People v. Holland

Decision Date29 August 1986
Docket NumberNo. 81-2895,81-2895
Parties, 100 Ill.Dec. 868 PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Daniel HOLLAND, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Richard M. Daley, State's Atty. of Cook County, Michael E. Shabat, Marie Quinlivan and Jean Subletj, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Donald S. Honchell, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel, Chicago, for defendant-appellant.

Justice PINCHAM delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty and was sentenced to concurrent, extended terms of imprisonment of 60 years for rape, 60 years for deviate sexual assault and 30 years for aggravated kidnapping. Defendant was also sentenced to a consecutive, extended term of 25 years for armed robbery. The trial court ordered that these sentences were to be served consecutive to any sentence the defendant would receive as a result of any parole violation. 1

On appeal, defendant urges for reversal that: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community; (2) his confession should have been suppressed; (3) the element of force in the armed robbery was not proven; (4) the consecutive sentences were improper; and (5) defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel.

The complainant's testimony at trial revealed that on May 4, 1980, at approximately 12:00 midnight, the complainant and her boyfriend left a party, riding in her boyfriend's car. The complainant drove. The car suddenly had a flat tire and the complainant pulled the car over to the shoulder of the road. They discovered that the spare tire was also flat. After waiting an hour for assistance, the couple decided to sleep in the car. They awakened at dawn and began to walk on the shoulder of the road. Shortly afterward, defendant pulled up in his car, asked what was wrong, and offered to give the complainant and her boyfriend a ride home. Accepting the invitation, the couple got in defendant's car. The complainant sat in the front seat and her boyfriend sat in the back seat.

After driving for a while, defendant pulled off the road and stopped the car, he grabbed the complainant, brandished a knife against her throat, ordered the boyfriend to get out of the car, and threatened to kill them if the boyfriend did not do so. The complainant's boyfriend got out of the car. The complainant pleaded with the defendant to release her. The defendant said he would let her go when he was through with her. He pulled her nearer to him and continued driving while holding the knife under the complainant's arm. Defendant then pulled his car into a parking lot. The complainant was ordered to take off her clothes or get "cut up." As the complainant disrobed, the defendant cut her brassiere and forced her to perform an act of oral copulation.

During this ordeal, defendant complained that the complainant was not sexually performing the way he wanted and he cut the complainant's upper thigh with his knife. The complainant testified that the defendant threatened to kill her if she did not do what he wanted. They got back in the car.

The defendant continued driving. The defendant then pulled into an alley where he and the complainant again got out of the car. The defendant forced the complainant to have intercourse with him twice and to perform oral copulation on him. The complainant testified that she did not attempt to leave nor did she cry out for help because she was only partially clothed. The defendant took the complainant's money (approximately $60), driver's license and school identification card and threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to the police. The defendant then allowed the complainant to get dressed outside the car and leave. The complainant testified that as she walked away she turned and noticed that the defendant's car did not have a rear license plate. The complainant ran to a grocery store where she used the washroom and called home. Her brother came to pick her up and immediately drove her to a police station. After reporting the incident to the police, the complainant was taken to a hospital. From the hospital, the complainant was driven to the places she had been taken by the defendant and then went back to the police station where she identified the defendant's picture from a group of photographs.

During the time the complainant was with the defendant, the complainant's boyfriend called the police. The police radioed a description of the defendant and the type of car he was driving. Defendant was arrested at about 8:15 a.m. when he was stopped by the police for driving without a rear license plate. The defendant did not have a valid driver's license. He was taken to the Schiller Park police station where a hunting knife, the complainant's high school identification card and $58.80 were taken from him.

The defendant was taken from the Schiller Park police station to the Des Plaines police station where he was interviewed by two assistant State's Attorneys and a police officer. At approximately 2:30 p.m. at the Des Plaines station, the defendant confessed to sexually assaulting the complainant.

Prior to trial, the trial court sustained defendant's motion to suppress the defendant's initial confession made at the Schiller Park police station. The court found that "there was physical confrontation between the Schiller Park police officers and the defendant. Under the circumstances, when it was that this occurred, it is not really necessary for me to make a determination * * *. I feel that that degree of physical confrontation contaminates any statements defendant would have made at the Des Plaines police station were denied."

