498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007), 06-3517, United States v. Warner

Citation498 F.3d 666
Party NameUNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Lawrence E. WARNER and George H. Ryan, Sr., Defendants-Appellants.
Case DateAugust 21, 2007
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 666

498 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2007)

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Lawrence E. WARNER and George H. Ryan, Sr., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 06-3517, 06-3528.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit

Aug. 21, 2007 [*]

Argued Feb. 20, 2007.

Opinion Published Sept. 6, 2007.

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Stuart D. Fullerton, Patrick Collins (argued), Edmond E. Chang, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Marc W. Martin (argued), Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Dan K. Webb, Winston & Strawn, Chicago, IL, Gene C. Schaerr (argued), Winston & Strawn, Washington, DC, for George H. Ryan, Defendant-Appellant.

Before MANION, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

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WOOD, Circuit Judge.

This appeal comes to us after an investigation that lasted for years and a jury trial that lasted more than six months. In the end, the two defendants, former Illinois Governor George H. Ryan, Sr., and his associate Lawrence E. Warner, were convicted on various criminal charges. The case attracted a great deal of public attention, and thus the district court handling the trial had to handle a number of problems, some of which were common and others less so. The fact that the trial may not have been picture-perfect is, in itself, nothing unusual. The Supreme Court has observed more than once that "taking into account the reality of the human fallibility of the participants, there can be no such thing as an error-free, perfect trial, and ... the Constitution does not guarantee such a trial." United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 445, 106 S.Ct. 725, 88 L.Ed.2d 814 (1986) (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)). It is our job, in this as in any other criminal appeal, to decide whether any of the court's rulings so impaired the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that the only permissible remedy is a new trial.

Defendants Warner and Ryan raise eight grounds on appeal, six of them common and one argument unique to each. Their primary emphasis is on specific issues about the jury. They contend that the verdict was tainted by jurors' use of extraneous legal materials. They characterize the dismissal of a juror as an "arbitrary removal of a defense holdout." They object to the substitution of jurors after deliberations had begun. They also raise claims unrelated to the jury, including the arguments that the exclusion of certain evidence was an "erroneous exclusion of exculpatory evidence," that the prosecution failed to identify an "enterprise" for purposes of its charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1962, and that the mail fraud charges were grounded in an "unconstitutionally vague criminal statute," see 18 U.S.C. § 1346. Warner additionally objects to the joinder of his trial with Ryan's, and Ryan argues that certain grand jury testimony violated his attorney-client privilege.

Some potential issues, we note, are not before us. The defendants do not argue that the problems with the jury had a cumulative, prejudicial effect, even though they made this argument in their motion for a new trial before the district court. Nor do they claim that the evidence was insufficient to support any of the charges on which they were convicted. Rather, their appeal is focused on particular alleged procedural and legal errors. As we would in any case, we review only those issues presented to this court. We conclude that the district court handled most problems that arose in an acceptable manner, and that whatever error remained was harmless. We therefore affirm the convictions.

I

The facts of this case are well-known, and so we recite only what is necessary to understand the issues on appeal. In December 2003, a grand jury returned a 22-count indictment against Warner and Ryan. After a lengthy trial, on April 17, 2006, a jury found Warner and Ryan guilty on all counts. On September 18, 2006, the district court set aside the jury's verdict with respect to two separate mail fraud counts against Ryan and then entered judgment against both defendants on the remaining counts. The court sentenced Warner to 41 months' imprisonment and Ryan to 78 months' imprisonment. The defendants both filed timely notices of appeal on September 20, 2006.

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The story behind this case began in November 1990 when Ryan, then the Lieutenant Governor of Illinois, won election as Illinois's Secretary of State. He was re-elected to that post in 1994. Throughout Ryan's two terms in that office, Warner was one of Ryan's closest unpaid advisors. One of Ryan's duties as Secretary of State was to award leases and contracts for the office, using a process of competitive bidding for major contracts and selecting leases based on the staff's assessments of multiple options. Improprieties in awarding four leases and three contracts form the basis of the majority of the RICO and mail fraud counts against Warner and Ryan, as these leases and contracts were steered improperly to Warner-controlled entities. The result was hundreds of thousands of dollars in benefits for Warner and Ryan. These benefits included financial support for Ryan's successful 1998 campaign for Governor of Illinois.

