Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, s. 83-457

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Vermont
Citation496 A.2d 151,145 Vt. 510
Docket Number83-490,Nos. 83-457,s. 83-457
PartiesThe TRUSTEES OF THE DIOCESE OF VERMONT, et al. v. STATE of Vermont, Vermont Railway, Inc., and City of Burlington.
Decision Date19 April 1985

Gravel, Shea & Wright, Ltd., Burlington, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Norman C. Smith of Bloomberg & Greenberg, Burlington, for defendant-appellee Vermont Railway, Inc.

John T. Leddy of McNeil, Murray & Sorrell, Inc., Burlington, for defendant-appellee City of Burlington.

Before HILL, UNDERWOOD and PECK, JJ., and KEYSER and DALEY, JJ. (Ret.), Specially Assigned.

HILL, Justice.

The plaintiffs, The Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont, appeal an order of the superior court which dismissed their cause of action. We affirm.

In 1899, pursuant to an act of the Vermont Legislature, the Rutland-Canadian Railroad Company obtained Commissioner's awards permitting the taking of an easement for railroad purposes on land owned by predecessors in title to the plaintiffs. The Rutland-Canadian Railway Company was succeeded by the Rutland Railway Corporation. In 1962, the State of Vermont acquired the land from the Rutland Railway Corporation as part of the liquidation of that company. The State leased the right-of-way to Vermont Railway, Inc., which operated a railroad on the land until about the end of 1970. At that time, Vermont Railway removed all of its railroad equipment, including all switches, bridges and tracks, from the land. The defendant, City of Burlington, currently operates a bicycle path over part of this land. Vermont Railway still has approval from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to operate a railroad over the right-of-way. It has neither sought, nor received, permission from the ICC to abandon the railroad operation on this land.

In 1981, plaintiffs commenced this action in superior court, seeking a declaration that the easement granted for railroad purposes has been abandoned and is extinguished. Consequently, the plaintiffs claim that their title to the property is unencumbered by any interest of either the State of Vermont or Vermont Railway. Plaintiffs also sought a permanent injunction barring the defendants, the State of Vermont, Vermont Railway, Inc. and the City of Burlington, and all those claiming under them, from: (i) asserting any claim adverse to plaintiffs' titles to the land, (ii) trespassing upon the right-of-way, and (iii) executing any lease or conveyance of the land.

In 1982, the State of Vermont moved the court to dismiss the action for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, or, in the alternative, to grant summary judgment to the defendants. In urging the court to dismiss this action, the State argued that the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA), through 49 U.S.C. § 10903 (1976 and Supp. IV 1980), requires the approval of the ICC before a railroad may abandon its line. Since Vermont Railway did not obtain such approval, the State argued that no abandonment occurred, and absent an abandonment, the plaintiffs have no right to the relief they seek. The State's motion was denied by Judge Dier.

Later in 1982, the City of Burlington submitted a Suggestion of Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, pursuant to V.R.C.P. 12(h)(3), and then moved the court to dismiss the action on these grounds. The City alleged that Vermont Railway is subject to the ICC's exclusive jurisdiction with regard to its use of the land in question, and that, consequently, the court does not have jurisdiction to decide the case. By an Opinion and Order in August of 1983, Judge Martin granted the City's motion, and dismissed the action. It is from this dismissal that the plaintiffs appeal.

I.

Plaintiffs' first claim is that it was error for Judge Martin to have dismissed the case, because the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was previously presented to the trial court and ruled upon by Judge Dier in response to the defendant's, State of Vermont, motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs argue that as a result of this ruling, the trial court was precluded from later finding a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

In Merrill v. Reed, 123 Vt. 248, 252, 185 A.2d 737, 740 (1962), we stated: "A ruling of the trial court, ... without any exceptions being taken, becomes the law of the case." Plaintiffs allege that Judge Dier's failure to dismiss the case was a ruling that the superior court had subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and that under the rule as set forth in Merrill v. Reed, supra, this issue could not be ruled on later by Judge Martin.

A review of the various motions and memoranda reveals that the specific issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction was not raised in the first motion to dismiss. The defendant, State of Vermont, argued in the first motion that absent a ruling by the ICC on the issue of abandonment, the plaintiffs' allegations lacked merit, and failed to present the court with a claim upon which relief can be granted. This does not suggest that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Having not been raised in the first motion, Judge Dier's ruling on that motion did not preclude the issue of lack of subject matter jurisdiction from being raised at a later time.

II.

The plaintiffs' second claim is that it was error for the superior court to find that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case, and thereby grant defendant's, City of Burlington, motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs in this action claim that defendants have abandoned their interest in the land and that, under Vermont law, title to this land reverts to the plaintiffs. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that because there has been no authorization from the ICC for them to abandon or discontinue service on any part of the railroad line, the railway is still under ICC jurisdiction. Consequently, the defendants argue, any order by the state courts declaring an abandonment, and granting plaintiffs the relief they seek, would usurp the ICC of its authority in this area and, therefore, would be unconstitutional.

State laws which "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress" are invalidated by the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); U.S. Const. art. VI. When Congress chooses to legislate, pursuant to its constitutional powers, courts must find that local laws have been preempted by federal regulation if they "stand[ ] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941), quoted in Chicago & North Western Transportation Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S....

To continue reading

Request your trial
22 cases
  • Eldridge v. Greenwood, 2851.
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of South Carolina
    • June 15, 1998
    ...City Area Transp. Auth. v. Ashley, 555 S.W.2d 9 (Mo.1977) (condemnation suit barred by ICC's jurisdiction); Trustees of the Diocese v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151 (1985) (state court did not have jurisdiction to hear declaratory judgment action that railway easement was extinguished; e......
  • Preseault v. U.S., s. 93-5067
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
    • November 5, 1996
    ...Commerce Commission Act, and that the state court is therefore without subject matter jurisdiction. Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151 (1985). The second state court decision, some ten years later, affirms an injunction against the Preseaults prohibiting ......
  • Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 88-1076
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • February 21, 1990
    ...the route and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction over it. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. Trustees of Diocese of Vermont v. State, 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151 (1985). Petitioners then sought a certificate of abandonment of the rail line from the ICC. The State of Vermont int......
  • Burgoyne, LLC v. Chi. Terminal R.R. Co.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 25, 2020
    ...advance of any request for interim trail use. Preseault , 494 U.S. at 9, 110 S.Ct. 914 ; see Trustees of the Diocese of Vermont v. State , 145 Vt. 510, 496 A.2d 151, 152 (1985) (prior state court decision in the case). Indeed, one of the issues in the landowners' subsequent suit seeking com......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT