497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974), 72-2644, Jones v. Breed

Docket Nº:72-2644.
Citation:497 F.2d 1160
Party Name:Gary Stevens JONES, a minor, By and Through Lola Mae Jones, his guardian ad litem, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Allen F. BREED, Director of the California Youth Authority, and RobertMcKibben, Superintendent of the Southern Regional Center Clinic, CaliforniaYouth Authority, Respondents-Appellees.
Case Date:May 15, 1974
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Page 1160

497 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1974)

Gary Stevens JONES, a minor, By and Through Lola Mae Jones, his guardian ad litem, Petitioner-Appellant,


Allen F. BREED, Director of the California Youth Authority, and RobertMcKibben, Superintendent of the Southern Regional Center Clinic, CaliforniaYouth Authority, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 72-2644.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

May 15, 1974

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[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

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Robert L. Walker (argued), Peter Bull, San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner-appellant.

Russell Iungerich, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Los Angeles, Cal., for respondents-appellees.

Before GOODWIN and WALLACE, Circuit Judges, and EAST, [*] District judge.

WALLACE, Circuit Judge:

Seventeen-year-old Jones was apprehended for robbery, detained and adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court. Subsequently, he was referred for trial as an adult and was convicted. Having exhausted his state remedies, he unsuccessfully applied to the district court for habeas corpus relief, claiming a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against double jeopardy. We reverse.

California does not challenge the use of habeas corpus as a proper remedy in this case, see Fain v. Duff, 488 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1973), or contend that Jones has not exhausted his state remedies. The sole question before us is whether jeopardy attached during the juvenile court proceedings to prevent Jones' trial as an adult.

The State of California filed a petition in the juvenile court alleging that Jones, a minor, had committed an act which, if committed by an adult, would be a violation of Cal.Penal Code § 211 (robbery). If the allegations in the petition were true, the juvenile court had jurisdiction pursuant to Cal.Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 602. 1 The juvenile court, following a preliminary hearing, ordered that Jones be detained pending a hearing on the delinquency petition.

Twenty days later, the juvenile court held the delinquency hearing 2 for the purpose of determining whether Jones had committed the crime alleged, whether the juvenile court had jurisdiction and whether Jones would be adjudged a ward of the court. 3 Thus, for the juvenile court to proceed, the state had to prove that Jones committed the robbery. With the exception of a right to a jury trial, the delinquency hearing is in the nature of a criminal trial. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365-366, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49-51, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Jones and two prosecution witnesses testified at the hearing. The juvenile court found that Jones had committed the robbery and that Jones was under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and continued the proceedings to a later date at which time the court would determine the proper disposition of Jones. 4 At the

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subsequent hearing, the juvenile court judge announced he did not intend to proceed with Jones as a juvenile but intended to find him unamenable to the rehabilitative facilities of the juvenile court and to direct the District Attorney to prosecute Jones as an adult. 5 Upon an objection by Jones that he had assumed the hearing was to determine disposition to the appropriate juvenile facility, not to determine certification to the adult court for criminal prosecution, the court granted a one-week continuance. At the next hearing, Jones objected to the certification, contending, among other things, that he had already been adjudicated a person described in Cal.Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 602 6 by the juvenile court and, therefore, certification to be 'tried' again would place him twice in jeopardy. The court rejected the argument and certified Jones to be tried as an adult.

Following an unsuccessful attempt to secure habeas corpus relief in the state courts, Jones was tried and found guilty of armed robbery and his double jeopardy argument was again rejected.

Undaunted, Jones filed a petition for habeas corpus in the district court, once more claiming double jeopardy. The district court judge denied the petition, holding that jeopardy does not attach in the juvenile proceedings and even if it had, no new jeopardy arose by the procedure of certifying Jones to be tried and ultimately convicted as an adult. Jones v. Breed, 343 F.Supp. 690 (C.D.Cal.1972).

We must first resolve whether the protection of the Fifth Amendment 'nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . .' applies to juvenile court proceedings. 7 Certainly the constitutional mandate makes no distinction between adults and juveniles. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 16 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1967). The district court found that the nature of the juvenile court proceeding is such that it should be treated differently from adult criminal proceedings and double jeopardy restrictions should not be applied.

The juvenile court system was conceived around the turn of the century with the emergence of the enlightened concept of separating erring children from hardened felons. 8 The primary

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objective of the new system was to take juvenile offenders out of adult courts and adult bastilles and provide them with a sound rehabilitation program. 9 The system was envisioned as civil in nature rather than criminal. Traditional adversarial fact-finding procedures were abandoned in favor of informal procedures that would allow the court to determine what was in the juvenile's best interest and how he could be retrained, while at a pliable age, to live lawfully in society. 10 The juvenile court judge, in his role as 'father' 11 to the erring juvenile, was to protect his interest and welfare. Rules of evidence were abandoned and constitutional guarantees provided in adult proceedings were not afforded juveniles. 12

Although the adoption of these informal methods was perhaps sound in principle, the complexities of our society and our overcrowded juvenile court facilities dictated some modification. 13 In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), the Court analyzed the procedure for referring a juvenile for trial as an adult. Recognizing the significant disparity of what could happen to the juvenile depending upon whether he was tried as a juvenile or as an adult, the Court was no longer willing to have the waiver of jurisdiction decision made without the due process requirements of a hearing, representation by counsel, a statement of reasons or considerations for any referral to the adult court and opportunity for the juvenile's counsel to review the child's social study records.

Kent was followed by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 16 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1967), in which the Court mandated due process protection at the delinquency hearing by requiring (1) that the juvenile be given adequate notice of the charges, (2) that he be given the right to counsel, (3) that he be allowed to assert the privilege against self-incrimination and (4) that he be given the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses. More importantly, the Gault Court sounded a new approach to the juvenile system and rejected the theory that consitutional safeguards should be denied juveniles by the expedient of labeling the proceedings as civil when in fact they were criminal in nature. The Court reemphasized this requirement in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), holding that the charges against the juvenile must be proven at the delinquency hearing beyond a reasonable doubt. After Winship, if the state wished to limit constitutional rights, it inherited the burden of proving that criminal safeguards would be detrimental to particular aspects of the juvenile system. 14

It was unclear, however, whether these constitutional safeguards 15 included the Fifth...

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