Souders v. South Carolina Public Service Authority
| Decision Date | 10 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-1426.,No. 2006-1427.,No. 2006-1428.,2006-1426.,2006-1427.,2006-1428. |
| Citation | 497 F.3d 1303 |
| Parties | William J. SOUDERS, Phyllis W. Souders, C. Barry Marsh, Justin Marsh, Frank M. O'Brien, III, Teresa Marsh Foxworth, Lewis Drew Marsh, Sarah Over, Allen D. Fore, Bettye S. Marsh, Joe Easley (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), McLeod Lumber Company, Inc., Dorothy McLeod Rhodes, Helen M. Bradham, Darlington Veneer Company, Inc., Bubendorf Brothers, Inc., Susan Sheppard, James M. Simons, Michael Tappert, Elizabeth Singleton Grayson, Eugene Collins, Barbara Collins, Ralph Hoffman, John D. Hollingsworth, Jesse D. Russell, and Carole R. Russell, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and United States, Movant-Appellee. William J. Souders, Phyllis W. Souders, C. Barry Marsh, Justin Marsh, Frank M. O'Brien, III, Teresa Marsh Foxworth, Lewis Drew Marsh, Allen D. Fore, Bettye S. Marsh, Joe Easley (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), Dorothy McLeod Rhodes, Helen M. Bradham, Darlington Veneer Company, Inc., Bubendorf Brothers, Inc., Susan Sheppard, James M. Simons, Michael Tappert, Elizabeth Singleton Grayson, Eugene Collins, Barbara Collins, Ralph Hoffman, Elbert Smalls, John D. Hollingsworth, Jesse D. Russell, and Carole R. Russell, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. South Carolina Public Service Authority (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and United States, Movant-Appellee. Herbert Butler, Phyllis W. Souders, C. Barry Marsh, Justin Marsh, Mary O. Swatek, Frank Swatek, Linda H. Fore (Personal Representative of the Estate of Allen D. Fore), Bettye S. Marsh Roberts, Dorothy M. Rhodes, Helen M. Bradham, Darlington Veneer Company, Bubendorf Brothers, Inc., Susan Sheppard, Hollingsworth Funds, Inc., Elizabeth S. Grayson, Ralph Hoffman, Frank M. O'Brien, III, Barbara Collins (Personal Representative of the Estate of Eugene Collins), Joe Easley (Personal Representative of the Estate of Alice V. Lucas), Elbert Smalls, Bucky Watkins, and James L. Lambert, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. South Carolina Public Service Authority (also known as Santee Cooper), Defendant-Appellant, and United States, Movant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Federal Circuit |
J. Edward Bell, III, Law Firm of J. Edward Bell, LLC, of Georgetown, SC, argued for plaintiffs-appellees.
Timothy A. Ngau, Alston & Bird LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant.
Ryan D. Nelson, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued for movant-appellee. On the brief were Sue Ellen Wooldridge, Assistant Attorney General, and Matthew J. Sanders, Attorney, Appellate Section, Environment & Natural Resources Division, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC. Of counsel were Fred R. Disheroon and Malcolm L. Stewart, United States Department of Justice, of Washington, DC.
Before MICHEL, Chief Judge, MAYER and DYK, Circuit Judges.
Defendant South Carolina Public Service Authority ("SCPSA") appeals the order of the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina denying a motion of the United States to intervene and transfer to the United States Court of Federal Claims three lawsuits filed by plaintiffs against SCPSA. See Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., Nos. 2:93-cv-3077-23, 2:97-0673-23, 2:03-0934-23 (D.S.C. April 12, 2006) (order denying motion to intervene and transfer). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A) to hear an interlocutory appeal of an order denying a motion to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims. Because the Court of Federal Claims lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear any of plaintiffs' claims in these three cases, we affirm.
SCPSA is a public utility company in South Carolina. Since 1942, SCPSA has operated a series of hydroelectric plants on the Santee and Cooper Rivers under license from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC"), collectively known as the Santee Cooper Diversion Project ("Santee Project"). These waterworks disrupted Charleston Harbor, thus Congress authorized the Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to construct new waterworks, collectively known as the Cooper River Rediversion Project ("Rediversion Project"), to rectify the problem. The centerpiece of the Rediversion Project is the St. Stephen hydroplant.
