North American Coal Corp. v. LOCAL UN. 2262, UMW OF AM.

• Citation: 497 F.2d 459
• Decision Date: 10 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-1629.,73-1629.
• Parties: The NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOCAL UNION 2262, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

497 F.2d 459 (1974)

The NORTH AMERICAN COAL CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOCAL UNION 2262, UNITED MINE WORKERS OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants-Appellants.

No. 73-1629.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued November 27, 1973.

Decided May 10, 1974.

Daniel B. Edelman, Washington, D. C., for defendants-appellants; Joseph A. Yablonski, Lewis D. Sargentich, Washington, D. C., on brief.

Jerry A. Fullmer, Cleveland, Ohio, and Edward H. Laylin, Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff-appellee.

Before EDWARDS, Circuit Judge, McALLISTER, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOINER,^* District Judge.

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge.

In this appeal Local 2262 of the United Mine Workers of America, seeks relief from a preliminary injunction which enjoined the local union and its officers from continuing, encouraging, and picketing in support of a work stoppage at North American's Powhatan #3 Mine in Jacobsburg, Ohio. This is also an appeal from judgments finding the eight officers and the local union itself in criminal contempt of the court's injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 401 (3) (1970) and assessing penalties therefor.

This litigation originated in a work stoppage at Powhatan #3 over the case of a miner, who after missing two days of work, was not allowed to return without a doctor's slip. The District Judge originally denied a temporary restraining order but orally required that the company resume negotiations on the grievance and that the union order return to work. Negotiations were resumed and the men did return to work for two shifts, but again left their jobs.

At a hearing on April 12 no formal proofs were taken from the plaintiff, but the parties agreed that there was a strike, and that the contract between the company and the union contained a compulsory arbitration clause. The District Judge thereupon declared that the burden of proof that an injunction should not issue was upon the UMW. He issued the temporary injunction, however, after refusing to take proofs pertaining to the equities between the parties and without any proofs as to the issue of irreparable damage.

After the issuance of the preliminary injunction, the union called a meeting where testimony indicates that the union officers urged resumption of work, but it is clear that in fact no work was resumed. Thereafter on two successive dates, after the officers and the union had been cited for contempt, the judge entered orders finding first, two of the officers and then six more of the local union officers in criminal contempt. The District Judge sentenced them to 30 days in jail, but subsequently suspended the sentences.

It is the appellants' claim as to these sentences that there was no proof at the hearings that any of the eight officers had authorized or encouraged the work stoppage, and on the contrary, that the undisputed proof was that each of the eight officers had urged the men to go back to work. The only finding of fact on this issue which the District Judge appears to have made (other than the ultimate findings of contempt) was that the officers had made "valiant efforts" to get the men back to work.

The District Judge's reasoning at the April 13, 1973, hearing pertaining to the individual contempt findings and sentences as to appellants Phillips and Smith is fully set forth below:

"THE COURT: On April 12, 1973, this Court issued an order upon specified named individual Defendants enjoining them collectively and severally from doing specific acts. A Union is a voluntary organization of members who seek a common goal. The officers of that Union must accept responsibility for the acts thereof. This Court is not willing to allow its orders to be defied.

In this particular matter and at this particular time, the Court represents the United States of America. No one is going to defy this Court\'s order.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Russell Phillips and Oscar Smith as officers of Local Union 2262 are guilty of contempt of Court. The Court will remand such Defendants to the custody of the United States Marshal for a period of 30 days for such contempt. The execution of this sentence will be delayed until 1:30 P.M. on Monday, April 16 at which time the Court will hear as to the contempt of the other named Defendants.

The Court will take into consideration at that time the status of the mine in question and whether or not it is operating.

The Court will reserve the question as to a monetary fine against Local 2262 and hold this matter for a further hearing. Pending such hearing, however, the Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to hold all checkoff funds in escrow pending a further determination and instruction by this Court.

