Safetcare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc., 2006-1535.

• Decision Date: 03 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 2006-1535.,2006-1535.
• Citation: 497 F.3d 1262
• Parties: SAFETCARE MANUFACTURING, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TELE-MADE, INC., Modern Medical Supply, Gendron, Inc., ConvaQuip Industrial, Inc., and Cambridge Technologies, Inc., Defendants, and Burke, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit

497 F.3d 1262

SAFETCARE MANUFACTURING, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TELE-MADE, INC., Modern Medical Supply, Gendron, Inc., ConvaQuip Industrial, Inc., and Cambridge Technologies, Inc., Defendants, and Burke, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2006-1535.

United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit.

August 3, 2007.

John S. Egbert, Egbert Law Offices, of Houston, TX, argued for plaintiff-appellant. With him on the brief was Paul S. Beik.

Michael L. Sturm, Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee.

Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, GAJARSA, Circuit Judge, and ROBINSON, District Judge.^*

GAJARSA, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff SafeTCare Manufacturing, Inc. ("SafeTCare") brought this patent infringement action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, alleging that the defendants infringed SafeTCare's U.S. Patent No. 6,357,065 (the "'065 Patent"). The '065 Patent discloses a variable width bariatric modular bed that is particularly suitable for use by obese patients. SafeTCare appeals the district court's summary judgment decision holding that the bariatric bed designed and manufactured by Defendant Burke, Inc. ("Burke") does not infringe the '065 Patent. SafeTCare Mfg., Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc. ("Summary Judgment Order"), No. 04-2306, slip op. (S.D.Tex. Jun. 14, 2006). Because Burke's product does not infringe Claim 12, the only claim asserted, of the '065 Patent, we affirm.

I.

A.

The written description notes that a "hospital bed is typically adjustable to control both mattress contour and height above the floor." '065 Patent col.1 ll.16-17. Bariatric beds have these same capabilities. "However, a bariatric bed is capable of lifting up to three times the weight of the typical hospital bed" and "is also wider than a standard hospital bed . . . so as to better support large (i.e. obese) patients." Id. col.1 ll.35-40. The frame of the variable width bariatric modular bed disclosed in the '065 Patent is reproduced below.

NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE

Id. Fig. 5.

SafeTCare asserts infringement only of Claim 12 of the '065 Patent, which reads:

A bed comprising:

a frame;

a plurality of deck sections pivotally connected to said frame to support a mattress, each of said plurality of deck sections having first and opposite sides and first and opposite pull out extensions slidable outwardly from said first and opposite sides between a retracted position at which said plurality of deck sections have a relatively narrow width by which to support a mattress having a correspondingly narrow width and an extended position at which said plurality of deck sections have a relatively wide width by which to support a mattress having a correspondingly wide width; and

a plurality of electric motors carried by said frame and coupled to respective ones of said plurality of deck sections for exerting a pushing force on said plurality of deck sections for causing said deck sections to rotate upwardly relative to said frame so as to adjust the contour of the mattress.

Id. col.8 ll.31-50 (emphasis added).

B.

Burke manufactures and markets a bariatric bed named the Tri-Flex II. Burke agrees that "the movable deck panels on Burke's Tri-Flex II bed are rotated relative to the frame by two electric motors, one for the head section and one for the foot section," and that "the head section of the Tri-Flex II bed rotates upwardly relative to the frame through use of a motor exerting a pushing force." Appellee Br. 13.

For the foot section of Burke's Tri-Flex II bed, a motor is connected to the movable deck panel through an actuator and a lift dog. Specifically, when the foot section is in the lowered position, the movable deck panel lies horizontally above the bed frame. The motor is connected to the bed frame and located on a horizontal plane under the deck panel. A "lift dog," which is a bracket attached or affixed to the deck panel,¹ extends vertically from the deck panel down to the horizontal plane on which the motor is located. An actuator lies on the plane on which the motor is located and connects the motor with the lift dog. See J.A. 287-92, 514-15.