The Corps contracted with SCPSA in 1977 to operate the Rediversion Project, which entered service in 1985. The 1977 contract provides that after fifty years, SCPSA would acquire title to the Rediversion Project from the federal government. Until then, the contract provides that the federal government would "assume the risk of all claims arising from the construction and operation" of the facilities, "except those arising from the fault or negligence of [SCPSA]." Further, the contract requires that SCPSA gives timely notice to the government of any such claims.
In 1993, plaintiffs filed suit in state court against SCPSA alleging that its operation of the dams and related facilities in the area caused their lands along the Santee River to be flooded. The complaint made claims of negligence, trespass, and inverse condemnation/governmental taking under both the South Carolina and United States Constitutions. Pursuant to the 1977 contract, SCPSA informed the Corps of the lawsuit within days. SCPSA then removed this suit to federal district court and filed a third-party complaint against the United States. The district court dismissed the third-party complaint, holding that the United States was immune to the tort claims under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, and that it lacked jurisdiction over the contractual indemnity claims.
The district court proceeded to trial on plaintiffs' 1993 lawsuit, and the jury returned a verdict against SCPSA on the trespass and takings claims, rejecting SCPSA's asserted government contractor immunity defense.1 SCPSA moved for judgment as a matter of law on government contractor immunity grounds; the district court denied the motion because it held that SCPSA had broad discretion under the 1977 contract in operating the Rediversion Project and thus its actions were not sufficiently controlled by the government. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed the ensuing appeal, remanding for consideration of whether the liable conduct fell within the scope of SCPSA's FERC license so as to preclude a government contractor defense.2 The district court found that the conduct in question related to SCPSA's operation of the St. Stephen plant, not the Santee Project, thus it was not within the scope of the FERC license. As a result, the court maintained its earlier holding as to the government contractor defense. SCPSA did not appeal this decision. Meanwhile, plaintiffs proceeded to file additional lawsuits in 1997, 2003, and 2005 to seek relief for alleged continuing damage due to the same, still continuing conduct. All of these cases have been stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.
In 2003, SCPSA filed a claim against the Corps under the 1977 contract seeking reimbursement for any damages awarded, as well as attorney's fees and costs, for the various ongoing cases relating to the Rediversion Project. The claim resulted in a decision by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals holding that the 1977 contract obligated the federal government to indemnify SCPSA subject to potential defenses. The federal government then filed a motion to intervene in the 1993, 1997, and 2003 actions against SCPSA and transfer to the Court of Federal Claims due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. SCPSA filed a brief in support of the government's motion.
On April 12, 2006, the district court issued an order denying the government's motion to intervene and transfer in all three cases and holding that it did have jurisdiction over all the claims. Both SCPSA and the government timely filed appeals to this Court; the government later withdrew its appeal.
The scope of our review here is limited. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(d)(4)(A), our jurisdiction is restricted to a review of the district court's denial of the United States' motion to transfer these cases to the Court of Federal Claims.3 We conduct this review de novo. See Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 247 F.3d 1378, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2001); James v. Caldera, 159 F.3d 573, 578 (Fed.Cir.1998).
It is well settled that transfer of a case to another court is only permissible if the destination court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case.4 28 U.S.C. § 1631; James, 159 F.3d at 582-83. Thus here, a crucial inquiry is whether the Court of Federal Claims has subject matter jurisdiction over the claims of the three civil actions at issue. The jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), which states:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
The claims of the three lawsuits at issue can be summarized as generally consisting of (1) tort claims,5 (2) other state law claims,6 (3) a claim that SCPSA was in violation of its FERC license, and (4) takings claims under the United States Constitution. It is immediately clear that the tort claims are clearly outside the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims and thus cannot be transferred there. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (). Claims founded on state law are also outside the scope of the limited jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims. See id.; United States v. Mitchell, 463...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Paresky v. United States
...may be transferred under [S]ection 1631 only to a court that has subject matter jurisdiction.") (citing Souders v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).ANALYSISI. TIMELINESS The government's principal argument in support of its motion to dismiss is that the......
-
Alvarado Hosp., LLC v. Price
...another court is only permissible if the destination court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. , 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631 ; James v. Caldera , 159 F.3d 573, 582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1998) ). Accordingly, our "cruci......
-
Jan's Helicopter Service, Inc. v. F.A.A.
... ... because its transport aircraft did not have authority to operate. On August 9, 2002, airport authorities denied ... Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 ... 525 ... ...
-
Plaintiff V. The UNITED States, 10-26 C
...(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a) and Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 214 (1993)); see, e.g., Souders v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. (Souders), 497 F.3d 1303, 1307 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff's negligence claims sounded in tort and thus were beyond the jurisdiction of the......