Defendant contends that his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community was denied because a disproportionately small number of blacks were available for voir dire jury selection. Over 40 jury veniremen, of whom two were black, were assembled, from which the jury was selected. The State used two peremptory challenges to excuse the two blacks and 10 peremptory challenges to exclude white jurors. There were no black members of the jury. Defendant is Caucasian.

The State contends that defendant failed to preserve this issue for review by failing to raise an objection prior to the voir dire examination. The State points out that Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 114-3(a) and (b) provides:

"(a) Any objection to the manner in which a jury panel has been selected or drawn shall be raised by a motion to discharge the jury panel prior to the voir dire examination. * * *.

(b) The motion shall be in writing supported by affidavit and shall state facts which show that the jury panel was improperly selected or drawn."

The State contends that (1) contrary to the requirements of this statute, defense counsel made an objection to the jury array after the voir dire examination had begun and a panel of jurors sworn in; (2) although the court granted defense counsel leave to file a written motion, defense counsel failed to do so; (3) there is no written motion in the record, supported by an affidavit, challenging the selection of prospective jurors; and (4) defendant's motion for a new trial failed to raise the issue of the alleged improper jury array.

The question of whether it is a constitutional violation for the State to use its peremptory challenges to systematically exclude blacks from the jury solely because of their race was recently decided on April 30, 1986 by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids the State through its use of peremptory challenges from excluding jurors solely on account of race. We do not rule on this issue for the reasons that (1) we reverse the case at bar on other grounds and remand for a new trial; (2) the parties and trial judge in the instant case did not have the benefit of the Batson decision when the alleged peremptory challenge improprieties occurred; and (3) with Batson now controlling, it is highly unlikely that this issue will recur on retrial.

Defendant next contends that it was error for the trial court to admit his confession because the police failed to inform him while he was in custody at the Des Plaines police station that his attorney, Anthony Rocco, had called the station in an effort to contact him. At the pretrial hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his confession, Assistant State's Attorney Ira Raphaelson testified for the State that he arrived at the Des Plaines police station between 1 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. and that he interviewed the defendant at about 2 p.m. Assistant State's Attorney Howard Friedman and Officer John Meese were also present at this interview. Raphaelson testified that he told the defendant that he and Friedman were not Public Defenders and that he informed the defendant of his Miranda rights. According to Raphaelson, defendant responded that he understood his rights and was willing to talk. Raphaelson further testified that at about 2:30, he, Officer Meese and Assistant State's Attorney Friedman had a second conversation with the defendant, during which time the defendant gave a confession of his involvement in the offenses.

Raphaelson testified that he did not talk to defendant's attorney, Anthony Rocco, until after the defendant confessed and that it was about 3 p.m. when he talked to Rocco on the telephone. Raphaelson testified that Rocco told him "that he had something to do with the family of Daniel Holland," and wanted to know what charges were being filed against his client. Raphaelson told Rocco that he "was not free to divulge that information," and that no decision had...

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7 cases
  • Holland v. Illinois
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 22 Enero 1990
    ......202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965): .           "[The peremptory challenge] is often exercised . . . on grounds normally thought irrelevant to legal proceedings or official action, namely, the race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations of people summoned for jury duty. For the question a prosecutor or defense counsel must decide is not whether a juror of a particular race or nationality is in fact partial, but whether one from a different group is less likely to be." Id., at 220-221, 85 S.Ct., at 836 (citation ......
  • US ex rel. Holland v. McGinnis
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • 12 Febrero 1991
    ......The defendant did not have a valid driver's license. He was taken to the Schiller Park police station where a hunting knife, the complainant's high school identification card and $58.80 were taken from him. .          People v. Holland, 147 Ill.App.3d 323, 324-26, 100 Ill.Dec. 868, 870-71, 497 N.E.2d 1230, 1232-33 (1st Dist.1986). .         The Illinois Appellate Court reversed Holland's conviction. It found, among other things, that: (1) failure of the police to notify Holland that his attorney had attempted ......
  • State v. Stoddard
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Connecticut
    • 2 Febrero 1988
    ......168] rights of a suspect merely by diligently intervening in the proceeding. People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d . Page 453 . 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979); People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 ...Houston, supra, 42 Cal.3d at 610, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal.Rptr. 141; Weber v. State, supra, 685; People v. Holland, 147 Ill.App.3d 323, 497 N.E.2d 1230, 1237 (1986); State v. Matthews, supra, 1278; Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 291, 450 N.E.2d 566 ......
  • People v. Holland
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 21 Diciembre 1987
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