Prospective jurors for the trial in this case filled out a 110-question, 33-page form, which covered among many other topics the subjects of their criminal and litigation histories, their knowledge of the investigation of Ryan, and their awareness of Ryan's positions on public issues. Counsel for all parties and the court reviewed the questionnaires for four days; voir dire consumed another six days. The district court seated 12 jurors and eight alternates. The trial lasted six months. The prosecution presented approximately 80 witnesses against the defendants. In the end, the evidence supporting the jury's verdict was overwhelming. We give only a few examples here from the extensive record that was created. To begin with, the evidence showed that Ryan steered an $850,000 four-year Secretary of State's office lease to Warner for a property that Warner had recently purchased for just $200,000. Ryan took regular Jamaican vacations paid for by a currency-exchange owner to whom Ryan later steered a $500,000 six-year Secretary of State's office lease. Ryan took a Mexican vacation paid for by an individual to whom Ryan later steered another Secretary of State's office lease and a lobbying contract worth nearly $200,000 for virtually no work. Warner received more than $800,000 for helping a company land a major Secretary of State's office contract without registering as a lobbyist and added another of Ryan's friends into the arrangement at Ryan's request before the contract was awarded. Finally, and remarkably, despite evidence showing that they were enjoying a very nice lifestyle, Ryan's and his wife's total withdrawals from their bank accounts averaged less than $700 per year for ten years.

The jury retired on March 13, 2006. This jury deliberated for eight days. During their deliberations, the jurors were allowed occasional breaks so that some jurors could smoke outside. At the same times, some of the other jurors would go outside for fresh air or walk up and down the courthouse stairwells for exercise. No one formally objected to the court about these activities. On at least one occasion, the court noted that the jurors were accompanied by court personnel when on breaks. Putting media accounts and testimony that the district court discredited to one side, there is no basis in the record to conclude that any deliberations took place when the jurors were separated from one another.

It was not long before problems arose. On Monday, March 20, 2006, Juror Ezell sent the court a note, also signed by the foreperson, complaining that other jurors were calling her derogatory names and shouting profanities. The court conferred with counsel and responded with a note instructing the jurors to treat one another "with dignity and respect." Two days later, the court received a note from Juror

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Losacco signed by seven other jurors, asking if Juror Ezell could be excused because she was refusing to engage in meaningful discourse and was behaving in a physically aggressive manner. The court again conferred with counsel, noting that "[Losacco] has not told us anything about the way the jury stands on the merits. She really has not." The next morning the court responded with a note, which began "You twelve are the jurors selected to decide this case." The note then reiterated that the jurors were to treat each other with respect and reminded them of their duties.

On the eighth day of deliberations, a few hours after the court responded to the Losacco note, media reports surfaced claiming that one of the jurors had given untruthful answers on the initial juror questionnaire regarding his criminal history. The court stopped the jury's deliberations while it looked into the new allegations, After a background check confirmed that Juror Pavlick had not disclosed a felony DUI conviction and a misdemeanor reckless conduct conviction, the court questioned him individually. The court asked counsel if there would be any objection to dismissing Pavlick. Neither the prosecutor nor Ryan's counsel voiced any objection when Warner's counsel moved to dismiss Pavlick or when the court granted that motion.

It turned out that Juror Ezell's record was also problematic. A background check turned up seven criminal arrests, an outstanding warrant for driving on a suspended license, and an arrest under a false name, "Thora Jones." The fingerprints of the "Thora Jones" arrestee...

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4 books & journal articles
  • Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 52 No. 4, September 2015
    • 22 Septiembre 2015
    ...abrogated on other grounds by Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 1986). (99.) See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 696 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the State of Illinois fits within the definition of "enterprise" for purposes of RICO). (100.) See United States v.......
  • Bringing RICO to the ring: can the anti-mafia weapon target dogfighters?
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 89 No. 1, December 2011
    • 1 Diciembre 2011
    ...Ill. 2006) (upholding RICO convictions premised on providing support to foreign terrorist organization). (199.) United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 696 (7th Cir. 2007) (upholding RICO conviction against former Illinois Governor George Ryan, Sr., and an advisor for selling public licenses......
  • Racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations.
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 48 No. 2, March 2011
    • 22 Marzo 2011
    ...beauty college approved for veterans' vocational training by Veterans Administration an enterprise). (89.) See United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 696 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that the State of Illinois fits within the definition of "enterprise" for purposes of RICO). (90.) See United St......
  • Pre-trial prejudice 2.0: how YouTube generated news coverage is set to complicate the concepts of pre-trial prejudice doctrine and endanger Sixth Amendment fair trial rights.
    • United States
    • The Journal of High Technology Law Vol. 10 No. 2, July 2010
    • 1 Julio 2010
    ...90 F.3d 490, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding extraneous information must affect the facts of trial in context); United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding extraneous information must be in context with facts presented at trial to show prejudice result); Commonwealth v......

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