This is a matter that should not have reached this point. On two separate occasions this Court has gone beyond its legal obligation in an effort to compromise the differences between the parties. On Tuesday, April 10, the Court made a specific effort for the parties to adhere to the agreement that is binding upon them. That effort was unsuccessful.

On Thursday, April 12, this Court issued an order requiring the parties to proceed in accordance with the contract between them and that order was disobeyed.

No person should mistake forebearance for weakness. No person, no group, no Company will defy the United States District Court.

Mr. Osterman, you may adjourn the Court."

The District Judge's reasoning at the April 16 hearing concerning the balance of the local union officers is set forth fully below:

"THE COURT: The Court is aware today as it was aware on Friday that there is a difference between the individuals who are here before this Court and the large number of members of this Local Union, a difference in the sense that they as officers are identifiable whereas the bulk of the Union is not identifiable. This is a very difficult problem. It has been a difficult problem for a number of years. We have reached a point in our relationship between Management and Unions that we place a burden on both. We have passed the point where Management can hire and fire at will with or without just cause, and we have also passed the point where a Union may strike as it will with or without just cause.

For reasons that escape this Court, in this particular situation despite numerous efforts to explain in as simple terms as possible, this Union and these Defendants simply refused to understand what the Court was saying, and I will say it once more. There is no right to strike under this agreement so long as the contract is in effect.

You have a right to process grievances and this Court stands ready to assist in processing grievances. No one is going to make a mockery out of that process by delay, by refusal, or by clouding the issue, and I impose upon Management as I imposed upon them last week the obligation to meet with you promptly, to deal with you fairly, and to process this grievance in accordance with the contract.

If you cannot agree, the matter goes to an impartial Umpire.

If you can\'t agree upon an Umpire and if both sides so require, the Court will appoint one. The Court is willing to assist so that there be a prompt disposition of a grievance.

Now, next week, any time there is a grievance, this is your Court. These are your laws and they are intended to be fair laws. I repeat again, anytime, anyplace, this Court is ready to assist in the prompt settlement of industrial grievances, but when this Court makes an order, it will be obeyed, and this Court made an order and these Defendants violated that order.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Frederick Clark, Nick Corise, Paul Mackinaw, William Lawrence, Jacob Schramm, Frank Del Vecchio have each been guilty of contempt of Court and the Court does, therefore, impose a sentence upon each of them of 30 days incarceration.

The Court is aware of the fact that as of this time the mine is back in operation. The contempt of the Court\'s order no longer issues and, therefore, the sentences heretofore imposed as well as those imposed upon Russell Phillips and Oscar Smith on Friday, April 13, are hereby suspended.

There is likewise a question of whether or not the Local Union itself as an entity has been guilty of contempt of Court and whether or not this Plaintiff is entitled to damages. That matter will come before this Court in Columbus, Ohio at 3:00 P.M. Wednesday, April 18, and the sole issue at that time will be whether or not the Union itself should be held in either civil or criminal contempt of Court."

At still another hearing upon April 18, 1973, the District Judge took testimony upon plaintiff-appellee's claims of losses in tonnage and profits due to the strike. The District Judge concluded:

"THE COURT: The Court is going to take this matter under advisement. Let me make just one or two observations: This has been an unpleasant task presented to this Court over the past week and a half. I am well aware of the fact that none of the participants have gained over this incident. This Company has lost money, substantial sums of money. Individuals of this Union have been held in contempt. Men have lost wages. This Union is facing consideration at this time of a fine, and I would point out further that all of this was totally unnecessary. In this room just over a week ago the Court made its position known and urged as strongly as it could that the parties seek a peaceful settlement of this dispute.

Unpleasant or not, however, an order of this Court was issued and despite the valiant efforts and I recognize that the best efforts were made by individuals, nevertheless, this Union did stay out on strike and did violate the express terms of this Court\'s order.

All of these matters will be taken into consideration and the Court will issue an order promptly.

Mr. Walters, you may adjourn the Court."

The order entered thereafter provided:

"Disobedience of this Court\'s order, however, is another matter. There has been a willful and deliberate disregard thereof. To accept the defense that

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