To raise the movable deck panel, the motor exerts a force that is translated through the actuator to pull the lift dog toward the motor. Because the deck panel is connected to the lift dog and to other components of the bed that are not discussed here, the motion of the lift dog toward the motor results in the deck panel rotating in an upward direction relative to the bed frame. See id.

SafeTCare did not dispute during oral argument the mechanical means of operation of Burke's Tri-Flex II bed. See Digital Audio Recording: Oral Argument in Case No. 2006-1535, at 11:47 (Mar. 8, 2007) ("Oral Argument"), http://www.cafc. uscourts.gov/oralarguments/mp3/06-1535. mp3.

C.

SafeTCare filed a complaint asserting infringement of its '065 Patent by seven different defendants: Tele-Made, Inc.; Burke; Cambridge Technologies, Inc. ("Cambridge Technologies"); ConvaQuip Industrial, Inc.; Modern Medical Supply; Kinetic Concepts, Inc.; and Gendron, Inc. Burke, along with several of the other defendants, asserted various counterclaims against SafeTCare.

The district court conducted a Markman hearing, where the parties agreed that the term "a pushing force" of Claim 12 of the '065 Patent means "a physical force applied in a direction away from the body exerting it." The district court subsequently issued an order construing the term in the same manner.

Burke and Cambridge Technologies moved separately for summary judgment of noninfringement. In June 2006, the district court granted both motions. The district court then docketed what it asserted was a "Final Judgment," stating, "for the reasons stated in the Court's Orders granting Defendant Burke, Inc.'s and Defendant Cambridge Technologies, Inc.'s Motions for Summary Judgment . . . this action is DISMISSED."

II.

As a threshold matter based on the district court's "Final Judgment" order, this court is confronted with a case in which "the parties have failed to determine the finality of the appealed judgment." Int'l Elec. Tech. Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 476 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed.Cir.2007). Here, SafeTCare filed a notice of appeal in July 2006 asserting that this court had jurisdiction over its appeal. Burke did not object to SafeTCare's appeal. The district court, however, had not dismissed the claims and counterclaims relating to six of the defendants, including Burke's counterclaim.

The Supreme Court has stated that "[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree." Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). Furthermore, "every federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself . . . of its own jurisdiction . . . even though the parties are prepared to concede it." Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S.Ct. 1326, 89 L.Ed.2d 501 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, this court is required to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction over an appeal exists notwithstanding the parties' belief or concession that we possess jurisdiction. Finally, "[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction." Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (citations omitted). Similarly, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28 requires that an appellant establish the basis for this court's jurisdiction on appeal. Therefore, reliance on an agreement of the parties or an absence of an objection by the appellee is insufficient and cannot vest a court with subject matter jurisdiction.

This court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1295(a)(1) only "from a final decision of a district court." The Supreme Court established that "a `judgment' or `decision' is final for the purpose of appeal only `when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.'" Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518, 76 S.Ct. 912, 100 L.Ed. 1377 (1956) (internal citations omitted). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) ("Rule 54(b)") clearly explains that when more than one claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim is presented in an action or when multiple parties are involved:

In the absence of [a Rule 54(b) judgment], any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Therefore, unless the district court enters an express Rule 54(b) judgment or unless the case falls into a "specific, and narrowly circumscribed, exception[] to th[e] general rule" of finality, Mercantile Nat'l Bank at Dallas v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 573, 83 S.Ct. 520, 9 L.Ed.2d 523 (1963), a statement by the district court that the judgment is final is by itself insufficient to establish this court's appellate jurisdiction under § 1295(a)(1). For a judgment to be appealable to this court, the district court must issue a judgment that decides or dismisses all claims and counterclaims for each party or that makes an express Rule 54(b) determination that there is no just reason for delay. In this case, because litigation on the merits remained pending in the district court, the parties' reliance on the district court's order labeled "Final Judgment" was...