State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 58315
| Decision Date | 06 June 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 58315,58315 |
| Citation | 495 S.W.2d 385 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. William J. CASON et al., Relators, v. Christopher S. BOND, as the acting Commissioner of Administration, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Cullen Coil, Jefferson City, for relators.
John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Bruce C. Houdek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondents.
Original proceeding in mandamus. Art. IV, § 26, Mo.Const., V.A.M.S., authorizes the Governor to veto all or part of any item of money in an appropriation bill. The basic issue for decision herein is whether that section also allows the Governor to strike words which set out the purpose of an appropriation bill without vetoing the money appropriated. We hold that it does not.
On April 26, 1973, Relators, as taxpayers and as members of the 77th General Assembly, sought from this Court a writ of mandamus directing that authorization and issuance of warrants for expenditures under specified sections of Conference Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 16 of the 77th General Assembly (C.C.S.H.B. 16) be limited to those purposes specified in said sections as enacted by the General Assembly. The requested writ also would direct that Respondents give no effect to the delection of words from those enumerated sectiosn as set out in the Governor's April 3, 1973, veto message to the House of Representatives.
Relators named as Respondents the Honorable Christopher S. Bond, Governor, in his capacity of Acting Commissioner of Administration, 1 Honorable James I. Spainhower, State Treasurer, and Governor Bond in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Missouri. No relief of any kind was sought by Relators against Governor Bond as Governor. We issued our alternative writ of mandamus directed to the Acting Commissioner of Administration and the State Treasurer and they have made return thereto. In addition, the parties have filed a Stipulation of Facts which resolves the factual issues raised by the pleadings. Subsequent references to Respondents relate only to the Acting Commissioner of Administration and the State Treasurer.
Relators, as taxpayers, have standing to maintain this action. Miller v. Ste. Genevieve County, 358 S.W.2d 28 (Mo. 1962); Everett v. County of Clinton, 282 S.W.2d 30 (Mo.1955); State ex rel. Johnson v. Sevier, 339 Mo. 483, 98 S.W.2d 677 (1936). This being true, we need not address ourselves to the question of whether, as members of the General Assembly, the Relators would have independent standing to maintain this action.
The current General Assemply adopted C.C.S.H.B. 16, an appropriation bill providing funds for emergency and supplemental purposes. It then was sent to the Governor, who, on April 3, 1973, returned the bill which he had signed after making partial vetoes of certain sections. The details of those vetoes were set out in a message to the House of Representatives which accompanied the bill when it was returned.
C.C.S.H.B. 16 consists of 49 sections numbered from 16.010 to 16.530. The Governor totally vetoed §§ 16.460 and 16.470. No question as to that action is raised in this proceeding. In addition, the Governor struck from §§ 16.490, 16.495, 16.500, 16.515 and 16.520 certain language pertaining to the purpose of these appropriation items. He did not veto or reduce the sum appropriated in each of said sections.
The following seriatim recital shows the sections in question, the words stricken by the Governor, his explanation of the reason for each of the vetoes (from the Governor's message of April 3, 1973, to the House of Representatives) and information from the Stipulation of Facts which discloses any payments heretofore made:
'Section 16.490. To the Bi-State Development Agency
From General Revenue . . . $48,520.00'
By stipulation, the parties agree that the money appropriated by § 16.490 was expended prior to the institution of this suit for partial payment of principal and interest on Equipment Trust Note, $48,520.00.
'Section 16.495. To the Bi-State Development Agency
For meeting the operating deficit of the transit system
'Section 16.495. I hereby veto and delete from Section 16.495 the words 'for the period ending June 30, 1973' for the reason that the language would prevent payment of these funds to the Bi-State Development Agency until after June 30, 1973.'
By stipulation, the parties agree the money appropriated was not expended prior to the institution of this suit; however, they also agree the money has since been expended in accordance with the provisions of the alternative writ.
