently fired from his job on September 2. Anderson woke Russell up at 6 a.m. on the morning of September 5 and appeared not to have slept. At Anderson's request, Russell wrote letters and made phone calls to a government agency, the news media, and a union. After speaking to the union, defendant seized a gun and went out. The shootings followed. Russell said he thought Anderson was "crazy" and described his behavior on the day of the killings as "wild."
Anderson's sister testified to a history of mental illness in the family. She also identified certified commitment papers on the defendant's mother and brother.
In rebuttal the State presented its own psychiatric expert, who concluded that Anderson was legally sane. By stipulation, a written statement of another psychiatrist[113 Ill.2d 5] who believed that the defendant was sane was also introduced. In addition, the prosecution elicited testimony from three building residents who witnessed some of the events of September 5 and said that they had never noticed anything unusual about Anderson or seen him in a rage. The arresting police officer and an assistant State's Attorney who interviewed the defendant on the day of the shootings both stated that Anderson appeared normal.
The defendant raises some 35 issues on this appeal concerning his convictions and the sentence of death which was imposed. We need only address two of these.
The defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when the State introduced evidence of his responses to Miranda warnings to establish his sanity. Officer Ken Riess testified that, shortly after the defendant arrived at the lockup, his partner read the Miranda warnings to the defendant and the defendant replied that "he understood and that he had no more to say to us." The officer stated that Anderson subsequently requested a lawyer. The evidence was admitted over defense objection, and the trial judge instructed the jury that it could only be used "for the limited purpose of considering the state of mind, the ability to comprehend, to understand what his mental condition was."
Assistant State's Attorney Michael Melber testified that when he read Anderson his rights later in the day, the defendant said that he understood the rights and, after inquiring about the condition of the victims, again asked for an attorney. The judge reiterated that the evidence could be used in a "limited fashion only as bearing upon the issue of the defendant's mental condition." In both initial and rebuttal closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that the defendant's responses to the Miranda warnings showed his "ability to
Page 487
[99 Ill.Dec. 106] appreciate the criminality of his act and to conform his conduct...To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Gacy v. Welborn
...... The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed. People v. Gacy, 103 Ill.2d 1, 82 Ill.Dec. 391, 468 N.E.2d 1171 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1037, 105 S.Ct. 1410, 84 L.Ed.2d 799 (1985). That court also ... On collateral review, however, that court addressed the merits of Gacy's contentions. In light of an intervening decision, People v. Anderson, 113 Ill.2d 1, 12-13, 99 Ill.Dec. 104, 495 N.E.2d 485 (1986), overruling People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968), on which Judge ......
-
Clifford v. U.S., 85-319.
......Gilifs, 773 F.2d 549, 553-54 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ramos, 725 F.2d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1984); People v. Anderson, 113 Ill.2d 1, 99 Ill. Dec, 104, 495 N.E.2d 485, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 658, 93 L.Ed.2d 713 (1986). We do not discuss ......
-
People v. Goins, Docket No. 1–11–3201.
...retardation might struggle to define certain words. But, Goins cites our supreme court's holding in 999 N.E.2d 35People v. Anderson, 113 Ill.2d 1, 99 Ill.Dec. 104, 495 N.E.2d 485 (1986), to argue that Dr. Neu should have been allowed to testify about the responses where they contributed to ......
-
85 Hawai'i 336, Tabieros v. Clark Equipment Co., 17339
...... data are not admitted as substantive evidence, but only for purposes of showing the basis of the expert's opinion." (Citations omitted.)); People v. Anderson, 113 Ill.2d 1, 99 Ill.Dec. 104, 495 N.E.2d 485, 488 (1986) ("Rule 705 .. does not clearly answer whether [the] facts [upon which an ......
-
The admissibility of expert opinion and the bases of expert opinion in sex offender civil management trials in New York.
...an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates.... CAL. EVID. CODE [section] 801(b) (West 2011). (209) People v. Anderson, 495 N.E.2d 485, 487 (Ill. (210) People v. Swanson, 780 N.E.2d 342, 350 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (citing Anderson, 495 N.E.2d at 488). (211) Lawrence v. Commonwe......
-
Table of Cases
...§§1:210, 1:350 A-559 Table of Cases People v. Amy C. , 364 Ill App 3d 785, 847 NE2d 621 (1st Dist 2006), §1:300 People v. Anderson , 113 Ill 2d 1, 495 NE2d 485 (1986), §§5:40, 11:30, 11:120 People v. Anderson , 2012 Ill App (1st) 103288, 977 NE2d 222 (2012), §22:10 People v. Anderson, 266 I......
-
Science, Opinion & Experts
...of whether those in the expert’s profession would reasonably rely on the hearsay in their practice outside of court. People v. Anderson , 113 Ill 2d 1, 495 NE2d 485 (1986). For example, a patient’s subjective description of symptoms made to an examining physician is trustworthy hearsay on w......
-
Confusing, Prejudicial & Bolstering
...written, may be inadmissible because it is an extrajudicial statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Anderson , 113 Ill 2d 1, 495 NE2d 485 (1986); People v. Trent , 315 Ill App 3d 437, 734 NE2d 1 (2000). In a civil case, if an out-of-court document or statement has ......