Michael v. Ghee

• Decision Date: 10 August 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-3595.,06-3595.
• Citation: 498 F.3d 372
• Parties: Dennis MICHAEL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Margarette GHEE, Chairperson, Ohio Adult Parole Authority, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

498 F.3d 372

Dennis MICHAEL, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Margarette GHEE, Chairperson, Ohio Adult Parole Authority, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 06-3595.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: June 1, 2007.

Decided and Filed: August 10, 2007.

ARGUED: Leonard W. Yelsky, Yelsky & Lonardo, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Todd R. Marti, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Leonard W. Yelsky, Norman L. Sirak, Yelsky & Lonardo, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellants. Todd R. Marti, Office of the Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellees.

Before: MOORE and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges; McKINLEY, District Judge.^*

OPINION

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs, inmates in Ohio correctional facilities who were sentenced prior to Ohio's enactment of a revised sentencing system on July 1, 1996, appeal the district court's order granting defendants' motion for dismissal and for summary judgment. Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in dismissing their state law claims, and in entering summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiffs' claims arising under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.

Under Ohio's former sentencing law, Ohio inmates were given an indeterminate sentence comprised of a minimum and a maximum sentence. An inmate became eligible for parole after serving his or her minimum sentence, minus credit for good behavior. Parole decisions were delegated to the Ohio Adult Parole Authority ("OAPA"). It determined when release was appropriate for each inmate. In 1995, Ohio adopted a new sentencing system for crimes committed after July 1, 1996. See OHIO REV.CODE § 5120 et seq. Under the new law, indeterminate sentences were abandoned in favor of fixed terms of incarceration determined by the defendant's presiding judge. The new system does not apply retroactively to Ohio inmates sentenced under the former sentencing scheme. OHIO REV.CODE § 5120.021(A).

In 1998, the OAPA adopted guidelines designed to guide the discretion of parole officers making release determinations for Ohio inmates sentenced prior to July 1, 1996. The guidelines are similar to the guidelines used by the United States Parole Commission, using two factors to determine how long a prisoner should be incarcerated before parole: (1) the seriousness of the inmate's crime, and (2) the "risk of reoffense," based on the inmate's prior criminal conduct and performance on probation and parole. The presumptive amount of time an inmate serves is determined by finding the intersection on a grid between the inmate's offense category and his or her risk of reoffense. Parole officials, however, retain discretion to depart from the guidelines, but may not retain an inmate beyond the maximum sentence. See OHIO REV.CODE § 2967.03 (describing the OAPA's broad discretionary powers).

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the Lucas County (OH) Court of Common Pleas on July 20, 2001, challenging the OAPA's practices, procedures, and proceedings.¹ In their amended complaint brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiffs contend that the lack of retroactivity of the new sentencing scheme and the implementation of the 1998 guidelines violate the Ex Post Facto, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution, as well as various provisions of state law.

Defendants, various members of the OAPA, and the Ohio Parole Board (collectively "defendants" or "the State") removed this case to federal court. On February 1, 2006, the district court, 411 F.Supp.2d 813, granted the State's motion for dismissal and summary judgment. The court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide for a cause of action for violations of state law and, accordingly, dismissed plaintiffs' state law claims pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). The court entered summary judgment in favor of the State on plaintiffs' federal constitutional claims, holding that plaintiffs' due process claims fail for lack of a liberty interest, that plaintiffs' equal protection claims fail under a rational basis review, and that the Ex Post Facto Clause does not apply to the OAPA's adoption of the 1998 guidelines. This timely appeal followed.

II.

First, plaintiffs challenge the district court's dismissal of their four causes of action that arise under Ohio state law. The district court dismissed each of these causes of action for failure to state a claim, pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6), because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not provide relief for a violation of state law. In so holding, the district court relied on this court's opinion in Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 887 F.2d 710, 714 (6th Cir.1989). Plaintiffs dispute the district court's reliance on Huron Valley, and argue that the court's dismissal runs counter to the Supreme Court's holding in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005). Plaintiffs' arguments are without merit, and the district court's dismissal of claims one through four is affirmed.