'Section 16.500. To the Office of Administration
From General Revenue ... $1,100,000.00'
By stipulation, the parties agree the money appropriated was not expended prior to the institution of this suit and to date has not been expended.
'Section 16.515. To the State Park Board
For Lee Fine Airport equipment to comply with the F.A.A. Regulations From General Revenue ... $3,500.00'
By stipulation, the parties agree the money appropriated was not expended prior to the institution of this suit. The budget record shows as of May 11, 1973, total allotments of $3,500.00, unexpended balance of $3,500.00, outstanding orders of $3,076.56, and an unencumbered balance of.$423.44.
and '(from March 1 thru June 30, 1973)' for the reason that such language is unnecessary.'
By stipulation, the parties agree that prior to the institution of this suit the following amounts were expended: Danville Tent and Awning $15,192.58; Lamberth Plumbing and Heating $30,840.49; and Queen City Electric $45,916.61. Subsequent to the institution of this suit and to the issuance of the alternative writs, the $38,993.00 was credited to the operation account and some money was spent, leaving a current balance of $38,674.73.
At the outset, Respondents question our jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by Relators. This contention is based on the language of Art, II, § 1, Mo.Const., which relates to the separation of powers and provides as follows:
'The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments--the legislative, executive and judicial--each of which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances in this constitution expressly directed or permitted.'
We conclude that this section of the Constitution does not deprive us of jurisdiction in cases such as this. Prior decisions of this Court so establish. For example, in State ex rel. Donnell v. Osburn, 347 Mo. 469, 147 S.W.2d 1065 (1941), this Court issued its peremptory writ of mandamus to the Speaker of the House of Representatives directing him to open and publish the election returns with reference to the election of the governor and to declare as elected the person having the highest number of votes. The issue was raised as to whether the separation of powers section of the Constitution (which applies, of course, to legislative as well as executive and judicial branches) shielded the Speaker from a writ of mandamus from this Court. A unanimous en banc decision ruled that the Speaker's duty was purely ministerial and that he was subject to the writ. In so holding, the Court said, l.c. 1070:
'Nor does the office occupied by respondent as speaker of the House put him beyond the jurisdiction of mandamus. In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60, Chief Justice Marshall declared that 'it is not by the office of the person to whom the writ is directed, but the nature of the thing to be done that the propriety or impropriety of issuing a mandamus, is to be determined'. This Court followed that rule in effect in State ex rel. Robb v. Stone, 120 Mo. 428, 25 S.W. 376, 23 L.R.A. 194, 41 Am.St.Rep. 705. There we refused to issue mandamus against the governor on the ground that the performance or nonperformance of every duty placed upon the governor, who has 'supreme executive power,' involved the exercise of executive duty and discretion with which this court could not interfere. In no way would we be interfering in this case with the legislative power conferred on the legislature by issuing our...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Colorado General Assembly v. Lamm
...presented with this question have reached the same result. Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130 (1915); State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Mo.1973). In Re Interrogatories, Senate Resolution No. 5, 195 Colo. 220, 578 P.2d 216 (1978), is not authority for a contrary con......
-
Jubelirer v. Rendell
...for purposes of MISS. CONST. art. IV, § 73 (allowing governor to "veto parts of any appropriation bill"));19 State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Mo.1973) (holding that "item" for purposes of MO. CONST. art. IV, § 26 (permitting governor to "object to one or more items or porti......
-
State ex rel. Wiseman v. Oklahoma Bd. of Corrections
...see Patterson v. Dempsey and State v. Thatcher, 152 Conn. 431, 207 A.2d 739, 746, 747, 748, 749 (1965); Mo., see State v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Mo.1973) citing In Re Opinion of the Justices, 294 Mass. 616, 2 N.E.2d 789 (1936); New Mexico, see State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. ......
-
Washington State Legislature v. Lowry
...participating in the legislative process and the language conferring such authority is to be strictly construed." State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385, 392 (Mo.1973). Yet this majority allows the Governor to remove all legislatively imposed restrictions on appropriations without affe......