Perez v. Sugarman

• Citation: 499 F.2d 761
• Decision Date: 07 June 1974
• Docket Number: No. 202,Docket 73-1790.,202
• Parties: Paulina PEREZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jule M. SUGARMAN et al., Defendants, and New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home of Peekskill, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

499 F.2d 761 (1974)

Paulina PEREZ et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Jule M. SUGARMAN et al., Defendants, and New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home of Peekskill, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 202, Docket 73-1790.

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

Argued December 3, 1974.

Decided June 7, 1974.

Lisa H. Blitman, George C. Stewart, Napoleon B. Williams, New York City, for plaintiffs-appellants.

Frederick J. Magovern, Bodell, Gross & Magovern, New York City, for defendants-appellees.

Before WATERMAN and FEINBERG, Circuit Judges, and GURFEIN, District Judge.^*

WATERMAN, Circuit Judge:

This is a civil rights suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four individual defendants, all of whom are employed by the municipality of New York City, and two private child-caring institutions, New York Foundling Hospital and St. Joseph's Home for Children. The complaint alleges deprivations of the constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In the district court below the two institutional defendants moved to dismiss the complaint as against them on the grounds, inter alia, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court, Metzner, J., apparently assuming arguendo that subject matter jurisdiction existed, first dismissed the complaint, but only to the extent that it was based on alleged denials of equal protection, against the institutional defendants upon the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Judge Metzner then dismissed the entire complaint against the private institutions for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. We do not disturb the district court's dismissal of the complaint insofar as the complaint alleges equal protection violations.¹ We hold, however, that the lower court had subject matter jurisdiction and, accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and order the complaint reinstated against the defendants-appellees herein except to the extent that it rests on alleged denials of equal protection.

The gravamen of the complaint is an alleged unlawful and unconstitutional detention of appellant² Perez's children. Although the allegations are unclear at some points in describing what specific acts were performed by which particular defendants, the complaint does disclose the general sequence of events concerning which the plaintiff complains. In late December 1969, plaintiff-appellant suddenly became ill and was transported to a hospital by ambulance. During the period of her hospitalization appellant's children came into the custody of New York City child welfare officials. The children were subsequently placed by the city with the two private institutional defendants herein. Following her release from the hospital appellant began to request the return of her children, but the defendants refused to surrender custody.

The complaint states that it was not until March of 1972 that the defendant city officials made any attempt to obtain a court order to attest to the validity of their detention of appellant's children. Even then, the neglect proceeding filed by the city in the Family Court was apparently instituted only in response to a petition filed by appellant in New York Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, in which she sought return of her children. In short, appellant's complaint alleges that these children were removed by the city and then detained by the defendant institutions for well over two years without the parent's consent or without benefit of either a court order protecting the detention or benefit of a hearing of any kind whatsoever. The complaint also alleges that the institutional defendants were cognizant of the fact that there had been no hearing and that there had been neither a court order authorizing institutional custody nor consent of the parent agreeing to it.³

42 U.S.C. § 1983, the provision of law upon which this lawsuit is predicated, is apposite only when the person against whom the provision is invoked has acted "under color of" law. It is well-established that this jurisdictional prerequisite is congruent to the "state action" concept. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n. 7, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966); United States v. Wiseman, 445 F.2d 792, 794 (2 Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 967, 92 S.Ct. 346, 30 L.Ed.2d 287 (1971).⁴ In this case the appellee institutions, concededly private in nature, contend that their actions in detaining the appellant's children do not constitute "state action" but rather the action of private parties wholly without the purview of Section 1983. For the reasons developed below, we disagree, and we conclude that under the circumstances here the actions of the institutional defendants did constitute "state action" and therefore the district court had subject matter jurisdiction.

As a general rule, the proscriptions of the Fourteenth Amendment do not extend to private conduct. But "conduct that is formally `private' may become so entwined with governmental policies or so impregnated with a governmental character as to become subject to the constitutional limitations placed upon state action." Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 488, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966). While the numerous cases which have grappled with the concept of "state action" have reached widely disparate results, this apparent disarray is to be expected since "only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances of each case can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722, 81 S.Ct. 856, 860, 6 L.Ed.2d 45 (1961); accord, Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-300, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966); Male v. Crossroads Associates, 469 F.2d 616, 620 (2 Cir. 1972). When we "sift the facts" and "weigh the circumstances" before us here, we conclude that the acts of the private institutions of which appellant complains were "under color of" state law.

In certain instances the actions of private entities may be considered to be infused with "state action" if those private parties are performing a function public or governmental in nature and which would have to be performed by the Government but for the activities of the private parties. See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932); United States v. Wiseman, supra. For example, in United States v. Wiseman, supra, we held that the acts of private process servers there constituted "state action" despite the fact that the servers were not technically state employees. The rationale of that decision was that the function which these people performed was one "essentially and traditionally" public. Similarly, in Evans v. Newton, supra, the operation of a municipal park was considered essentially public in nature, irrespective of whether the parties supervising the operations of the park were private persons or public officials. In accepting and retaining custody of children alleged to have been "neglected" or "abandoned," child-caring institutions of the type we have in this case perform a "public function." Any doubt that this function is a public one is dispelled by even a cursory reading of Section 395 of the New York Social Services Law (McKinney Supp.1972) (NYSSL), which declares that government officials "shall be responsible for the welfare of children who are in need of public assistance and care, support and protection . . . ." In fulfilling this responsibility, however, the State may provide direct assistance or, should it so choose, the State may act "through an authorized agency." Id. Both institutional defendants herein lie within the statutory definition of "authorized agency." See NYSSL § 371(10). Thus, the statutory scheme expressly contemplates that in performing this public function of caring for children the State may utilize private entities of the sort we have here.⁵ This is precisely what the city welfare officials did when they transferred appellant's children to the care of the institutional defendants. But, as the statute makes incontrovertibly clear, it is the State which in effect is providing the care through the private institutions. This exercise of the administrative placing prerogative does not affect in any way the State's ultimate responsibility for the well-being of the children, and, consequently, the public nature of the function being performed.

We need not rely solely on the "public function" theory, however, to support our conclusion that "state action" exists. The comprehensive statutory regulatory scheme of the New York Social Services Law is persuasive, perhaps compelling, evidence of the degree to which the State has insinuated itself into the actions of the private defendants here. As we have already indicated, the statute makes the State bear responsibility for the care of all children in need of assistance. NYSSL § 395. The pervasiveness of the state control over cooperating private institutions is disclosed by further inquiry. Section 371(10) requires that any child-caring institution desiring to qualify as an "authorized agency" must be incorporated in New York and must consent to be approved, visited, inspected, and supervised by the State "as to any and all acts in relation to the welfare of the children" it receives from the State. Public Welfare officials have the power to place children only in those institutions which are "visited, inspected and supervised by the board and conducted in conformity with the rules of such board." Id. § 398, subd. 6...