In their first cause of action, entitled "Abuse of Discretion," plaintiffs claim that the new sentencing guidelines were never submitted to the Joint Committee on Agency Rule Review pursuant to OHIO REV. CODE § 111.15(D) and that the State did not satisfy the procedure for adopting the guidelines as set forth in OHIO REV.CODE § 119.03.

In their second cause of action, entitled "Arbitrary and Capricious Decision Making," plaintiffs cite OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-1-07, and claim that "[r]endering decisions without fully disclosing eligibility criteria is akin to deviating from fixed rules and rendering decisions predicated upon unknown rules. This practice constitutes arbitrary and capricious decision-making." Under this cause of action, plaintiffs claim further that Policy 501-36, which the OAPA adopted on December 22, 2000, and — argues plaintiffs — makes consideration of the factors set forth in OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5120:1-1-07(C) discretionary, contravenes OHIO REV.CODE § 2967.03.

In their third cause of action, entitled "Separation of Powers," plaintiffs claim that because the parole board has the discretion to retain inmates past the expiration of their minimum sentence date, the parole board exceeds the scope of its state constitutional powers.

In their fourth cause of action, entitled "Bad Faith," plaintiffs claim that the parole board has breached its duty to give every inmate a meaningful parole hearing. Plaintiffs contend that "[p]romulgating [the] New Guidelines and Policy 501-36 to extend the sentences of Old Law inmates, thereby extending their own careers and delaying the eventual demise of the Parole Board, constitutes an ulterior motive." Each cause of action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The district court properly dismissed these claims. "Section 1983 . . . authorizes courts to redress violations of `rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and [federal] laws' that occur under color of state law. `The statute is thus limited to deprivations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. It does not cover official conduct that allegedly violates state law.'" Neinast v. Bd. of Trs. of the Columbus Metro. Library, 346 F.3d 585, 597 (6th Cir.2003) (quoting Huron Valley Hosp., 887 F.2d at 714). In the amended complaint, plaintiffs have invoked only state statutory authority for each of these claims.² On appeal, plaintiffs have not identified any federal law or constitutional provision that is implicated by these claims. In short, plaintiffs have not offered any recognized argument that the district court erred in construing these claims as state claims.

Nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that the district court's reliance on Huron Valley is misplaced. Plaintiffs contend that Huron Valley stands for the proposition that a plaintiff may properly challenge an established state procedure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs are correct that they may raise a challenge to an established state procedure pursuant to § 1983, but only to the extent that the challenge invokes federal statutory or constitutional rights. In Huron Valley, we noted explicitly that § 1983 may not be used as a vehicle to challenge "official conduct that allegedly violates state law." Huron Valley, 887 F.2d at 714. Thus, Huron Valley allows plaintiffs to raise their due process claim through § 1983; it does not provide that plaintiffs have stated a viable claim under § 1983 in their allegations of violations of Ohio state law.

Likewise, the Supreme Court's consideration of the revised Ohio parole procedures in Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 125 S.Ct. 1242, 161 L.Ed.2d 253 (2005), does not support plaintiffs' position. In Dotson, the Court held that state prisoners challenging the constitutionality of state parole procedures are not limited to seeking relief exclusively under the federal habeas corpus statutes, but may also file their challenge pursuant to § 1983. Dotson, 544 U.S. at 82, 125 S.Ct. 1242. However, Dotson involved federal constitutional challenges to the Ohio parole procedures only and is silent as to whether state prisoners may raise state statutory and constitutional claims under § 1983. Id. at 76, 125 S.Ct. 1242.

Plaintiffs also argue that the district court erroneously relied upon evidence offered by defendants to rebut plaintiffs' separation-of-powers claims. In dismissing plaintiffs' state law claims, however, the district court did not refer to any evidence offered by defendants. Rather, it found that each cause of action was an allegation solely under state law that may not be brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, plaintiffs' argument is without merit, and the district court's dismissal of these claims is affirmed.

III.

Plaintiffs also challenge the district court's dismissal of their bad faith claim. On December 18, 2002, the Ohio Supreme Court decided ...