Wayne v. State
| Decision Date | 02 February 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A2012,S97A2012 |
| Citation | 269 Ga. 36,495 S.E.2d 34 |
| Parties | , 98 FCDR 389 WAYNE v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Megan C. DeVorsey, Atlanta, for Willie Mays Wayne.
H. Maddox Kilgore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Gina C. Marshall, Asst. Dist. Atty., Cari Kaplan Johanson, Asst. Dist. Atty., Atlanta, for the State.
Following a jury trial in which Willie Mays Wayne represented himself, he was convicted of malice murder, felony murder (predicated on the underlying felonies of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, aggravated assault, and theft by taking), armed robbery, kidnaping, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, aggravated assault, and theft by taking. 1 On appeal, Wayne primarily asserts that the trial court erred in determining that he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.
Viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict, we find the following: Wayne knew the victim, Lovell Matthews, and asked him for a ride. Matthews obliged. Later that day, Matthews' girlfriend paged Matthews several times. Each time she did, Wayne answered the page.
The next day, Wayne was seen with Matthews' car, a 1977 Buick. The back seat was bloodied and so was Wayne's shirt. Wayne cleaned the blood from Matthews' car, explaining to a friend that he had been in a fight with the person who owned, and loaned him, the car. Wayne added that he took the owner of the car to the hospital.
Over the course of the next several days, Wayne pawned a gun which belonged to Matthews. He also pawned a gun which, according to a ballistics expert, was probably used to kill Matthews. Then, Wayne left Georgia.
When the police found Matthews' decomposed body, they issued an alert for his car. One month later, the car was located in Michigan. It was being driven by an individual who said he was Wayne's roommate. Wayne was arrested in short order. At that time, he possessed Matthews' birth certificate and social security card, and identified himself as Lovell Matthews.
1. The evidence is sufficient to enable any rational trier of fact to find Wayne guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
2. Wayne was represented initially by a public defender. Because Wayne made numerous complaints about that attorney and repeatedly asked to represent himself, the trial court permitted the public defender to withdraw and appointed another attorney, Robert F. Coheleach, to represent Wayne. Soon, Wayne complained about Coheleach, too. When Wayne asked to be allowed to proceed pro se, the trial court initially denied his request and advised him to cooperate with Coheleach. When Wayne persisted, the trial court permitted him to proceed pro se, with Coheleach standing by to assist him. Shortly thereafter the trial court reversed itself, ruling that Wayne would not be allowed to represent himself, and that Coheleach would be his attorney. Soon, Wayne again expressed dissatisfaction with Coheleach and asked for permission to represent himself. The trial court acceded to Wayne's request and he proceeded to trial without the benefit of counsel.
Wayne asserts the trial court failed to make an appropriate inquiry as to whether he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. We disagree. The trial court ascertained that Wayne completed the ninth grade, obtained his GED, and attended business school at a university for 18 months. It also ascertained that Wayne was aware that various motions would be addressed before trial and that he understood what would take place during the course of a trial. 2 Asked if he appreciated the "substantial number of pitfalls involved in self-representation," Wayne responded that he did, adding, "It is very frightening and for the record, it is a very frightening thing and I take it very seriously." The trial court informed Wayne repeatedly that self-representation was dangerous; that self-representation would be hurtful; and that the only question would be how much he would hurt himself. The trial court asked Wayne directly if his decision to proceed pro se was made intelligently, freely and voluntarily, and Wayne responded in the affirmative. Accordingly, the trial court found that Wayne knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his right to counsel.
Cochran v. State, 253 Ga. 10, 11, 315 S.E.2d 653 (1984).
The record in this case reflects that Wayne made an informed and voluntary choice to relinquish his right to counsel and represent himself and that the trial court so found. The mere fact that, in the opinion of a court appointed psychiatrist, Wayne lacked the ability to represent himself well is of no consequence. The test is not whether the accused is capable of good lawyering--but whether he knowingly and intelligently waives his right to counsel. (We note, parenthetically, that the psychiatrist opined that Wayne was competent to waive that right knowingly and intelligently.)
Relying upon Prater v. State, 220 Ga.App. 506, 469 S.E.2d 780 (1996), Wayne asserts the record does not demonstrate a valid waiver of the right to counsel because the trial court did not establish that the waiver was " 'made with an apprehension of the nature of the charges, the statutory offenses included within them, the range of allowable punishments thereunder, possible defenses to the charges and circumstances in mitigation thereof, and all other facts essential to a broad understanding of the matter.' " Id. at 509, 469 S.E.2d 780. See also Campbell v. State, 128 Ga.App. 74, 76-77, 195 S.E.2d 664 (1973), quoting Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724, 68 S.Ct. 316, 323, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948). In this regard, Wayne maintains that a waiver of counsel cannot be said to be knowing and intelligent unless the trial court makes each and every one of the inquiries outlined in Prater. We disagree. Although it would be helpful, it is not incumbent upon a trial court to ask each of the questions set forth in Prater. The record need only reflect that the accused was made aware of the dangers of self-representation and nevertheless made a knowing and intelligent waiver. See U.S. v. Fant, 890 F.2d 408 (11th Cir.1989); Kirkland v. State, 202 Ga.App. 356, 358, 414 S.E.2d 502 (1991). Compare Hasty v. State, 215 Ga.App. 155, 159, 450 S.E.2d 278 (1994) with Singleton v. State, 176 Ga.App. 733, 337 S.E.2d 350 (1985).
3. Three separate crimes were introduced into evidence to show Wayne's modus operandi and identity. In each of the separate crimes, Wayne plead guilty to theft by receiving a stolen automobile. Wayne asserts that the separate crimes do not have a sufficient connection or similarity to the crimes for which he was tried and that, therefore, they were inadmissible.
The first crime occurred in 1981 when Wayne stole a Mercury Cougar. Placed under arrest and advised of his rights, Wayne stated that he had purchased the car for $900. Subsequently, Wayne was found to be in possession of a driver's license and other items belonging to the owner of the car.
In 1987, Wayne was seen driving a stolen Buick Somerset with an Ohio tag. Approached by police officers, Wayne claimed that the car belonged to his sister. A fracas ensued and Wayne fired shots at the officers. Approximately one week later, Wayne was arrested and items belonging to the car's owner were found on his person.
Finally, in 1992, police officers stopped Wayne's girlfriend in a stolen Toyota Corolla. She informed the police that the car belonged to Wayne and that he let her use the car. When the police questioned Wayne, he identified himself as Willie Mays and insisted that the car rightfully belonged to him.
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